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Abstract 
A large body of academic research has developed regarding the prevalence of social 
media in society, and its impact. Previous research has delved into this topic from the 
perspective of psychology, business administration, sociology, politics, law, and media 
communication studies. One common thread among many that can be found in a large 
number of these academic endeavours is the attempt to evaluate the manner in which social 
media impacts norms, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours.  
This thesis investigates this same topic through an analysis of rural citizens in Egypt in 
the period between 2011 and 2015. The main topic addressed in this thesis is the impact of 
the new media environment, specifically the synergy between social media and satellite 
television, on the public sphere and political interactions of rural Egypt, with the aim of 
assessing the role social media played in the neglected areas of Egypt during the 2011 
uprisings. To do this, this thesis addresses (i) the effect of social capital on the political 
interaction of citizens in the public sphere with a consideration of social media access, (ii) 
how social media changed individual norms of political interaction within the public sphere 
of rural Egypt during and after 2011 due to convergence with television media, and (iii) how 
media coverage of the uprisings impacted micro public spheres and sentiments of 
empowerment and social capital in rural Egypt. 
It is found that rural Egypt contributed significantly to the 2011 uprisings, and their 2013 
counterparts. Social capital among the rural population is shown to have had a marked effect 
on the development of the 2011 uprisings, as well as their success. Through primary research 
and supporting data, it is shown that there were four distinct stages of media use during the 
period of the 2011 uprisings that, when analysed, highlight that social media could not have 
been the primary determinant of the uprisings and their aftermath. While social media did 
play a role, it was not the driving factor behind the uprisings. Issues such as economic, 
linguistic, and infrastructural barriers prevented social media penetration from being 
significant enough to be the driving force it has been considered by some academics. 
Moreover, the state’s decision to cut Internet access early on in the timeline of the uprisings 
highlight that other factors were at play. Finally, the four stages of media contribution bring 
to light the expansion of rural Egypt’s social capital during this time, and show that this 
played a stronger role than had been previously thought when evaluating the 2011 uprisings. 
As such, other factors - social capital, interaction norms, and the public sphere - are 
evaluated given the findings on social media’s role.  
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1. Introduction 
The prevalence of social media in society has brought with it a body of academic 
research in fields as diverse as psychology, business, sociology, politics, law, and 
- in the case of this thesis - media communication studies. As social media and 
digital platforms become more firmly entrenched into societal norms, the 
question of their effect on these societies will become more significant. This 
question is, of course, already being addressed and researched. Scholars such as 
Henry Jenkins, Manuel Castells, and Tarik Elseewi, among others, have 
investigated the impact of the Internet, digital media, and social media on society, 
and their interactions with other forms of media. For some scholars, such as in 
Jenkins’ works (2006) or in this particular thesis, this research may be to 
highlight the interactions between traditional forms of media and the new media 
forms that have arisen. Other scholars may be more interested in an analysis of 
new forms of media in a specific situation, for a specific purpose, or at a specific 
time (Elseewi, 2011). In any case, the research of these scholars - and the 
continued commitment in academia to uncover social media’s impact - highlights 
the significance of the topic. One common thread among many that can be found 
in a number of these academic endeavours is the attempt to evaluate the manner 
in which social media impacts norms, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. 
Interaction norms, social norms, individual norms, and political norms have all 
been assessed in light of the ubiquity of social media, as well as the relationship 
between social media and more traditional forms of media. As such, this is a 
central concern, especially given the potential for political, economic, and social 
outcomes to be influenced.  
The aim of this thesis is not to provide an answer to the question of social 
media’s impact in the abstract, or to deal with all circumstances of social media 
use, for all purposes. Rather, the aim is to investigate a narrow slice of this field - 
the effect of social media on interaction norms - within a narrower circumstance: 
rural citizens in Egypt in the period preceding the 2011 uprisings, during the 
period of the 2011 uprisings, and during its aftermath up to 2015. It is important 
to note that, unlike the scholars previously mentioned, this thesis deals with the 
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interaction that exists between traditional forms of media and social media during 
the period between 2011 and 2015, rather than social media only. 
In any case, the period being discussed (2011-2015) is a period of particular 
significance, for the purpose of this study, for a number of reasons. First, digital 
and social media were considered primary features of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt 
and other uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa in the period 
dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’. As a result, news reporting in the aftermath of the 
uprisings considered that social media was pivotal to the execution of the 2011 
Egyptian uprising and that the opportunities it provided regarding communication 
and collaboration were largely responsible for the uprisings’ success (Gustin, 
2011). In fact, the uprisings have commonly been referred to as examples of a 
‘Social Media Revolution’, or a “Revolution [that] began on Facebook” (Vargas, 
2012). These claims, however, provide an incomplete picture of the 2011 
uprisings and the ten-year period which preceded it. First, it must be noted that 
revolutions and civil uprisings have occurred - in both world history and the 
history of Egypt - prior to the advent and ubiquity of social media. Second, this 
claim may not take into consideration a vast number of indicators and socio-
political considerations regarding Egypt in the years preceding the 2011 
uprisings, including the rates of offline political engagement, the history of 
protesting in rural regions, the importance of social capital and societal ties, and 
infrastructural and economic barriers to social media use, among others. The most 
significant of these considerations is the role of rural citizens. This is a topic 
which, perhaps, has not received as much consideration as it is due. This is not 
uncommon and, in this case, may be due to a number of concerns. One of these 
concerns is general; studies have highlighted that intellectuals, especially within 
the social sciences, have a tendency to focus their attention on the elite or middle 
class, on the centre of the demonstrations and on political authorities (Kabbanji, 
2011). Given that the majority of Egypt’s population is rural, however, this focus 
may provide an incomplete image of events. The second concern may be the 
difficulty in accessing these areas; safety concerns, as well as the openness of 
individuals in these areas, may prevent access or the level of engagement and 
interaction needed for a study to be accomplished. Lila Abu-Lughod, an 
anthropologist at Columbia University in New York, discusses this aspect of 
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researching outside urban areas in her book, entitled Veiled Sentiments; the book, 
an investigation of gender relations and oral lyric poetry in a Bedouin community 
in Egypt’s Western Desert, necessitated a lengthy stay in a bedouin household 
(Abu-Lughod, 1986). However, regardless of the reasons why, the claim that the 
2011 uprisings were dependent on social media - and that the communicative and 
collaborative opportunities it provided were pivotal to its success - is a claim that 
deserves academic research. As such, the role of social media in Egypt during 
2011 is a subject of academic significance.  
In order to successfully approach this subject, three areas will need to be 
considered: (i) the role of social media in relation to its effect on political 
interaction and interaction norms in rural Egypt; (ii) the role of social capital in 
terms of its effect on political interaction among rural Egyptians in the public 
sphere, taking into consideration the state of rural interaction with social media; 
and (iii) the effect of media coverage on the uprisings in rural Egypt, in terms of 
the media’s role in invigorating micro-public spheres and contributing to the 
strengthening of social capital in rural Egypt. Through an analysis of these three 
areas, this thesis will examine the impact of the new media environment, 
specifically the synergy between social media and satellite television, on the 
public sphere and political interactions of rural Egypt in order to assess the role 
social media played in neglected areas of Egypt during the 2011 uprisings. The 
‘new media environment’ in this sense can be defined as the media environment 
wherein there is convergence between social and traditional forms of media such 
as television, radio, and newspapers. New media, on the other hand, refers 
primarily to media that was brought about recently due to the increased level of 
connectivity that has arisen due to the Internet and a more globalized landscape; 
examples of this include social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, as 
well as other online applications such Youtube and Whatsapp. To a lesser degree, 
satellite television can also be classified as new media since it is a new method of 
providing a traditional form of media. 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, each of which deals with a particular 
aspect of this study. The first chapter provides contextual information that acts as 
a necessary background. This includes a brief overview of rural Egypt, and a 
breakdown of the rural regions that are studied in-depth through interviews - 
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Qalyoubia, Menoufia, Minya, and South Sinai. Moreover, this chapter delves into 
formal and informal political participation, highlighting the distinction between 
them as well as the manner in which they exist in Egypt during the period 
discussed. This is followed by a brief topline view of the barriers that exist to 
social media use in rural Egypt, and a historical summary of the relationship 
between traditional media (primarily television, and news journalism) and the 
state. 
This chapter will be followed by a review of the relevant literature regarding 
the Egyptian media, political interaction, and other academic research of 
significance to this study. This chapter will address the political context of the 
Egyptian media system, public sphere theory, agenda setting theory, relevant 
studies and practical examples relating to social media, convergence theory and 
the manner in which private, state, and international broadcasting proved 
significant in 2011, and the concept of social capital. In essence, this chapter will 
provide an overview of relevant scholarly research of significance for the purpose 
of this study and its objectives regarding the investigation of social media, 
political interaction, and rural Egypt; as such, this chapter investigates previous 
academic research in order to provide a scholarly overview in a similar manner to 
which the first chapter provided a contextual overview.  
Following this, Chapter 3 will focus on methodology. In this chapter, a review 
will be conducted of the research methodology adopted in the collection and 
analysis of data relating to Egypt’s media environment, before and after the 
uprisings. The methodology of a study defines the specific stages in which the 
researcher will obtain data relevant to the research objectives (Thomas, 2011). 
The stages of conducting the study involve selection of a suitable sample size, 
data collection, and data analysis which culminates in the presentation of 
findings. This is central to the study, since it determines the accuracy of the 
conclusions of all subsequent chapters. This chapter will address the reasoning 
behind the chosen methodology, its impact on the results, the way it may aid or 
limit the research, and any ethical considerations that arise as a result of the 
methodology chosen. 
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Having discussed all relevant contextual, theoretical, and methodological 
considerations, the subsequent three chapters will each be focused solely on the 
aim of this thesis: the investigation and analysis of the new media environment’s 
effect on the public sphere and political interactions of rural Egypt, taking into 
consideration the synergy between social media and satellite television, in order 
to assess the role social media played in rural Egypt during the 2011 uprisings. As 
such, these chapters will discuss the results of this thesis. To do so, each of these 
three chapters will discuss one specific aspect of this overall aim. Chapter 4 will 
address whether social media changed political interaction norms in the public 
sphere in rural Egypt during and after 2011 due to its convergence with television 
media. This will include a consideration of the media’s contribution during 
different stages of the 2011 uprisings, protest patterns in rural Egypt before and 
during the 2011 uprisings, mobilisation and demobilisation frames during the 
same period, and offline and online activism or political interaction during the 
2011 uprisings. Chapter 5 will focus on how social capital in rural Egypt affected 
the political interaction of citizens in the public sphere, taking into consideration 
social media access and the circumstances surrounding it. In this chapter, analysis 
of this question will be conducted through a consideration of the unique example 
of social capital that exists in rural Egypt and the reasons surrounding its 
existence, the impact of rural Egypt’s social capital on formal and informal 
political interaction norms, the forms of political participation that existed in the 
period preceding the 2011 uprisings as well as during and after the uprisings, as 
well as the manner in which social capital and social media interact. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will address the extent to which the media coverage of the uprisings in 
rural Egypt invigorated micro-public spheres and contributed to empowerment 
and building social capital in rural areas. This chapter will include a discussion of 
the media background after the 2011 uprisings and in the build-up to the 2013 
uprisings to oust the Muslim Brotherhood regime, social media usage after the 
2011 uprisings and its significance in 2013, changing norms in relation to social 
capital and the public sphere in rural Egypt, and the impact of the 2011 uprisings 
on the electoral framework.  
These chapters will together highlight the extent to which social media 
affected rural citizens of Egypt in the 2011 uprisings, the extent to which social 
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media was a driving factor for these uprisings, as well as the manner in which 
social interacted with the new media environment, traditional media, the state, the 
citizens and their political interactions and interaction norms. Given the fact that 
rural Egyptians constitute over half of Egypt’s population, and the fact that they 
are an understudied group in this context, this thesis will address the above 
factors through the lens of the rural citizens, their relationship to traditional news, 
the state, social media, political participation, and the new media environment. 
This does not mean that urban citizens will not be discussed. However, the focus 
will be on rural citizens; reference to urban citizens will be used throughout for 
comparative purposes, or in order to highlight a distinction between them and 
their rural counterparts.  
Of course, this thesis and its findings do not exist in isolation. The findings 
here exist in conversation with a variety of scholars and researchers with 
specializations in convergence, agenda setting, political interaction, media and 
communication, and sociology. Without the body of scholarship that exists from 
previous researchers and academics, this thesis would not have the theoretical, 
methodological, and contextual underpinnings that act as its foundation. As such, 
the opinions, findings, and considerations of these researchers will be used 
throughout this study - in conjunction with the primary research conducted - in 
order to evaluate the assertions made throughout. In this manner, a conclusion 
will be reached regarding the impact of the new media environment, specifically 
the synergy between social media and satellite television, on the public sphere 
and political interactions of rural Egypt in order to assess the role social media 
played in neglected areas of Egypt during the 2011 uprisings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
2. Chapter 1 - Contextual Background 
The 2011 Egyptian uprisings began a period of political, cultural, and social 
change within Egypt. These changes have affected interaction norms, technology 
usage, and media reliance and organization. As such, an evaluation of an event as 
politically significant as the 2011 Egyptian uprisings necessarily requires an 
understanding of the context in which the event occurred, and the background 
from which it sprang. This thesis addresses three primary areas in relation to 
political interaction in rural Egypt during the period between 2011 and 2015: (i) 
the role of social media in relation to its effect on political interaction and 
interaction norms in rural Egypt; (ii) the role of social capital in terms of its effect 
on political interaction among rural Egyptians in the public sphere, taking into 
consideration the state of rural interaction with social media; and (iii) the effect of 
media coverage on the uprisings in rural Egypt, in terms of the media’s role in 
invigorating micro-public spheres and contributing to the strengthening of social 
capital in rural Egypt. Through these areas, the aim of this thesis is to investigate 
the effect of social media on interaction norms within rural Egypt. For this subject 
to be analysed with any degree of accuracy or success, there are several topics 
that must be discussed beforehand to provide the necessary context for the 
discussion. As such, this chapter deals with the period between 2011 and 2015, as 
well as the ten-year period that preceded it .    
The aim of this chapter is to provide context relating to Egypt generally, and 
rural Egypt in particular, in terms of significant cultural details, political 
participation, political and media organization, and technology usage. This will 
serve as an underpinning for the remainder of the thesis. This background is 
divided into five sections.  The first section provides a general overview of rural 
Egypt, and an introductory overview for each of the four governorates 
specifically researched for this thesis: Qalyoubia, Menoufia, Minya, and South 
Sinai. Each of these governorates is described in terms of social structure, 
location, proximity to the urban centers where the uprisings occurred, and other 
distinguishing features. This will showcase both their commonalities and their 
differences, and the manner in which the four governorates provide a full view of 
rural Egypt. This section also highlights the limited focus that has been given to 
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rural involvement in political change, as well as the reasoning behind scholarly 
focus on elites, middle class, urban centers, and political authorities. 
The second and third sections of this chapter address formal and informal 
political participation, respectively. In each case, a theoretical background of the 
term is provided, and a definition that serves to distinguish them. Following this, 
formal and informal political participation are considered in terms of Egypt 
generally, and rural Egypt specifically. This serves as a topline overview of 
political participation in Egypt, providing the underpinning for all subsequent 
discussion. These sections include examples of each form of participation, the 
prevalence of this form of participation in Egypt, and other contextual 
information related to this form of political participation in the country. Given the 
focus of this thesis, an overview of political participation prior to the 2011 
uprisings allows for a deeper understanding of the 2011 uprisings, the 
circumstances that led to the uprisings and played a role in their progression, and 
their aftermath.  
The fourth section of this chapter deals with the barriers that exist in rural 
Egypt regarding the use of social media. This includes socio-cultural barriers, 
economic barriers, infrastructural barriers, and barriers that arise from linguistic 
or educational limitations. This overview furthers one’s contextual foundation of 
rural Egypt while specifically addressing the role of social media.  Given the 
focus of this thesis on the effect of social media on interaction norms within rural 
Egypt, a foundational understanding is necessary. It is important to note that, 
while the barriers to social media will be discussed, this does not imply that social 
media played a small role in rural Egypt’s involvement in the uprisings. Rather, 
in order to successfully assess the extent to which social media affected political 
interactions and interaction norms within rural Egypt, it is necessary to 
understand the role of social media in the area beforehand, as well as its 
limitations. 
The final section provides an overview of the relationship between the media 
(primarily in terms of traditional media) and the state, prior to and following the 
2011 uprisings. To uncover the details about the evolution in Egyptian society in 
the aftermath of the uprisings, it is clear that the media must be considered as an 
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important source and a useful indicator of what happens in a society. As such, this 
section provides a recounting of the media in terms of its significance in Egyptian 
society, its role, its limitations, and its interaction with the state. This background 
information will allow for clarity when analysis is conducted on whether media 
coverage on the uprisings in rural Egypt played a role in invigorating the micro-
public sphere and if it contributed to the strengthening of rural Egypt’s social 
capital. 
Essentially, the sections of this chapter all exist to provide information that is 
essential for any meaningful analysis of Egypt, rural Egypt, political interaction 
in Egypt, and the role of the media in the uprisings between 2011 and 2015.  
2.1. A General Overview of the Rural Area of Egypt 
The regions chosen for analysis were four large Egyptian governorates 
characterised by a big territorial area, considerable importance in Egypt’s 
political scene, and the fact that they make up a dominant percentage of the rural 
population. Due to these factors, the four governorates chosen are best-suited for 
discussion on social media’s influence and analysis of the changes in political 
norms as relating to political interaction triggered during, and after, the 2011 
uprisings. This is due to several factors, including variety in social structures, 
different proximities to the urban centers in which protesting occurred, different 
locations within Egypt, varying economic and political realities, and differing 
population sizes. The four chosen areas where research was conducted are 
Qalyoubia, South Sinai, Minya, and Menoufia. 
In order to analyse the role of rural Egypt in the uprisings with any measure of 
success, some contextual information is necessary regarding Egypt in general and 
the governorates chosen for this thesis specifically. Being composed of 27 
governorates, Egypt has only four governorates that are predominantly urban, 
namely Alexandria, Port Said, Suez and Cairo. The other remaining 23 are mixed, 
both rural and urban. Nine governorates are located in Upper Egypt, four in the 
Eastern and Western frontiers and nine in Lower Egypt (El Zanaty and Way, 
2008; CAPMAS, 2015). While the urban areas are composed of the capital of the 
governorate and its smaller districts, the rural areas are composed mainly of 
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“villages, pilgrimages in the land areas, and the Bedouins in some of the frontier 
governorates, such as North and South Sinai” (Zohry, 2002). More than 50% of 
Egypt’s population – around 47 million – live in rural areas, of which 15 million 
are living under the poverty line (Rural Poverty Portal, 2014). In terms of the four 
governorates discussed in this thesis, the table below highlights the rural-urban 
split, and the levels of political participation as seen in the 2014 presidential 
elections.   
Governorate Population Urban 
Population 
Rural 
Population 
Political 
Participation 
in 
Presidential 
Elections, 
2014 
Qalyoubia 5,105,972 2,280,927 2,825,045 55.2% 
Menoufia 3,941,293 812,833 3,128,460 62.6% 
South Sinai 167,426 85,502 81,924 45.4% 
Minya 5,156,702 973,418 4,183,284 35.4% 
 
Political Participation in Presidential Elections By Governorate (Pres2014.elections.eg, 2014) 
Qalyoubia is one of the most populated regions of Lower Egypt, with a 
population slightly over five million; 50% live in rural areas. This region also 
represents the second most important region in terms of political participation, 
because the voting percentage is 55.2%. This is the second highest voting 
percentage in Egypt and clearly highlights the strong political deliberations in this 
area. A voting participation level of 55.2% also makes the region one of the most 
politically active in Egypt, a fact that is very important considering that 52% of 
this statistic are women. In fact, this area has the highest female voting 
participation in Egypt (Pres2014.elections.eg, 2014). This high level of political 
engagement is also determined by the governorate’s geographical positioning; 
Qalyoubia is situated only 50 km from Cairo, the capital, and 30 km from 
Menoufia, which is another of the governorates chosen for study in this thesis. 
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Nevertheless, the strong political sense of this population has never alienated 
them from their bond to the land, which keeps the people focused on agriculture 
and on their rural way of life. There is, of course, variation within every 
governorate in regards to employment, with some commuting to work rather than 
engaging in agricultural activity. The citizens living in Qalyoubia are similar to 
those living in Menoufia; one significant difference that arose among 
interviewees from these governorates is that Qalyoubia’s citizens appear more 
interested in engaging with media than Menoufia’s citizens, since minimal travel 
time for work (for commuters) allows them more free time. The urban area in 
Qalyoubia is also very developed, with many citizens based in  rural areas 
commuting to the urban area of the governorate daily.   
Menoufia is in Lower Egypt as well, being characterised by a strong political 
involvement and a great lobbying tradition. The region has a population of 
approximately four million citizens, 80% of whom reside in rural areas. However, 
their voting participation reached 63%, the highest in Egypt 
(Pres2014.elections.eg, 2014). Menoufia was chosen as a focus area because it is 
majority-rural, yet remains the governorate with the highest level of political 
participation. It also has the highest percentage of individuals commuting daily to 
Cairo, 80 km away, for work, which is 22.1% of its population (Zohry, 2002). 
The majority of Egyptian presidents have come from Menoufia. Its financial 
stability is superior to that of other rural areas such as Minya and its citizens are 
less conservative and more open to communicating freely. However, even if 
Menoufia has a strong political tradition, its citizens in lower economic categories 
are not particularly concerned about using social media more than citizens with 
similar circumstances in Qalyoubia, as will be shown in interview data 
throughout this thesis; they have less agriculture due to changes in their area that 
will be discussed in later chapters, and tend to commute to Cairo on a daily basis 
for work. This makes their daily routine exhausting due to the difficulty of 
transportation facilities to and from Cairo.  
South Sinai, unlike Qalyoubia and Menoufia, is a frontier governorate with a 
strong tribal tradition. This governorate has been chosen because its population 
represents an interesting sample for the analysis of social media influence and of 
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levels of political participation. South Sinai is one of the few governorates in 
Egypt with a tribal tradition. This is due to geographic position, which is very 
close to Libya, with many Libyan tribes exerting a specific influence on the 
region.  The area is also quite isolated because of the mountains surrounding it; 
the tribal form of organisation is more effective in such a geographical context. 
Six major tribes that discuss with the government the particular needs of the 
entire population represent South Sinai (A, 2018 in South Sinai). Even though 
educational institutions have been introduced in the last 50 years, even the most 
educated citizens still have strong bonds to the tribal culture and social behaviour, 
especially when it comes to obeying the head of the tribe. The heads of the tribes 
determine political participation even when some members have different 
opinions. South Sinai is close to Palestine and government authorities prefer to 
have a very high level of security in that area. Therefore the government makes 
agreements with the head of each tribe, on the presumption that they know better 
about the needs of their own people and because they know the mountains and 
geography of the areas more. This situation has led to a reliance on tribal leaders 
for political decision-making.  
 While the importance of South Sinai and its tribal traditions will be discussed 
in more detail throughout this thesis, it will also be discussed here in terms of 
how that tribal tradition affected their social media use during the time period this 
thesis is analysing. It is sufficient here to note only that the governorate has a 
45% rate of voting participation, and a population of 167,000, 50% of whom are 
based in rural areas (Pres2014.elections.eg, 2014). The majority of the other 
frontier governorates are urban and do not have a tribal tradition. In fact, North 
Sinai is the only other governorate with such a tradition. However, this region 
was not an option for analysis in this thesis due to safety concerns. One of the 
most significant aspects of this tradition is the fact that the head of the tribes 
determines everyone else’s political participation even when some of the 
members have different opinions. This provides a focus on the local level that, as 
will be shown, may not be consistent with the use of social media for political 
participation.  
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The final region that will be discussed in this thesis is Minya. This governorate 
is the most populated in Upper Egypt, with 80% of its citizens living in rural 
areas. This makes Minya one of the most important areas for analysis in Upper 
Egypt because it has the second highest voting participation in the region: 
approximately 35% with a majority rural population (Pres2014.elections.eg, 
2014). Upper Egypt’s governorates are characterised by strong ties to tradition, 
especially relating to women and vengeance if a family takes land from another 
or disrespects one of its members. It is important to note however that, despite 
this, residents of Minya are also open to settling disputes calmly depending on the 
situation and the families involved.  As part of Upper Egypt, traditions in Minya 
are more conservative compared to Lower Egypt. Generally, women do not deal 
with strangers as easily as in Lower Egypt. For example, during interviews 
conducted in Minya, the time of female interviewees was notably shorter than 
their male counterparts because they did not talk as much as women in Lower 
Egypt. Moreover, Minya’s residents are also more rigid about their traditions due 
to seclusion from the rest of Egypt, caused by distance and lack of infrastructure. 
This region is farther from the urban areas when compared to Lower Egypt. It is 
around 300 km away from Cairo and almost 500 km away from Alexandria, the 
second largest urban center in Egypt, making its infrastructure not as developed 
and its living conditions more difficult. This leads people to focus more on day-
to-day life than politics, an attitude which plays a role in why voting percentages 
in this region are the lowest out of the four areas chosen in this thesis.  
Given Egypt’s high rural population, and the size of its rural governorates, it is 
not a stretch to assume that this sector of the population has affected its political 
landscape. However, focus on the effect of rural populations has generally been 
minimal. Lama Kabbanji (2011) underlines the fact that intellectuals, especially 
those in social sciences such as politics, have the tendency to focus their attention 
on the elite or middle class, on demonstration centres and on political authorities. 
Consequently, the opportunity to understand the events (and to analyse the 
dynamics of the Egyptian social movements from a broader perspective) is 
undermined by their vision. The instant analysis of the events outside the 
historical framework poses a barrier to analysing the contribution of all social 
categories in Egypt. While Galal Amin (2013) refers to the 2011 Egyptian 
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uprising as a revolutionary moment that emerged due to a desire to dispense with 
the Mubarak regime, Gilbert Achcar (2013) presents it as the climax of a long-
term process, opening the way to broader and more accurate analysis. It is for this 
reason that this thesis places a large emphasis on explaining the context of the 
rural population in terms of history, interaction norms, economic limitations, as 
well as linguistic and infrastructural barriers. It is necessary background, without 
which any analysis of social media’s impact on political interaction norms would 
lack context. Moreover, when comparing differences in political interaction 
norms, it is necessary to consider how these changed before, during, and 
especially after 2011. Finally, this thesis takes into consideration Kabbanji’s 
assertions regarding the limitations to understanding imposed by a focus solely on 
elites, middle class, centres of demonstrations, and political authorities. 
However, it is important to note that this perspective and focus does also cause 
difficulty. Research into rural activity comes with many complications that may 
not exist when focusing on the elite and middle class. One difficulty in 
understanding the rural activity concerning the resistance against the regime in 
Egypt, for example, comes from the geographical complication that it is simply 
difficult to access many rural areas. There is also the matter of security, and 
openness, in some of those areas when one enters it as a stranger, as well as the 
fact that the tribal organisation in some rural governorates sometimes makes 
interaction more difficult. South Sinai, as highlighted in this section, serves as an 
example of this. On the other hand, many difficulties in understanding the rural 
areas’ role in the uprising comes from stereotypes such as the idea of the ‘passive 
or indolent peasant’, which obscure the numerous forms, and their resistance to 
the Mubarak system. Some researchers consider that the rural citizens already had 
an everyday form of resistance prior to the events of 2011 (Scott, 1985) while 
others have questioned this idea (Fegan, 1986, Adas, 1986). This topic will also 
be considered later in the thesis.  
For now, it is sufficient to know only that the four governorates discussed in 
this section - Qalyoubia, Menoufia, Minya, and South Sinai - provide variety in 
terms of population size, social structures, safety and stability, financial 
wellbeing, historical and modern significance in politics, political participation 
27 
rates, location, and proximity to urban centers such as Cairo and Alexandria. 
However, despite these differences, the chosen areas also serve as rural centers. 
Given the focus of this thesis on the impact of rural Egypt on the political 
landscape between 2011 and 2015, a clear and nuanced analysis requires the 
study of different rural sectors of Egypt - with different histories, relationships to 
the regime, and political viewpoints. As such, these governorates allow for an 
analysis of rural Egypt that can both illuminate the commonalities and highlight 
the differences between rural areas in general, as well as between rural 
participation as compared to Egypt’s urban counterparts. 
2.2. Formal Political Participation 
Having discussed the four governorates that will serve as the focus of this 
thesis and given a general overview of their features, it is important to highlight 
Egypt’s political interaction norms. While this section (and the following section 
on informal participation) will not delve into specific norms of each individual 
region, it will serve as an outline for political participation in the country, and 
distinguishing characteristics of this participation. 
Political participation is broadly defined by researchers in the field as the 
involvement of citizens in governmental decision-making, in order to influence or 
change it (Nelson and Huntington, 1976). In theoretical terms, political 
engagement refers to active participation of citizens in the political sphere. It 
represents a process through which people can determine changes in the political 
life of their communities through the role they play in the political sphere. 
Political scholars divide political participation into formal and informal 
depending on the purpose and the direction of a specific context: “formal political 
participation is defined as not anti-systemic and does not directly challenge the 
underlying legitimacy of the central government” (Maki, 2006). Informal political 
participation, on the other hand, would challenge the legitimacy of the central 
government. Thus, formal political participation refers to people who make use of 
their legitimate right and get involved in the political sphere by means of political 
parties, associations, and other similar methods. Formal activities are not 
considered illegal and include running for a particular position, voting, 
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campaigning, joining different political parties, and getting involved in civil 
society organisations.  
According to detailed statistics presented by Mostafa Refaei (2012), Egypt’s 
citizens identify themselves more with formal than informal political 
participation. This is particularly clear when considering the importance 
individuals from rural Egypt place on parliamentary elections. Parliamentary 
elections in Egypt, particularly in rural regions, typically include higher voter 
turnout and consistency in voter choice than presidential elections (B, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia; D, 2018 in Qalyoubia; pres2012.elections.eg). While this will be 
discussed in greater detail in later chapters, it must be noted now that this focus 
on parliamentary elections and their importance has had ramifications on national 
politics. While in power, the Mubarak regime regularly attempted to locate and 
co-opt key political figures in rural areas to ensure that the ruling regime would 
maintain a parliamentary majority. This in turn made it appear, to citizens of rural 
Egypt, as though voting in parliamentary elections made a difference to the 
governance of the state and created a kind of connection between the regime and 
the citizens of rural Egypt. 
It is important to note that this commitment to formal political participation for 
parliamentary elections did not exist in the case of Egypt’s presidential elections. 
When, in 2005, presidential elections were held that involved multiple candidates, 
citizens of Egypt regarded this new situation with suspicion and voting 
participation was consequently very low (Lynch, 2006). However, Refaei’s  
statistics have highlighted that, in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, the 
majority of Egyptian citizens presumed voting at the national level would be 
more likely than previously to change the political sphere (Refaei, 2012). This is 
borne out in participation percentages. For example, the participation percentage 
in the March 2011 referendum was 41% and dramatically increased in the 
November 2011 elections of that year to an unprecedented 76%. This is in 
contrast to previous participation percentages of 23% in 2005’s presidential 
elections (Meital, 2006). 
The 2011 uprising marked the beginning of a series of transformations in 
Egypt’s political system. After President Mubarak’s resignation, studies showed 
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that almost all citizens had strong feelings of nationalism, as they were all proud 
of being Egyptians, but their political values and trust were affected by the 
division of the country in terms of religious and national identity (Karoui, 2015).  
The oppressive governance from the previous 40 years caused them to be highly 
unsupportive of the majority of political actors and institutions. This was based 
on their feeling that Egypt’s political leadership would continue to be corrupt in 
the future. Statistics conducted between August and October 2011 highlight that 
approximately 76% of Egypt’s citizens had “little confidence” or “no confidence 
at all” in the country’s political parties. The police, unions, press, and civil 
society organizations received similar percentages: 61%, 70%, 59%, and 63% 
respectively (Erle et al., 2012). 
After President Mubarak resigned, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) took power of the state until the first presidential elections were 
organised. During this transitional period, a constitutional review committee was 
founded and a referendum for a constitutional declaration organised. After the 
restrictive measures against forming political parties had been removed, Mr. Adel 
El Shourbagy, Head of the Party Establishment Committee stated more than 90 
parties were formed (El Daragly, 2017). Parliamentary elections were organised 
between November 2011 and January 2012. These elections were proclaimed as 
“the first honest national elections of any sort held in Egypt since the overthrow 
of the monarchy in 1952” (Ifes.org, 2013). The Islamists, run by Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom Justice Party, had an overwhelming victory, taking 47% 
of seats. As demonstrated, citizens from rural areas proved to have a strong 
political consciousness, participating massively in both parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Turnouts showed that around 72% of the rural population 
took part in parliamentary elections. In May and June of 2012 Egypt faced the 
first free presidential elections; 13 candidates participated in the first round. In the 
second round only two candidates remained: Mohamed Morsi, representing the 
Muslim Brotherhood and a former Prime Minster under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafik, 
with Morsi winning the election. 51.8% of the population of Egypt participated in 
the presidential elections (El-Mallakh, 2017). 
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2.3. Informal Political Participation 
Informal political participation refers to getting involved in a variety of 
political organisms not under the government’s control, and that usually represent 
the voices of dissent. Informal political participation takes many forms, including 
involvement in demonstrations and protests, organisation of violent activities 
against state institutions, and the practice of online activism through the use of 
social media networks, blogs or other channels (Nasser, 2010). Unlike formal 
political participation, informal participation is “primarily characterized by 
voicing or acting on anti-systemic opinions” (Maki, 2006). According to Lina 
Khatib (2013), informal political participation “through social networks, 
underground political movements, and social movements, was often the only way 
for citizens to challenge their regimes.” In fact, the uprisings discussed in this 
thesis would fall primarily under the term of informal political involvement. 
In Egypt, the legislative and political context was very limited for common 
people, and did not allow them much access (or options) in the political scene 
during Mubarak’s regime. As such, Egyptian citizens started to make use of 
informal political practices, rather than formal ones, because it was their only 
opportunity to gain the liberty of having formal rights in the formal political 
sphere. Many turned to social media as a form of informal participation, and 
began using Facebook and Twitter as uncoerced and local spaces for citizens to 
discuss issues of social, economic, and political concern. Informal forms of 
political involvement are often represented by their opposition to the existing 
authoritarian political system. The aim of this informal participation is to force 
the government to respond to particular issues the state’s citizens consider a 
priority. 
The Facebook group, “We are all Khaled Said” or “Kolona Khaled Said” in 
Arabic, is a particularly significant example of informal political participation 
with roots in social media. This Facebook group, which was started in July 2010 
by Google marketing manager and Internet activist Wael Ghoneim (Sakr, 2013b) 
reached 3.58 million Egyptian Facebook users. The group’s name is derived from 
Khaled Said, an Egyptian male who posted an online video of two police officers 
exchanging money after a drug deal. On his final day, Said visited an Internet 
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café where two officers approached him and began physically and violently 
abusing him. The beating began inside the café and continued on the street, 
ultimately resulting in his death. Immediately following this, a police car arrived 
to take possession of his body. Later that day, it was reported to his family that 
the cause of Said’s death was a drug overdose. His family and friends believed he 
was beaten because of the video he had posted online and many people, including 
human right activists and El Baradei, headed to the streets in an expression of 
outrage at his death. Said became a symbol, and the Facebook group solidified 
the opposition of Egyptian citizens to the routine police brutality that had become 
commonplace, and acted as an attempt to seek governmental response to issues of 
physical safety and the prevalence of police brutality; social media pages were 
soon flooded with images of Said's disfigured face following his brutal attack and 
murder by the police. Other citizens who held grievances against police 
maltreatment joined this group and posted their own experiences. As a 
consequence, Said became the icon of the 2011 revolution (Eltantawy and Wiest, 
2011) and his image could be seen as a cultural ‘meme’ which spread rapidly 
through social media and came to symbolise government repression and police 
brutality.  The sense of anger which was encapsulated in the Facebook group and 
its content was considered by Egyptians to have played an essential role in 
sparking the uprisings. Some consider this incident to be one of the primary 
catalysts for encouraging and motivating Egypt’s population to head to Tahrir 
Square.  
The 2011 Egyptian uprisings themselves consisted of an unprecedented mass 
mobilisation that brought millions of Egyptians onto the streets. Keeping in mind 
that political street demonstrations had been forbidden in Egypt since 1967, the 
uprisings themselves are considered a form of informal political participation 
(Joya, 2011). The goal of the uprisings was to combat corruption and social 
injustice, both of which had existed in Egypt for a long time. This is confirmed by 
the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which in 2010 
rated the country at 98 points out of 100. There are several researchers who have 
investigated the participation rates in the 2011 uprisings and the reasons that 
people gathered together. During the 2011 uprisings, those involved noted their 
reasons for participating as being related to wanting to combat social injustice, 
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“end [the] dictatorship and stifling [of] liberties,” and finally to end corruption 
within the state (Erle et al., 2012). 
According to Refaei (2012), there was also a socio-demographic component to 
the informal political participation in Egypt. 52% of those involved in informal 
political acts were aged between 18-30 years old and, as such, their participation 
in social media networks and protests was done with a level of enthusiasm that is 
typical of the youth (Refaei, 2012). Moreover, they had not been exposed to the 
authoritarian regime to the same extent as their parents and grandparents. As 
such, their level of fear was lower. 17% of the uprisings’ participants were from 
the upper-middle class, meaning that they were educated and had certain access 
to news, as well as a measure of economic stability. Moreover, approximately 
55% of those involved in informal political acts lived in urban areas, even though 
only 43% of the total population of Egypt live in cities (Erle et al., 2012). On the 
one hand, the previous statistics are normal, considering that the uprisings’ 
demonstrations took place in urban regions, primarily Alexandria and Cairo. On 
the other hand, the percentage of the rural population who participated in the 
events was quite impressive, considering that the rural population’s access to 
social media for getting news was reduced by their geographical position and 
conditions, as will be reviewed throughout this thesis. Moreover, given that the 
uprisings’ demonstrations occurred in urban regions, the ratio of urban to rural 
citizens, while favouring the former, only does so minimally. This highlights the 
high level of involvement, and the motivation, among rural citizens.  
Even though protestors made up only 8% of Egypt’s total population, 
specialists in the field claim this is a very high rate of participation, taking into 
account the high risks (Erle et al., 2012). For Egypt, these include jail, torture or 
even death. As such, it is clear that political participation in Egypt existed despite 
high risks and barriers. Even though many social media, news commentators and 
news transmissions referred to the 2011 uprisings as a “democratic movement”, 
democracy was non-existent in Egypt and it was only a goal that emerged after 
the uprisings that began on 25th January 2011. The movements’ goal was not to 
remove the regime, at the beginning, but to cut out corruption and reform the 
political system. The president’s refusal to cooperate gave activists no option but 
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to fight for the removal of the political regime. The dynamic of the events clearly 
indicate that the purpose of the 2011 uprisings was not just political, but also 
economic, because people were sick and tired of living at the edge of a normal 
existence. The end of unemployment was, in fact, another reason protesters gave 
for their participation in the uprisings (Erle et al., 2012). The different movements 
created online, via social media networks or offline, through face to face 
meetings, had different agendas, but they were united by the ardent desire to end 
corruption and social injustice (Joya, 2011). 
It is important to note here that the existence of these movements was partially 
possible because of the Mubarak regime’s desire to appear as pro-democratic. In 
order to maintain his image of a democratic leader, Mubarak allowed a number of 
political liberties: he increased his tolerance of criticism somewhat and allowed 
small protests, such as those conducted by factory workers prior to 2011 (Gamil, 
2017). Examples of this include the Mahalla Strike in 2008 and the El-Ghazl 
workers strike in 2006. Mubarak felt confident he could keep these small 
demonstrations under control and no one could threaten his position or power. 
Moreover, this allowed him to act as a democratic leader in front of his Western 
counterparts. He was playing a dual role between transparent leadership and 
dictatorship. Through his dictatorial regime, Mubarak wanted to destroy as much 
as possible the relationships between people – the social capital – to make the 
citizens and residents of Egypt helpless and disparate, rendering them easier to 
control. This was obvious in how the Mubarak regime refused to legalize 
protesting. Moreover, evidence of the state’s attempts to minimize the strength of 
the country’s social ties and connections is evident in the fear people held about 
the security police. These forces inspired a fear in Egypt’s citizens that centred on 
the concern that any citizen’s knowledge regarding protesters or protest plans 
could lead to arrest, interrogation, or imprisonment. In terms of restrictions on 
formal participation, the regime placed limitations and severe restrictions on the 
starting of any major political parties.  
However, this double-faced character - of democratic politics internationally 
and dictatorial measures internally - brought his regime to an end. By allowing 
small-scale liberties such as those mentioned, Mubarak inadvertently created 
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space for numerous youth movements and activities on behalf of civil society. He 
never managed to undermine the social relationships that were so prevalent 
within Egypt, especially in rural areas where strong bonds between people and 
their families was an ancestral heritage. The Kefaya Movement formed in 2004 
and became one of the most important movements of the period, because it united 
people of very different political interests and orientations. Its consistent calls for 
political change were not necessarily successful, but they inspired people to 
create other groups, causing a shift in the collective consciousness. “The April 6 
Movement” formed in 2008 and had its roots in the Kefaya movement. Together 
with “We are all Khaled Said”, these movements were able to fly under 
Mubarak’s radar and undermine totalitarian policies and control. This enabled a 
bridge to be created over the political regime and to gain support from many 
people, who could organise private meetings to exchange ideas, plan, and 
mobilise the public will. For example, the Kefaya movement reached 10,000 by 
2005; “We are all Khaled Said” reached approximately 30,000 members prior to 
the 2011 uprising, with an increase to 190,000 once Wael Ghoneim appeared on 
Dream TV. There have also been many other smaller groups such as “March 9 
Movement”, “Youth Movement for Justice” or “Workers for Change”. All these 
groups started to meet each other and discovered they had very similar interests 
and grievances; they also realised that they had an enormous potential to succeed 
when acting in unison, as a bigger movement, rather than as independent small 
groups. Their meetings revealed to them they could make a real impact only by 
acting together (Refaei, 2012), which helped in creating the micro public sphere. 
It became evident through these groups that discussions on social, economic and 
political issues could actually lead to changes in these areas if organized and 
directed in a deliberate fashion. The studies in the field show that political values 
and norms of the 2011 protests have to be regarded as a whole. First of all, in 
terms of the demands that gathered thousands of people together, under the same 
goal. Second of all, it is in terms of the common values shared by the activists and 
by the youth movements. Thirdly, in terms of how all these have reflected on the 
Egyptian society after the uprisings (Joya, 2011). 
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2.4. Barriers to Social Media Use in Rural Egypt 
 
Social media was one of the methods used for communication and 
coordination by independent groups such as those mentioned previously. Social 
media, in this sense, could theoretically allow for increased communication 
within Egypt, and increased flexibility in communication over long distances. 
This feature of social media plays a role in why many scholars have considered 
its use pivotal to the success of the uprisings (Chebib and Sohail, 2011). As such, 
the prevalence of social media, and its limitations, must be considered in order to 
evaluate this claim as related to rural Egypt. 
As already explained, over 50% of Egypt’s population reside in rural areas, 
which means that half of its population is represented by rural citizens. This is 
one reason why this study places such a strong emphasis on the rural areas’ 
contribution to the 2011 uprisings, aiming to discover the extent to which social 
media has had an impact on changing individual norms of political interaction. 
One of the important facts is that, on the one hand, the rural areas do not have as 
much access to social media as urban areas and, on the other hand, do not rely on 
it much when taking political action because it is not in their day-to-day culture, 
particularly when focusing on the time frame of this thesis. This perspective 
concerning the media is due to some specific barriers to its access in the rural 
areas. 
Economic barriers 
The economic barriers to accessing social media represent one of the most 
significant barriers. The economic level of some rural areas, which is very 
frequently more like a survival path for some of the rural areas, affects the 
possibility of having Internet access for some rural families from Egypt (Beilock 
and Dimitrova, 2003), because they do not have enough resources to buy mobile 
phones or computers or to pay for monthly subscriptions from an Internet 
company (Curran et al., 2012). Moreover, in the majority of rural areas, the 
economic barriers are far more challenging than the ones people encounter in the 
urban areas.   
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Poor infrastructure 
Another major barrier directly connected to the economic one is the poor 
infrastructure in Egypt’s rural areas when compared to the urban. Interviewee D 
in Minya, explained, "the area I was living in did not have Internet connection 
but I heard about it from other friends and relatives that were in areas with 
Internet connection" (D, 2018 in Minya). 
The low percentage of Internet users is also linked to poor infrastructure, 
which represents an obstruction to the introduction of Internet networks to these 
areas. Developing countries such as Egypt present a major need to run an 
inclusive growth system that would develop rural areas and which would also be 
reflected in the welfare of the population (Ghanem, 2014). The infrastructure 
barrier is directly connected with low economic levels in the rural areas and 
actually triggers many other barriers to social media access such as the next 
barrier: language and education.  
Language and education barriers 
Many rural citizens are illiterate and, as a result, cannot use the Internet (El 
Nawawy and Khamis, 2013). Internet users in Egypt, especially during the 2011 
uprisings, were represented by the educated youth, using mostly English 
(Prashad, 2012). According to the International Telecommunication Union, only 
3% of Internet users utilise the Arabic language; the rest rely primarily on English 
(Curran et al., 2012), meaning that the English language itself represents a huge 
barrier for a large majority of Egyptians, including even many of those living in 
urban areas. Even though in 2009 Facebook introduced its Arabic version, the 
translations were quite poor and did not provide easy access (Castells, 2013). 
Nevertheless, despite education and language representing a huge barrier to 
media access, Arab countries characterise themselves by a political unity which is 
specific to the Middle East, especially in the rural areas (Danielson, 2007).  This 
unity is called Pan-Arabism and refers to the fact that Arab citizens feel 
connected through history, religion and mother-tongue, which is enough to 
motivate them to take action when it comes to their country (Carbaugh, 2016). 
This is the reason why rural areas have not been hindered in their political 
interaction, because their tendency of sticking to tradition keeps them more united 
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and more implicated in politics in terms of both engagement and involvement, 
which takes us to the social and cultural barriers.  
Social and cultural barriers 
The rural communities have always been characterised by a more traditional 
way of living and by a general tendency of preserving their norms and cultural 
boundaries (Brusco, 1996; Paloscia, 1991; Granovetter, 1985). A prime example 
of this is South Sinai, which relies on a tribal framework. Some other academics 
show that the agrarian communities function in such a way that prevents the poor 
social class from participating in political life because they remain loyal to their 
farmers, landowners or tribal leaders, in the case of Bedouins (Moore and Putzel, 
1999). Basically, the power remains with rural elites, which have an interest in 
maintaining poverty levels to maintain the gap between their social class and 
lower ones. This phenomenon is also found in Egypt (Blair, 2000). Rural citizens 
do not rely on media only because their life is based on “connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000). As already discussed, the rural 
communities have much higher levels of connection among the citizens than the 
urban areas. This is mainly because small groups develop social relationships 
from one generation to another (Murdoch, 2000). Even though the higher status 
people affect decisions of the communities they run, this is a result of trust that 
has been built over time, rather than a mind-set, which is based on fear. This 
happens outside of any state institutions, because the relationships are built and 
transmitted from one generation to another and the tribal (or large family) leaders 
have a long history in their communities. The rural population needs much more 
time to integrate the Internet into their life and to trust it in the way they trust 
their local leaders and long established family and intra-families relations. They 
accept changes harder not because they are less civilised, but because they are 
more connected and attached to their culture, which they cherish and respect. 
Nevertheless, their culture and traditions have never been an impediment to 
taking action when needed and to protest against the state, as the following 
section will highlight. They trusted instead their old, traditional sources, which 
are ‘word of mouth’ recommendations together with following their leaders’ 
recommendations and advice. 
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As such, it is clear that rural Egypt suffered from economic, infrastructural, 
educational, linguistic and cultural barriers that prevented - or, at least, strongly 
limited - social media usage. These barriers, combined with a lack of experience 
in the use of social media for political purposes, must be considered when 
discussing the relationship between the uprisings, the media, and the rural 
population that forms the majority of Egypt. Despite these barriers, however, it 
must be noted that rural Egypt has a strong history of protesting injustices and 
governmental abuses when its citizens feel it is necessary, as will be highlighted 
It is important to note here that these barriers do not necessarily mean that 
social media was insignificant. On the contrary, Facebook groups such as 
“Khaled Said” and similar spaces certainly played a role and held significance. 
However, these barriers serve as a context for the prevalence of social media, 
which serves as a necessary first step for analysing the extent of that significance. 
By understanding the extent to which social media existed in rural Egypt, it will 
be easier to compare its effects to other factors - such as traditional media, private 
media, and social capital - between 2011 and 2015. 
     
2.5. The Media & The State: Pre-2011 and Post-2011 
The media gained heavy attention during the Arab spring. This is especially 
true for Egypt, where many researchers considered that the media, particularly 
social media, triggered the uprisings and mobilised people to go out onto the 
streets to fight for their rights (Campbell 2011; Castells, 2012; Howard and 
Hussain, 2013). The historical and political context created during the events of 
2011 acted as a signal for the popular appeal of social media for political 
interaction. Nevertheless, specialists in the field consider that it is important to 
remember, as a general rule, that “winning the media contest is not enough for the 
transformation of political systems – new Arab media have to be followed by new 
political movements” (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Scholars have even 
underlined that new media had been preceded by active political and social 
actions, and that new media continued this process by having a long lasting 
impact on liberalisation processes and real transformations in the society to which 
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they belong (Brisson and Lee, 2011). However, this claim is also refuted by 
Evgeny Morozov, and thus is not an unquestioned fact (Morozov, 2011). 
As such, in order to uncover the details about the evolution in Egyptian society 
in the aftermath of the uprisings, the media must be considered as an important 
source and useful indicator of what happens in society. Regardless of the question 
of cause-and-effect, after the uprising the media was expected to become a 
critical factor in the transformation of the political system. After the uprisings, the 
citizens of Egypt expected the media to play a role in the creation of a landscape 
of free speech and political discussion, and to act to facilitate the exchange 
between citizens and the government. In an increasingly globally mediated 
context, the media - be it social media, national television, or satellite television - 
is an important catalyst and tool in generating changes and simultaneously in 
controlling the masses. As such, the media and state must be considered in terms 
of their relationship - both before and after the 2011 uprisings - in order to have 
the necessary foundational context for the analysis of this thesis. 
This identification of the relationship between media and state requires an 
evaluation of the media forms most prevalent in Egypt, and rural Egypt in 
particular. While social media has been discussed previously, traditional media 
forms have not yet been considered. Despite the fact that there are several 
traditional media forms that can be analysed in comparison to social media, 
television remains the most readily available and prevalent medium across all of 
Egypt’s rural areas. Even radio has less penetration. According to the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (2014), nearly all (98.8%) Egyptians have a 
working television in their home, while only 37.9% of Egyptians own or use a 
radio. The percentage of Egyptians with a radio in their household is down 
significantly from 2012, when nearly half of the population (49.7%) reported 
radio ownership. Internet access at home is up slightly from the 2012 figure of 
22.3%, but remains fairly limited: only one in four Egyptians (25.5%) have 
Internet access in their household. Television is by far the most common source 
of news for Egyptians. Nearly all Egyptians (94.1%) use the TV for news at least 
once a week, and 84.2% use it daily, or most days. In contrast, fewer than one in 
five (17.3%) Egyptians use radio as a news source at least weekly, even though 
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more than twice that number have access to a radio at home. While only 20.5% of 
Egyptians use the Internet for news weekly, 75.5% of those with home Internet 
access use it for news at least weekly. With the exception of television, males are 
significantly more likely than females to use all other sources of media for news 
and tend to do so more regularly (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2014). These 
facts make it evident that television is the clearest medium for the analysis of this 
thesis, being the most widely spread and commonly used. As such, an analysis on 
the basis of television and social media will yield the strongest results for 
understanding the relationship of the new media environment and Egypt. Thus, 
television will be used as the counter to social media throughout this thesis when 
focusing on the effect of both in rural Egypt. An interesting aspect relating to 
television usage can be seen in the Eutelsat and Nilesat statistics, which revealed 
that the proportion of homes in Egypt with satellite and/or cable access rose from 
7.4% in 2002, to 24% in 2003, 32% in 2004, and 50% in 2006. The figure 
continued to rise, to 65% in 2010 (Elseewi, 2011). By 2011, it had reached 94% 
(Fanack.com, 2016). 
Having noted these numbers however, and their implications regarding the 
importance of television for connection within rural Egypt, it is important to 
consider the actual content of the television media being consumed. This is 
particularly significant given that one of the central features that critics have 
identified as undermining the flourishing of the public sphere is the concentration 
of media ownership in the hands of the state or a small group of powerful elites 
(McChesney, 1999; McQuail, 2005). Not only does concentration of ownership 
limit media plurality, but strong financial or political pressures from the state (or 
private actors within it) leads to news content that conforms to their interests 
(Altschull, 1984). This was, in fact, the case in Egypt. Although a variety of 
media outlets existed before 2011 and generally during Mubarak’s Egypt, the 
regime maintained tight control over media ownership. Admittedly, Mubarak did 
permit the establishment of private newspapers. However, in order to apply for a 
license from the Supreme Council of Journalism (Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research, 2006), the owning company was compelled to have a 
minimum of one million Egyptian pounds of prepaid capital for daily 
publications, and one owner could not own more than a 10% share in the 
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publication (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006). In 
addition, prospective media owners were obliged to be a joint stock company or a 
co-operative institution (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 
2006) and to follow exceptionally complicated legal procedures. Consequently, 
only wealthy elites - often with strong ties to the Mubarak regime - could afford 
the time and money to start a newspaper. In terms of broadcasting, the ownership 
of private channels, such as the El Mehwar channel, depended on approval from 
the government and the regime. One notable example of the close links between 
the regime and the media is the Sada El Balad Channel, owned by tycoon 
businessman Mohamed Abou El Enin. Abou El Enin was also a parliamentary 
member of Mubarak's ruling party (and is now a firm supporter of President 
Abdel Fatah El Sisi). He used his channel with the primary purpose of voicing the 
government's perspective. The Mubarak regime also controlled satellite broadcast 
channels such as NileSat and adopted a charter alongside other Arab governments 
which asserted the principle of state control over satellite broadcasting (Seib, 
2008; Pintak, 2010).  
Once in operation, media outlets felt obliged to self-censor in order to adhere 
to the regime's pre-set agenda. The Supreme Council of Journalism was 
empowered to shut down newspapers by terminating licenses if they published 
content believed to be a threat to national order, law, and security (Rugh, 2004). 
In addition to the government council having sole power to renew or revoke 
licenses, publication was controlled through the monopolistic national printing 
house (Rugh, 2004). Consequently, so-called opposition and independent 
newspapers were required to abide by certain limitations. Criticism of Mubarak’s 
regime by journalists at media organisations was not tolerated and often came at 
the risk of considerable personal and institutional penalties. In one incident, 
Egyptian journalist Ibrahim Eissa was taken to court for reporting news about 
Mubarak's health and corruption. He was accused of reporting information that 
threatened the country's stock market and, as a result, was sentenced to six 
months imprisonment (Heslop, 2012).  Similarly, in 2002, Al Nabaa and El 
Destour newspapers were shut down after publishing stories which were regarded 
by the regime as inciting religious hatred (Eissa, 2015). The Supreme Council of 
Journalism justified the closure of the newspapers by claiming the news stories 
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threatened national security by inflaming Christian sentiment (Asharq Al Awsat, 
2001). Other common justifications for newspaper shutdowns included claims 
that their content had a malign influence on 'moral', 'social’ or ‘cultural values', or 
that it acted as a tool for 'spreading propaganda' (Pintak, 2010).  
The government’s low tolerance for press and media freedom bred a culture of 
self-censorship. Naguib Sawiris, a prominent and well-connected businessman, 
admitted that fear of persecution plays a large role in the public’s reluctance - as 
well as his own personal reluctance - to oppose the regime. He said that 
incriminating information could be easily faked against journalists courageous 
enough to speak out (Sakr, 2013a). In fact, even pan-Arab broadcasters based in 
Egypt - such as Orbit, Dream and El Mehwar - largely avoided criticism of 
Egypt’s government despite the fact that they were given more relative freedom 
than domestic media. Lawrence Pintak (2010) points out that editors of current-
affairs shows at these channels privately advised that they had been given a 
warning by the Mubarak regime to control their coverage and ensure their talk-
shows included heavy representation of the government’s stance on all matters. 
As a result, the overall quality of journals, newspapers and journalists was 
compromised; even professionals often classified themselves as amateurs in the 
field because of the regime’s control over their work (Sakr, 2013a). Journalists 
were often forced to publish content that pleased their employers and managers 
(and ultimately the regime) due to fear, lack of education, lack of 
professionalism, as well as economic need rooted in the possibility that doing 
otherwise would lead to them losing their jobs. An alternative to this was 
migration; several journalists left for Gulf states in the knowledge that, despite 
equally restrictive media policies, they would find higher salaries (Rugh, 2004). 
One notable exception to this state of affairs can be seen in Al Jazeera, a news 
channel launched in Qatar in 1996, which played a strong role in the period 
directly preceding the 2011 uprisings. Unlike state channels and private channels 
headquartered in Egypt, Al Jazeera produced content that opposed the Mubarak 
regime’s stance on many occasions. Al Jazeera’s journalists encouraged public 
participation in news journalism and were critical of all aspects of social, 
economic and political life in the region, thereby exposing "the cruel failings of 
the Arab order" for all Arab citizens to see (Seib, 2008). In the 2005 
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parliamentary elections, for example, the state-run Egyptian channels did not 
report the violence that occurred during the voting process, whereas Al Jazeera 
ran footage of voters with bloody faces and thugs waving machetes while police 
officers stood by (Seib, 2008). The channel also reported that judges admitted to 
the fact the elections were fraudulent and that the police intimidated potential 
voters (Seib, 2008). Mustafa El Menshawy believed that Al Jazeera coverage 
shifted official attempts by state-run stations to deny or disregard the electoral 
violations (Seib, 2008). In addition, Al Jazeera played an essential role in 
highlighting even the most taboo of social issues such as gender discrimination, 
religious discrimination and unemployment (Rugh, 2004).  
Although, Al Jazeera’s news and current affairs programming did not directly 
cause the political upheavals in Egypt and in other Arab countries, its bold 
approach to journalism offered an alternative narrative to state-controlled and 
state-sponsored media, which may have begun to alter political perceptions. 
Salama Ahmed Salama, a renowned columnist and former managing editor of Al 
Ahram newspaper, explained that Al Jazeera threw a stone in the stagnant waters 
of the official and traditional media (El Nawawy and Iskander, 2008). Yosri 
Fouda, an Egyptian journalist and television anchor, noted that the reaction of the 
government to Al Jazeera proceeded in three phases. The first phase was utter 
shock resulting in the withdrawal of ambassadors from Qatar. The second phase 
was a series of smear campaigns, which involved arrests and harassment of 
journalists and the closing down of bureaux. The regime repeatedly threatened to 
forbid Al Jazeera from having studios and correspondents in Egypt and even 
threatened to ban the channel from broadcasting by satellite from Egypt (Lynch, 
2013). The Egyptian government also accused Al Jazeera of threatening national 
order and security, inciting civil disorder, poisoning Arab society and ripping that 
society apart. When this failed, the third phase was an attempt to dilute Al 
Jazeera’s influence by flooding the television market with alternatives. The 
government launched new channels, copying the style of Al Jazeera. Egyptians 
soon found ‘daring’ programs on their local television called 'In Depth', 
'Breakthrough', and 'Without Censorship' (Miles, 2005). This approach was 
necessary because the attempts of the Mubarak regime to portray themselves as 
supporters (and promoters) of freedom would be threatened if Al Jazeera was 
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banned. Unable to ban the channel, their only recourse was to dilute its influence. 
As such, Al Jazeera continued to elude state control, providing Egyptian 
audiences a new avenue of gaining information and significantly challenging the 
political narrowness which had previously characterised the Egyptian public 
sphere.     
Thus, the state of the media pre-2011 was one based on fear and control as 
opposed to the tenets of a free media environment. While there were some 
exceptions to this, such as Al Jazeera, these were few. After the 2011 uprisings, 
government manipulation of the media became less visible to the public. The only 
real change that happened in the media environment was that state control went 
from a direct strategy to an indirect strategy, in the sense that it became less 
visible. Under Nasser’s regime, the state manipulated the press’ production. Later 
on, under Mubarak, control shifted to printing houses and every publication was 
censored to avoid controversial content. The so-called censorial controllers were 
employed in each publishing house, in order to do the media’s censoring job. This 
form of media control proved very efficient, because employees were 
professional journalists who knew how to present the news in an attractive and 
credible way, despite being censored (Yasin, 2011). 
Immediately after the 2011 uprising and Mubarak’s resignation, the state 
media publishing houses faced two battles: removing the existing chief editors 
who were symbols of the old regime, and eliminating the huge income scales of 
the journalists, in order to decrease disparity. The new editors were named by the 
staff, but were not chosen based on professional criteria. They were, rather, 
chosen based on who had the most experience in the news area. Many of them 
were selected as a form of revenge against those who had served Mubarak for a 
long time. Consequently, during this transition, the media lacked professional 
managers. Instead, managers simply wanted to please the staff and increased 
salaries based on sympathies, in order to keep their positions, a move which 
created a new opportunity for the state to have a good reason to once again 
appoint their chosen individuals in chief editor positions: 
Under the interim governments which followed Mubarak’s 
resignation, a Deputy Prime Minister was assigned to implement the 
45 
prerogatives of the then-dissolved Shura Council, and appoint the 
editors-in-chief of state press. In the short period in which the 
Ministry of Information was abolished, the functions of this 
Ministry were exercised by the government-appointed heads of [the 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union] ERTU. After the formation 
of the Muslim Brotherhood government, the new Shura Council 
appointed new editors-in-chief of state publications, sparking the 
indignation of journalists. They considered these nominations as an 
attempt to circumvent long-standing requests to free this process 
from the authority of the Shura Council.  
(Issawi, 2012) 
This new wave of nominations generated some protests inside the journalists’ 
community who were demanding an end to any form of subordination to the 
Shura-controlled Supreme Press Council, but no real changes have taken place, as 
Ahram reported: 
(…)the new editors replicated the old managerial style. They did not 
take any measures for liberalising the internal structures such as 
enforcing editorial independence and setting clear editorial policy 
and standards. There were no real changes inside newsrooms. 
(Egypt Independent, 2012) 
The journalist Issam Zakariya from the Roz el-Youssif publication described in 
a very clear manner what truly happened in the media after the uprisings, stating 
that after the January 25th uprisings, the media only suffered an internal shock 
instead of a real revolution that should have brought real changes in terms of 
editorial practices. This led to major losses in audience, as people were less 
trusting of the media than they had been during the Mubarak regime (Walker and 
Orttung, 2012).  
 
It is important to note, however, the state media did not behave in a uniform 
manner. In some sense, this was due to a lack of directives. The end of the 
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Mubarak regime had an effect in this regard: it left the state media in a situation 
wherein official guidance had disappeared and yet attitudes had not shifted. 
Obedience and the bureaucracy had not totally disappeared, despite the end of the 
regime: 
The idea of prohibited information no longer exists but journalists 
are used to it. They continue to define new red lines even if no one 
asked them to do so. They had to be reassured by the publication of 
the information by private media to consider the news as non-
prohibited  
(Interview with Gamal Fahmy, the first secretary of the journalists 
Syndicate, in Issawi, 2012).  
It is clear that the systems of the regime, and the punishments associated with 
disobedience, continued to play a role. In the absence of official direction, state 
journalists looked toward private media for confirmation; if private media 
channels reported on an incident or story without consequence, state media would 
be reassured. Many state media journalists who were trying to do their job (and 
broadcast facts as they were truly happening) faced bureaucratic and censorship 
measures, or at least attempts to censor them: 
Our correspondent was not relying on the news provided by the 
official news agency as we used to do. He was in the street, when 
the police issued a communiqué saying that they did not use gunfire, 
our correspondent was reporting live showing us the empty cartridge 
in streets. We were telling what we were seeing and not what we 
were told to say. (…) Our major problem is our editors who still 
follow the old practices, such as waiting for the government to issue 
a communiqué before reporting on the events. The quality of 
reporting is very much linked to the personality of the editor of the 
day. There is no clear editorial policy. 
(Interview with a Nile TV reporter, in Issawi, 2012) 
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As such, the existence of bureaucracy and culture of obedience after the end of 
the Mubarak regime led to both the continuation of the previous system, and 
attempts to reform it on the side of some journalists. However, while the lack of 
an editorial policy may have encouraged more active journalistic pursuits in some 
areas, there were exceptions. Some institutions, such as the military, remained 
untouched by media coverage, and only the state media reported news about 
them, and even this was done sparingly and according to strict guidelines. These 
military institutions were the most feared by people all over the country and no 
one reported anything beyond the official communiqués. Nevertheless, although 
with great caution, there has been some criticism concerning SCAF, while the 
military institution remained protected by Law 313 that prohibited any coverage 
about it without the consent of the Director of Military Intelligence. Breaking 
these prohibitions was a real taboo among journalists, who faced the possibility of 
arrest or, at least, a trial before military courts. Even though these rules generated 
massive protests, the journalists who dared to cross this red line and report 
criticisms against SCAF or military institutions faced hundreds of days of arrest, 
torture, etc. (Walker and Orttung, 2012).    
In fact, during the time of the Muslim Brotherhood’s government there was an 
unprecedented wave of legal trials against journalists. This sharpened the gap 
between the liberal media and the state media journalists, but it also led to a 
greater diversification of perspectives among the state media’s representatives. 
The Muslim Brotherhood chose to control the media almost as much as Mubarak 
had done and the intimidation of journalists through repressive methods generated 
a major debate on state-controlled media. Around 30 cases, against different 
journalists, were initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood government who claimed 
that they had insulted President Morsi or the Muslim religion (Issawi, 2012). 
Asked about this situation, the Minister of Information tried to cover the 
government’s tracks with legal statements:  
The law allows any citizen to resort to legal cases against 
expressions of defamation targeting the president given that he is 
representing them and they elected him. This is our law. The 
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president did not intervene personally against any journalist. Most 
importantly, no journalist has been imprisoned under these cases. 
(The former Minister of Information under the Brotherhood 
government declaration, in Issawi, 2012) 
However, an important progressive measure was the fact that arrests-before-
trial had been stopped, even though the Muslim Brotherhood continued to 
dominate state media. Furthermore, according to different TV and radio 
broadcasts, “(…) any change in leadership is irrelevant. All the second and third 
rank managers are known to be members of the Mubarak regime’s party” 
(Somaya al-Shinnawy of Egyptian TV and radio interview in Issawi, 2012). 
Basically, as stated previously, the media had not suffered a real uprising and the 
changes were only superficial or repressed by the state.  
Media staff’s reactions to state manipulation can be categorised into three 
groups. Some individuals simply obeyed instructions, fearing the loss of their 
jobs and freedom. The second group pleaded for an improvement to working 
conditions, not mentioning anything about the political agenda. The third group 
(the smallest) vehemently protested against state control and pleaded for media 
independence. Nevertheless, their protests have never been broadcast and most of 
the time they were dismissed as people making chaotic expressions of their 
personal frustrations (Walker and Orttung, 2012). Although the government 
denied it, the trend was to lower any voices of radical or critical opinions 
concerning the government. There were even rumours about a black-list with 
persona non-grata who had criticised the regime, rumours which were not denied 
by the head of the news department: 
“if a guest is employing obscene expressions and using our platform 
to settle personal accounts, he cannot be a regular guest with us. I 
asked the staff to invite the wise people and the moderate voices; 
those who have constructive opinions that unite and not divide” 
(according to Issawi, 2012).  
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The Arabic Network of Human Rights Information reported almost 30 cases of 
abuses against media staff during the Muslim Brotherhood government, ranging 
from public prosecution to arbitrary income cuts, work suspensions or 
administrative investigations. The Minister of Information claimed that: 
“In any media system, journalists and staff can be subject to 
investigation when they commit professional mistakes. A presenter, 
for example, praised a guest while he was expressing insults. This is 
not professional. Will [sic] this be accepted in western media?” 
(Interview with the Minister of Information, in Issawi, 2012).  
Thus, it is clear that the media faced different challenges in the aftermath of 
the uprisings than before, but that these challenges shared a commonality in that 
they limited a truly free media environment. During Mubarak’s regime, this could 
be seen through censorship by the state, bureaucracy to limit the creation of new 
channels, centralized printing, a culture of fear based on the threat of 
imprisonment, self-censorship on the basis of that fear, among others. After 
Mubarak’s regime, the media continued to face challenges. These challenges 
included a continuation of self-censorship as a result of uncertainty and habit, the 
continued threat of imprisonment by the Muslim Brotherhood, fear of SCAF, and 
a culture of obedience ingrained into the sector from years under Mubarak. While 
the post-2011 situation was less restricted, and several journalists did in fact 
attempt to report accurately and objectively, the threat of the state remained a 
genuine fear that limited true change for the majority in this regard.  
  2.6. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of Egypt between 2011 and 2015 requires an understanding of a 
complex system of relationships between various bodies within the state. As such, 
the 2011 uprisings, and their aftermath, cannot be discussed without first 
providing a foundational knowledge of these relationships and the manner in 
which they existed before 2011. This is particularly true given the focus of this 
thesis on three aspects of this time period: (i) the role of social media in relation 
to its effect on political interaction and interaction norms in rural Egypt; (ii) the 
role of social capital in terms of its effect on political interaction among rural 
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Egyptians in the public sphere, taking into consideration the state of rural 
interaction with social media; and (iii) the effect of media coverage on the 
uprisings in rural Egypt, in terms of the media’s role in invigorating micro-public 
spheres and contributing to the strengthening of social capital in rural Egypt. In 
order to provide this foundation, this chapter has given an overview of rural 
Egypt, a background of formal and informal political participation in Egypt, a 
brief outline of barriers to social media use in rural Egypt, and a review of the 
relationship between the media and state. To do this fully, this chapter has moved 
beyond the confines of the 4-year period between 2011 and 2015, highlighting 
information from that period as well as the 10 years that preceded it. This 
information, while contextual, is necessary for the analysis provided in the 
following chapters.  
In terms of Egypt’s rural areas, it has been shown that the four governorates in 
which in-depth study was conducted - Qalyoubia, Menoufia, Minya, and South 
Sinai - provide a diverse sample of Egypt’s rural citizens. Each of the 
governorates has a unique history and location, as well as differences in economic 
and socio-political reality. This allows for commonalities to be found in terms of 
participation, and for these commonalities to be analysed in light of the 
differences between each governorate. Moreover, this overview ensures a focus 
on each rural area as an independent entity, providing a fuller view of rural Egypt 
as a result. Finally, this overview acts as a basis for understanding the interview 
data used throughout the thesis. 
On the other hand, the background provided into formal and informal 
participation in Egypt acts as a top-line perspective on political participation in 
the country. It is shown that Egypt’s citizens, rural and urban, prefer formal 
participation to its informal counterpart. However, the importance of informal 
political participation is also highlighted in terms of physical resistance (such as 
the uprisings themselves) as well as participation through social media. Groups 
on social media, such as “We are All Khaled Said,” have been introduced to shed 
light on socio-political concerns that Egypt’s citizens find most concerning, 
namely corruption, police brutality, and social injustice.  
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Given the importance that scholars have placed on social media’s role in 
Egypt’s uprisings, this chapter has also attempted to convey the level of social 
media access that existed within rural Egypt, as well as the barriers that prevent 
that access. These barriers - linguistic, educational, economic, infrastructural, and 
socio-cultural - are prevalent and, given the fact that over 50% of Egypt’s 
population is rural, highly significant for an understanding of the role of rural 
citizens in the uprisings. Furthermore, this allows for a discussion of the 
commonalities that exist between rural areas despite historical and cultural 
differences between them.  
Finally, in this chapter, a brief review has been given of the relationship 
between the media and the state prior to and following 2011. Pre-2011, it has 
been shown that the media faced challenges that arose due to a direct connection 
between media and state. These challenges included centralized printing, 
censorship by the state, bureaucracy to limit the creation of new channels, a 
culture of fear based on the threat of imprisonment, and self-censorship on the 
basis of that fear. These challenges meant that the media could not, in fact, 
operate as an uncoerced public sphere for the discussion of citizens’ concerns. In 
the aftermath of the uprisings, the media landscape changed. However, this 
change came with its own challenges. While, admittedly, several journalists 
attempted to enact change that would lead to a truer and more accurate media, 
this proved difficult. For the most part, the landscape in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings was characterized by a continuation of the self-censorship culture, the 
continued threat of imprisonment by the Muslim Brotherhood, fear of SCAF, and 
a culture of obedience ingrained into the sector from years under Mubarak. 
Thus, the contextual information in this chapter should act as an overview of 
the historical, political, and cultural considerations that must be taken into 
account for a full understanding of this thesis and its analysis. This information is 
the context from which the analysis of this thesis stems and, as such, acts as an 
introductory and foundational background. The following chapters will deal with 
literature - both theoretical and historical - addressed in this thesis, methods of 
research, and the primary research topics: (i) the role of social media in relation to 
its effect on political interaction and interaction norms in rural Egypt; (ii) the role 
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of social capital in terms of its effect on political interaction among rural 
Egyptians in the public sphere, taking into consideration the state of rural 
interaction with social media; and (iii) the effect of media coverage on the 
uprisings in rural Egypt, in terms of the media’s role in invigorating micro-public 
spheres and contributing to the strengthening of social capital in rural Egypt.  
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3. Chapter 2 - Egyptian Media & Political Interaction: A 
Scholarly Overview 
3.1. Background 
In 2010 and 2011, a series of popular uprisings changed the political arena of the 
Middle East and North Africa. In Egypt, weeks of growing protests and intense 
street clashes - compounded by fierce international pressure - resulted in the 
unexpected downfall of President Hosni Mubarak's regime. Ostensibly, the 
Mubarak regime had maintained control of the Egyptian people through a 
powerful and repressive state apparatus that included the Central Security Forces 
and the State Security Investigations Service. Egyptian politics had long been 
suffocated by the regime’s repressive and manipulative grip (Sakr, 2013a); 
freedom of expression was stifled, corruption was prevalent and detention 
without trial was a regular response to acts of political opposition or activism. In 
this context, state-controlled media also played an important role. In keeping with 
a number of other dictatorial Arab regimes, Mubarak’s government maintained a 
tight and ruthless control on the flow of public information and opinion. State-
controlled television stations glorified the regime while maintaining a 
monotonous and toxic brew of official pronouncements. Editorials were highly 
regulated and rigorously censored to uphold government standpoints. Often, these 
editorials were written directly by the intelligence agencies themselves (Lynch, 
2013). Mubarak’s regime appeared impregnable.  
The late-2000s, however, proved to be a time of change. Resentment and 
dissatisfaction surfaced as Egyptian society grew more disillusioned with a ruling 
class that proved itself corrupt, arrogant, and increasingly out-of-touch (Lynch, 
2013). Economically, the regime failed to produce jobs for the growing 
population, resulting in a widening gap between rich and poor (Sakr, 2013a). 
Furthermore, Egypt’s youth were frustrated by the lack of change in the country 
and its high cost of living. Critically, Marc Lynch notes that these young 
Egyptians had long since given up hope that their leaders might themselves 
change (Lynch, 2013). According to Elseewi (Elseewi, 2011), these issues in 
combination with a dilapidated educational system, an ineffectual pretence of a 
democratic structure, and the continued valorisation of a patriarchal culture paved 
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the way for popular unrest. Therefore, as evident from these findings, the 
uprisings and civil unrest in Egypt had a number of political, economic and social 
causes. 
In terms of execution, however, one of the main features attributed to the 2011 
uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa was the emergence of digital 
media technologies and social media tools. In fact, many news reports from the 
period suggest that the execution of the Egyptian uprising was primarily 
dependent on social media and the communicative and collaborative 
opportunities it provided (Gustin, 2011). It must be noted that world history has 
provided several examples of political uprisings and revolutions that were 
successfully conducted prior to the existence and prevalence of social media 
technologies. As such, there is a possibility that the effect of Facebook or Twitter 
may have been overestimated by news journalists, both at the time and in 
subsequent reporting. This makes the role of social media in the Egyptian 
uprising a subject of importance in academic research.  
Lynch (2013) observes that although the Arab regimes in general (and Egypt's 
regime in particular) had always been considered incompetent and corrupt in the 
West, changes in the information and news media environment managed to give 
voice and solid expression to the oppressed. As Lynch notes, perhaps the Arab 
regimes had always been bickering. Nevertheless, satellite television stations such 
as Al Jazeera, when combined with the increased penetration of social media in 
the region, meant that Arab leaders could no longer go about their business in 
private while suppressing all signs of discontent from the public eye (Lynch, 
2013). Naomi Sakr (2013a) posits that the growth in social media penetration, in 
particular, led to a situation wherein Egypt’s populace could receive and impart 
information intranationally and internationally at a level far beyond anything the 
region had ever experienced previously. New communication technologies in the 
form of satellite television, social media and cheap mobile phones all worked to 
change the nature of political communication, creating new public spheres and 
forms of communication. These new communication technologies created a less 
restricted environment for discussions related to governance and politics. As a 
result, a new public sphere was created that had more political interactions within 
society and political deliberations between citizens. According to Lynch (2013), 
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enhanced political interactions promote awareness of fundamental changes in 
society as well as their role in that society, elevate understanding of political 
ideologies and social challenges, and engender active participation in national 
conversations. Due to the new media landscape, Sakr (2013a) observes that 
journalists and reporters in Egypt’s mainstream media had a novel means of 
challenging misinformation from Mubarak’s dictatorial regime and his ruling 
National Democratic Party, providing new insights into its ills. The free flow of 
information and the explosion of public discourse and open debate facilitated by 
the new media are deemed to have shattered one of the core pillars of the 
authoritarian system (Lynch, 2013).  
The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of the new media environment, 
specifically the synergy between social media and satellite television, on the 
public sphere and political interactions of rural Egypt in order to assess the role 
social media played in neglected areas of Egypt during the 2011 uprisings. As 
relating to political interaction, this thesis will focus on deliberation on 
participation of voting in elections, the difference between participation with (and 
joining of) new political parties before and after the uprisings, and the extent to 
which citizens in rural areas were participants in political deliberations in the 
public sphere. In order to provide a theoretical basis for this research, the chapter 
will review three strands of existing literature. First, it will draw on Jurgen 
Habermas’s ideal of the public sphere to assess the nature of the media 
environment in Egypt prior, during and after the uprisings; this will be used as a 
means of understanding the impact of traditional and social media in Egyptian 
public discourse. This will depict the environment for political deliberation, 
which can impact political interaction. Second, literature on the emergence of the 
relationship between traditional and social media will be analysed within the 
context of a convergent media environment as a whole, which will clarify the role 
of new media (rather than solely social media) in the uprisings. Throughout the 
chapter, agenda setting theory will be included due to its ability to explain how 
Egyptian media functions and relates to the public sphere and convergent media 
concepts. Third and finally, the literature will include a consideration of social 
capital in order to assess the difference of the convergent media environment 
between governorates in relation to social capital of the people in each area.  To 
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achieve this, the review will investigate the context of the Egyptian media from 
ten years prior to the uprising and after the 2011 uprisings. 
There are a range of extant studies examining the Egyptian media, produced to 
determine the differences in the political interaction of the citizenry before and 
after the uprising. This study will commence by using the idea of the public 
sphere as the first concept in creating the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
This was done to demonstrate the forms of political deliberation taking place in 
Egypt whilst considering the changes that emerged in the public sphere during the 
timeframe being reviewed. Such a timeframe will provide groundwork for an 
explanation of the changes in political deliberation and its norms. By reviewing 
the context of the media both ten years before the uprisings and after the 2011 
uprisings until the end of 2015, one will be able to assess its impact on the public 
sphere and its relation to political deliberation, which impacts political 
interactions. Firstly, the section will examine the relevant literature on the public 
sphere and the Egyptian media environment. Secondly, the symbiotic relationship 
between traditional and social media will be analysed with a particular focus on 
the convergence that emerged after 2011 and the new norms of political 
deliberation, all of which form a part of the public sphere and impact political 
participation. The basis for this analysis will be Admire Mare’s (2013) assertion 
that one of the reasons for the opening up of access to the media environment is 
the symbiotic relationship between traditional and social media. It is important to 
note here that the agenda setting function must be taken into consideration since it 
plays a major role in the Egyptian media environment and, as such, impacts the 
public sphere. This will present a starting point for the framework that will 
conceptualise the media environment, which will be examined as one of the core 
factors of the research in this thesis. 
3.2. The Political Context of the Egyptian Media System  
 Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) note it is not possible to understand 
the role and nature of the media without understanding the political context in 
which the media functions. This includes the nature of the state, the system of the 
political parties, the pattern of relations between economic and political interests, 
and the development of civil society, which is in turn affected by the politics of 
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the state. It is worth briefly outlining, therefore, the central features of Egypt’s 
political system. Egypt was considered a Republic under the five-term rule of 
Hosni Mubarak. Theoretically, the state was organised under a multi-party semi-
presidential system, with power divided between the president and prime 
minister. In practice, this was not the case; power rested solely with the president. 
Moreover, Egypt held regular multi-party parliamentary elections. The last 
presidential election before the 2011 uprisings, in which Mubarak won a fifth 
consecutive term, was held in September, 2005. In late February, 2005, Mubarak 
indicated in an unannounced television broadcast that he had ordered the reform 
of the country's presidential election law, paving the way for multi-candidate 
polls in the upcoming presidential election. This meant that, for the first time 
since the 1952 movement, the Egyptian people were apparently being given the 
power to elect a leader from a list of various candidates (Rugh, 2004). As the 
president explained, his initiative came "out of [his] full conviction of the need to 
consolidate efforts for more freedom and democracy". However, as became 
evident, exorbitant restrictions were placed on the filing for presidential 
candidacies. These restrictions, designed to prevent any candidates from opposing 
Mubarak, cemented the road for his easy victory and re-election (Lynch, 2006). 
Following the 2005 parliamentary elections, the public began to consistently 
express their views regarding the election process, with specific focus being 
placed on public concerns regarding fraud, vote rigging, violence and police 
brutality by pro-Mubarak supporters to opposition demonstrators (Sakr, 2013a).  
Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, (2013) classify the nation's political system 
before the 2011 uprisings as being characterised by 'Patrimonialism' and, in 
extreme terms, 'Sultanism'. The latter is defined by Max Weber as "domination 
that develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal 
instruments of the master". Considering Egypt, Mubarak was head of most 
government departments and official head of the army. In such systems, there is 
no effective role for state officials because they are seen as the household staff of 
the sultan. One pertinent example of this is Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak’s son, who 
was known to interfere in economic policies and enact economic changes without 
holding any related official post in the government. This highlights that the 
Mubarak regime was, in fact, characterized by sultanistic measures, and that these 
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measures took precedence over official state roles (Stepan and Linz, 2013). 
Mubarak’s political approach was reflected in his handling of the media; his 
regime offered the impression of liberalisation while simultaneously pursuing a 
policy of ever-tightening media control through media ownership, censorship, 
agenda setting, and legal controls (Cottle, 2011). Before considering these 
elements of Mubarak’s approach to the media system in more detail, it is worth 
briefly outlining Habermas’ theory of the public sphere to provide a theoretical 
background to the discussion.   
In his influential work, The Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas 
sets out a model of an ideal public sphere. According to Habermas, the ideal form 
of public sphere is the informal environment where people discuss political issues 
and debates. Their discussions are free of domination and participants in this 
public debate do so on an equal basis. Within this public sphere, people rationally 
discuss and decide how they want their government to develop, which in turn 
shapes government policy (Habermas, 1989). According to Habermas, a public 
sphere that is adequate to a democratic polity largely relies on both the quality of 
the discourse and the quantity of participation (Calhoun, 1992). Habermas 
developed his concept of the public sphere based on the European context of the 
early modern period as a result of the evolution of what he termed a critical 
discourse in informal settings such as coffee houses and salons. In his view, this 
was reliant on the rise of national and territorial power regimes based on capitalist 
economic structures. These developments meant people were able to discuss and 
evaluate their views, eventually formulating a public opinion regarding issues of 
common concern. Political decisions were made on the basis of rational analysis 
of competing positions and empirical evidence. Consequently, political leaders no 
longer had absolute rights to impose their legitimacy; rather, they were expected 
to fulfil the people’s will which took shape and acquired expression in the 
emerging political public sphere. For Habermas, the public sphere was not 
necessarily permanent once it had emerged, and he chronicled a decline of the 
public sphere in Europe as powerful commercial, government, and media 
interests sought to influence and control the nature of political debate (Habermas, 
1989). There are problems transferring Habermas’s conceptualisation of the 
public sphere to the Egyptian context. In particular it is questionable whether the 
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same sort of public sphere Habermas described as emerging in early modern 
Europe ever emerged in Egypt. After all, the socio-legal and religious context of 
early modern Egypt under the Ottoman Empire was markedly different to that of 
Europe. Nevertheless, in the context of the 2011 uprising – an uprising that can be 
broadly understood as a call for ‘democratic’ reforms that include a Habermasian 
conception of freedom to debate political issues - Habermas’s ideal can be used 
as a backdrop against which to analyse the state of Egypt’s public sphere prior to 
the uprising.    
One of the central features that critics have identified as undermining the 
flourishing of the public sphere is the concentration of media ownership in the 
hands of the state or a small group of powerful elites (McChesney, 1999; 
McQuail, 2005). This concentration limits media plurality, and leads to a situation 
wherein financial and political pressures from the state and private actors within it 
leads to news content that conforms to their interests (Altschull, 1984). Egypt is 
an example of this kind of situation where, despite a wide variety of media 
outlets, there was tight control over ownership by the regime. Private newspapers 
exist, but the restrictions and limitations placed on their establishment is high, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. As a consequence, only wealthy elites - often 
with strong ties and relationships to the Mubarak regime - have the time and 
money to start a newspaper. The situation was similar with broadcasting, where 
the ownership of private channels, such as the El Mehwar channel, was dependent 
on approval from the government and the regime. The Mubarak regime also 
controlled satellite broadcast channels such as NileSat and adopted a charter 
alongside other Arab governments which asserted the principle of state control 
over satellite broadcasting (Seib, 2008; Pintak, 2010). 
Due to these restrictions and limitations, self-censorship was prevalent. The 
Supreme Council of Journalism was empowered to shut down newspapers by 
terminating their licenses if they published content that was believed to be a 
threat to national order, law, and security (Rugh, 2004). In addition to the 
government council having sole power to renew or revoke licenses, publication 
was controlled through the monopolistic national printing house (Rugh, 2004). 
Criticism of the regime by media organisations, or journalists within those 
organisations, often came at the risk of personal and institutional penalties. One 
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example of this is the case of Ibrahim Eissa - the journalist who was accused of 
threatening the country’s stock market and sentenced to six months imprisonment 
on the basis of a story on Mubarak’s health and corruption - which has previously 
been discussed (Heslop, 2012). As a result of the potential for severe punishment, 
and the fear this engendered, the overall quality of journals, newspapers and 
journalists was compromised, with professionals often classifying themselves as 
amateurs in the field of because of the regime’s control over their work (Sakr, 
2013a). Journalists were often forced to publish content that pleased their 
employers and managers (and ultimately the regime) due to fear, lack of 
education, lack of professionalism, as well as economic need rooted in the 
possibility that doing otherwise would lead to them losing their jobs.  
In addition to the phenomena of self-censorship, fear, oligopoly in media 
ownership, and patrimonialism, such media systems are also controlled through 
the agenda setting function. This will be explained in detail in the following 
section. 
3.2.1 Agenda Setting Theory in Relation to Public Sphere 
Agenda setting theory concerns the causal interrelations underlying the way in 
which the dominant agenda of the mass media comes to exert such sizeable 
influence on the public, particularly insofar as the media shapes popular 
perceptions. In essence, then, agenda setting theory holds that there is a direct 
correlation between the agenda of the media (in the form of issues given the most 
coverage, time and attention) and the agenda of the public (in terms of the issues 
they deem most important). Thus, as the media’s agenda changes, the public’s 
agenda shifts in direct correlation to reflect this. The news media therefore acts to 
“set the public agenda, [and] since the news media’s ability to cover events is 
limited by time and space, only a few issues muscle their way onto the media 
agenda, shoving aside other issues” (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 2008). It should be 
noted that, in this context, the term “agenda” is “meant purely in a descriptive, 
not a pejorative sense”, and refers merely to matters to be addressed or 
undertaken (Ongaro and Van Thiel, 2017). This theory brings the discussions of 
the previous section into a new light. Since the media’s focus on particular issues 
tends to direct the popular gaze in the same direction, it can be seen that the 
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Mubarak regime’s tight grip on the media led the public agenda toward issues 
that would limit (if not stifle) criticism of the regime. 
Agenda setting theory finds its origins in a study by Maxwell McCombs and 
Donald Shaw (1968) the “Chapel Hill study”. This study examined the correlation 
coefficients between public opinion and the news agenda, using the 1968 United 
States presidential election as its context (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The 
findings showed “evidence of strong agenda-setting effects” of news media 
“among the public”; in particular, a “substantial correlation” was identified 
“between the patterns of coverage in news magazines and the trends in public 
opinion reflected by responses [from Chapel Hill residents] to the Gallup Poll’s 
question about the most important problem facing the country” (McCombs, 
2004). The study concluded that voters “apparently learn” in “direct proportion to 
the emphasis placed on the campaign issues by the mass media” (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972). While the Chapel Hill study was not the first to examine the 
influence of the communications industries on public perception (see for example 
Lippmann, 1922; Cohen, 1963), it was groundbreaking in its methodological 
tenets: bringing together a combination of survey data and content analysis in 
order to examine cognitive effects. 
Since McCombs and Shaw’s foundational study, a significant body of follow-
up research has arisen (McCombs and Shaw, 1972;; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; 
Kosicki, 1993; Roberts and McCombs, 1994; Huckins, 1999; McCombs, 2000; 
McCombs, 2004; McCombs, 2005; Yu and Aikat, 2006; Wallsten, 2007; Sayre et 
al., 2010; McCombs and Stroud, 2014; Vargo et al., 2017). These developments 
have seen the progression of agenda setting theory from “simple techniques of 
ranking issue salience to advanced statistical analyses, as well as being researched 
with qualitative methods” (Bruns et al., 2015). Excepting only a few instances, all 
subsequent (and substantial) scholarly research has corroborated the initial 
findings attesting to marked agenda-setting effects (and the existence of positive 
correlation coefficients). Indeed, nearly every study on agenda setting theory has 
found that the media exerts some order of popular influence via the promulgated 
news agenda (Ansolabehere, 1990). As a consequence, the critical tradition, 
which extends over five decades and touches upon multidisciplinary focus, offers 
strong support for the salience and validity of agenda-setting research – in 
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general. Speaking more specifically, one can conceptualise agenda setting theory 
as containing the principal divisions as follows. Firstly, the apparent 
methodological flexibility - the theory’s widespread utilisation - means that it is 
analytically versatile, insofar as it is open to cross-subject integration. Secondly, 
agenda setting theory can be viewed as a new research paradigm in that it 
fundamentally changed and re-directed critical opinion on mass media influence 
(which, hitherto, had not been afforded anything like as much significance). 
Indeed, scholars agree that agenda setting constitutes one of the most important, 
influential and “scientifically prolific” research models to have arisen in previous 
decades (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). Thirdly, the theory is adaptive, having 
(especially in recent years) extended its scope to contexts outside of public affairs 
and expanded its purview on key findings, thus enabling greater analytical depth 
(McCombs et al., 2014). 
So, one can summarise that agenda setting theory encompasses a 
methodologically versatile, scientifically prolific and influential critical approach, 
as well as one that is analytically adaptive. These particular traits – characterised 
by adaptability – are of primary importance in the context of the current study, 
which specifically foregrounds the shifting relationships between media 
technologies, news agendas, and public perception. In other words, agenda setting 
theory, being concerned with determinant connections between communications 
processes and cognitive effects, is not confined to any platform-specific media 
context. As a result, even though the theory of agenda setting “was 
conceptualised before the fragmentation now evidenced in the twenty-first 
century new media climate”, its “continued prolific usage, not only within the 
field of political communications”, indicates its methodological “strength” 
(Johnson, 2013). Indeed, according to McCombs (2013) “communications is a 
process which can include any set of objects – or a single object – competing for 
attention among journalists and various audiences”. The expansion of the theory 
to accommodate heterogeneous contexts for agenda-setting has ensured its 
relevance in the rapidly shifting contemporary media marketplace (Anderson, 
2010). A prime example of this is the emergence of “Intermedia Agenda Setting”, 
which places focus on “the interaction between different media outlets in setting 
each other’s news agenda” (Vargo et al., 2017), with online/alternative media 
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now commanding more agenda-setting power than traditional broadcast and print 
media in some analyses (Meraz, 2011). The theory has likewise evolved more 
nuanced perspectives on shifts in generational media consumption habits 
(Coleman and McCombs, 2007). In agenda setting theory, then, one finds a 
methodological approach and analytical framework that is systematic and precise, 
yet adequately expansive and adaptable. This is relevant for the demands of the 
current thesis because this evolution is related to the convergent media 
environment, which is focused on while analysing social media impact in rural 
Egypt. Therefore, discussion will return to the agenda setting function and its 
relationship to the convergent media later on in the chapter. This will be done 
following a thorough accounting and explanation of the convergent environment 
in Egypt, since an understanding of both the agenda setting function and the 
convergent media will be necessary before highlighting the manner in which they 
relate.  
The past sections have demonstrated that the extent of freedom for traditional 
media journalism in society – one of the key considerations in any assessment of 
the state of the public sphere – was severely compromised under the Mubarak 
regime. Media freedom was affected by restrictive laws that were empowered, in 
some cases, to jail journalists and shut down newspapers at will. Egypt’s 
traditional media system under Mubarak fell short of the principle democratic 
roles of the media according to traditional liberal theory. Egyptian media was not 
acting independently, nor as a state watchdog. Furthermore, it was incapable of 
furthering the public interest in cases of government malpractice (Curran, 2003). 
Mubarak’s regime encouraged the media to self-censor, used fear and repression 
to stifle criticism of his government, and ultimately suppressed opposition 
movements. The regime also regularly interfered with the media’s agenda setting, 
stifling democratic discourse and controlling the terms of deliberation in the 
public sphere. Drawing on theories which suggest that the marginalisation of 
individuals from the public sphere leads to resignation, apathy, despair and a lack 
of willingness to participate in the national conversation, (Dahl, 1971; Pateman 
1971), many political observers such as Ahmed Ragab and Salama Ahmed 
Salama - both prominent political journalists - felt that Mubarak’s regime could 
not be challenged.  
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3.2.2. Al Jazeera: Disrupting Mubarak’s control over the Egyptian Public 
Sphere  
If Mubarak’s control over Egyptian media was so complete, the public sphere 
so compromised and political activity so stifled, the question remains as to how 
the political uprising in 2011 occurred. In his book, The Al Jazeera Effect, Philip 
Seib (2008) notes that traditional ways of shaping global politics have been 
superseded by the influence of new media – satellite television and social media 
in particular. The old dominance of state-structured and territorially-bounded 
public life - mediated by radio, television, newspapers and books - is coming to 
an end. National communication hegemonies are rapidly being eroded by the 
development of a multiplicity of network spaces of communication, which are not 
tied to a close proximity with the territory (Webster and Blom, 2004). The 
satellite channel Al Jazeera, which was launched in Qatar in 1996, was one aspect 
of a new media landscape, which crossed and transcended national boundaries in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Al Jazeera came to be an important player in 
Egypt’s media landscape because the country’s almost 90 million population has 
far easier access to television than to other news sources, with approximately 
94.1% of Egyptians using TV to get their news at least once a week, and 84.2% 
using it daily or most days (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2014). 
Al Jazeera’s journalists encouraged public participation in news journalism 
and were critical of all aspects of social, economic and political life in the region, 
thereby exposing "the cruel failings of the Arab order" for all Arab citizens to see 
(Seib, 2008). In the 2005 parliamentary elections, for example, the state-run 
Egyptian channels did not report the violence that occurred during the voting 
process, whereas Al Jazeera ran footage of voters with bloody faces and thugs 
waving machetes while police officers stood by (Seib, 2008). Futhermore, the 
channel had reports on political and social issues such as fraudulent elections, 
voter intimidation, electoral violations, gender discrimination, religious 
discrimination, and unemployment (Seib, 2008; Rugh, 2004). This bold approach 
to journalism - predicated on a lack of self-censorship and a direct, uncensored 
reporting of events - acted as an alternative narrative to that found in state-
controlled and state-sponsored media. This, in turn, may have served to alter 
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political perceptions in the region and - as noted by renowned columnist and 
former managing editor of Al Ahram newspaper Salama Ahmed Salama - throw a 
stone in the stagnant waters of the official and traditional media (El Nawawy and 
Iskander, 2008). Of course, this approach to journalism did lead to governmental 
reaction. The first reaction was the withdrawal of Egyptian ambassadors from 
Qatar as a response. The second reaction was a series of smear campaigns, 
harassment and arrest of journalists, as well as the closing down of bureaux. 
These campaigns included threats to ban Al Jazeera studios and correspondents 
from the country, threats to ban the channel from broadcasting by satellite from 
Egypt, and accusations against Al Jazeera on the basis that it was threatening 
national order and security, inciting civil disorder, and poisoning Arab society 
(Lynch, 2013). The final reaction was to flood the Egyptian market with 
alternative channels - examples include 'In Depth', 'Breakthrough', and 'Without 
Censorship' - in order to dilute Al Jazeera’s influence (Miles, 2005). However, 
given Mubarak’s attempts at appearing as a democratic leader and defender of 
civil liberties to the international community, banning Al Jazeera was not an 
option. As such, Al Jazeera continued to elude state control, providing Egyptian 
audiences a new avenue of gaining information and significantly challenging the 
political narrowness which had previously characterised the Egyptian public 
sphere.  
According to Nahed Eltantawy and Julie Wiest (2011), Al Jazeera’s coverage 
of Egyptian politics and their continuous broadcasting of Tahrir Square 
contributed significantly to the 2011 uprising. Everyone could watch Al Jazeera 
to find out where and when protests were occurring. In contrast, Egyptian 
television channels during the same period showed little more than the peaceful 
Nile River and the calm Tahrir Square from a safe distance. As noted by Lynch, 
Al Jazeera became the unquestioned home of the revolution across the airwaves. 
Therefore, Al Jazeera is indeed one of the earliest channels developed along 
western lines that dared to challenge and transform conventional forms of news 
media, and soon became one of the factors of Egypt's evolving public sphere. 
Prior to the rise of Al Jazeera in Egypt, citizens experienced apathy and lacked 
credibility in the media. However, Al Jazeera and similar types of media had 
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better credibility and refused to self-censor, which led to decreased apathy in the 
public and the promotion of political deliberation.   
It is clear that the foundation of Al Jazeera constituted a major development in 
the Egyptian media landscape. From the evidence presented thus far, it is also 
apparent that the satellite channel was an important player in the dissemination of 
news and information which challenged the Mubarak regime (Miles, 2005). It is 
in this context that social media platforms worked to further disrupt the regime’s 
tight control of the media system and the public sphere. Similar to Al Jazeera, the 
content on social media platforms did not self-censor and worked outside the 
regime’s tight control.  
3.2.3. Bourdieu: Television & Habitus 
 
Prior to discussing social media, however, it is significant to discuss 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s theories on the concepts of ‘habitus’ and capital, as 
well as his concerns regarding television. Habitus, in Bourdieu’s work, can be 
defined as “a set of acquired dispositions, the internalized interpretive framework, 
rooted in family upbringing and conditioned by one’s position in the social 
structure, through which one perceives the social world and one’s prospects 
within it.” (Bourdieu, 2002). These dispositions determine many aspects of one’s 
life, generating practices, perceptions, and aspirations. As a result, according to 
David Swartz (1997), these dispositions act as master patterns for styles of 
behaviour, and can “find expression in human language, nonverbal 
communication, tastes, values, perceptions, and modes of reasoning.” In this way, 
the circumstances of one’s family upbringing and life experiences act in such a 
fashion as to determine future circumstances and experiences. Essentially, one’s 
primary experience of the world is based on “an adherence to relations of order 
which, because they structure inseparably both the real world and the thought 
world, are accepted as self-evident” (Bourdieu, 1984; Garnham, 1993).  
 
In any case, Bourdieu posits that one’s class determines ‘habitus’, and that 
‘habitus’ is expressed in lifestyle choices; taste, the sign of these lifestyle choices, 
is thus determined by social class. Taste, to Bourdieu, is not arbitrary but is rather 
67 
determined by social status and power; the dominant classes “affirm their high 
social status through consumption of cultural forms consecrated by institutions 
with cultural authority. Through family socialization and formal education, class-
bound tastes for legitimate culture develop alongside aversions for unrefined, 
illegitimate, or popular culture” (Johnston and Baumann, 2007). As such, tastes - 
rather than being personal or autonomous - can be associated with class, and with 
symbolic associations; one may associate certain products with good or poor 
taste, high and low class, or legitimate and illegitimate culture based on habitus.  
 
It is through this paradigm that Bourdieu analyses television - and television 
journalism, or mass media - in his work, On Television. He posits that television 
journalism could be a danger to culture production; this is because of the 
introduction of “heteronomous agents into autonomous worlds,” these agents 
being heteronomous because the field in which their capital is most recognized 
becomes “subordinated to market pressures” (Whelan and Muthuri, 2002; 
Bourdieu, 1998). In order to discuss this concern, it is first important to consider 
the meaning of capital within Bourdieu’s work. Bourdieu’s definition of capital is 
“approximately equivalent to social power” (Fowles, 1999). This can be social 
capital (discussed later in this chapter, but which can be simplified as ‘whom one 
knows’), symbolic capital (in the form of recognition or prestige), or culture 
capital as seen through “expressive preferences gained primarily through 
education” (Fowles, 1999). An understanding of this definition of capital is 
significant when considering television, journalism, culture production, and 
power from Bourdieu’s perspective. 
 
Bourdieu posits that an autonomous field is one in which “producers’ sole 
consumers are their competitors, that is, individuals who could have made the 
discovery in question” (Bourdieu, 1998). Mathematics is such a field. Journalism 
however - including television journalism - is itself a field, but not one that is 
autonomous. This is due to the existence of market pressures within it. These 
occur in two ways. Market pressure is inherent in the field in the form of audience 
ratings, as well as competition without a rational consideration of consequences. 
The field is dependent on ratings for commercial success. These ratings are at 
least partially connected to the novelty and sensationalism of the content. 
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However, this causes a situation wherein “news which might prove dangerous to 
those involved can be broadcast simply to beat out a competitor, with no thought 
given to the danger” (Bourdieu, 1998). This existence of market pressure is a 
structural aspect of the field, but is one that means the field itself is not 
autonomous. 
 
This lack of autonomy has consequences on the content produced. Bourdieu 
(1998) asserts that the competition within the field leads to a situation of 
uniformity that arises through “permanent surveillance (which can turn into 
mutual espionage)” between journalists and their competitors, in order to “profit 
from competitors' failures by avoiding their mistakes, and to counter their 
successes by trying to borrow the supposed instruments of that success.” This 
uniformity can take the form of specific issues to be addressed, topics to be 
covered, individuals to be invited, and more. However, the consequence of this is 
not just uniformity in content, but a subsequent uniformity in values through the 
habitus. Content, rather than being informative, objective, novel or diverse, is 
structurally “oriented toward preserving established values” (Bourdieu, 1998). 
Dominant power structures are thus preserved through the habitus. Given the 
relationship between the media and the state in Egypt, as previously discussed, 
Bourdieu’s findings are interesting for the purpose of this thesis. State channels in 
Egypt, as shown previously and as will be shown throughout this thesis, have an 
influence on the nature of political debate, influencing the media’s agenda setting 
and minimizing negative statements related to the regime. This, in turn, meant 
that the state media continued to preserve the dominant power structures of the 
country. Moreover, the state’s power to revoke license - and several examples of 
this power being used - meant that this uniformity had at its basis a positive 
outlook of the regime, and minimal criticism. Bourdieu (1998) notes that it is 
clear that authorities, the government being a particular example, influence the 
media “not only through the economic pressure that they bring to bear but also 
through their monopoly on legitimate information.” This monopoly also allows 
manipulation of the media agenda, a power that is enhanced through the symbolic 
power of the state when used through actions, decisions, and entry into journalism 
through interviews and conferences, all of which allow them to manipulate “the 
journalistic agenda and the hierarchy of importance assigned to events.” This can 
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be seen through laws in Egypt - a prime example being Law 313 that prohibited 
any coverage about SCAF without the consent of the Director of Military 
Intelligence - as well as through the concentration of media ownership, the 
restrictive requirements for opening media outlets, and the government’s power 
to revoke licenses at any time for any reason  (Rugh, 2004; McChesney, 1999; 
McQuail, 2005). 
 
A second issue of television media, to Bourdieu, is the fact that this field - 
itself subject to market pressures and thus heteronomous - also subjects pressure 
on other, autonomous fields. This introduction of “heteronomous agents into 
autonomous worlds” leads to two distinct issues (Bourdieu, 1998). The first of 
these issues is the fact that, through exposure and the symbolic capital received 
by presence on television, agents are given authority that they would not have 
received from their own fields. In essence, these individuals are given “television 
value, a journalistic weight that is not commensurate with their particular weight 
in their particular world.” In some fields, this weight is even taken into account 
for funding, grants, and subsidies. This means, essentially, that these individuals 
are bypassing the requirements of their own fields, such as peer review, which in 
turn affects power relations between fields. Bourdieu uses the examples of judges 
being influenced by popular appeal, and other judges using television to short-
circuit internal hierarchies, in order to illustrate this point. The second issue that 
arises, however, is closely related to the first. It is the fact that information - and 
autonomous fields - become subject to this critiquing by individuals, groups, and 
social entities without the same cultural capital. These demands, and pressures, 
can be resisted within autonomous fields, but not when subjected to television 
and the engagement of heteronomous agents. Essentially, the more producers 
“aim for the mass market...the more likely they are to collaborate with the powers 
that be - State, Church, or Party, and, today, journalism and television - and to 
yield to their demands or their orders.” 
 
As such, when assessing the role of television journalism as media within 
Egypt’s state channels during the period of the 2011 uprisings, it is important to 
take into consideration the manner in which television can be used for the 
reproduction of dominant social structures, as well as the manner in which this is 
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done through market pressure and the monopoly on legitimate power. To 
Bourdieu (1998), politics is an autonomous field which can be unduly influenced 
by the introduction of “heteronomous agents into autonomous worlds.” 
Therefore, it must be assumed that the involvement of television-journalism in 
politics - and the involvement of politics and the government in television-
journalism - had some form of effect. This should be considered compared to 
social media, which may operate more autonomously. 
 
3.3. Social Media  
In his book Communication Power, Castells (2009) states that social media 
helps to build an "autonomous communication process" that ultimately produces 
effects on political systems and the public consciousness, which in turn leads to 
movements against unjust and corrupt social and political orders. Castells views 
social media as one feature in the emergence of ‘mass self-communication’ 
during the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The term ‘mass self-communication’ 
is derived from the idea that the information is created by the user (that is, the 
individual self) and reaches a general audience (the masses) (Castells, 2009). This 
is the alternative term for "user generated content" (Van Dijck, 2013). Due to the 
mass self-communication nature of social media, Castells argues that "the Arab 
uprisings were spontaneous processes of mobilization that emerged from calls 
from the Internet and wireless communication networks". He believes that 
without social media there would have been no protests whatsoever. Castells 
argues that mass self-communication challenges regimes in power because it 
gives the space for users to express their opinions by means that are otherwise not 
permitted (Castells, 2013). In this section, the extent to which scholars have 
agreed with Castells will be assessed, and the role that has been attributed to 
social media in the literature on the Egyptian uprising in 2011 will be discussed 
and evaluated. 
Returning to Habermas’s concept of the public sphere (which was discussed 
earlier in the chapter), scholars who have further developed Habermas’ original 
work point us to a more nuanced understanding of the public sphere. Rather than 
considering the public sphere as a single entity, John Keane (1995) identifies a 
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macro-public sphere, meso-public sphere and a micro-public sphere. This offers a 
useful starting point from which to assess the potential impact of social media on 
the Egyptian rural public sphere and its role in the political uprisings of 2011. The 
micro-public sphere is represented in a variety of small-scale local spaces in 
which citizens argue and discuss issues of social, economic and political concern. 
This is distinguished from the meso-public sphere; this is the most familiar and 
publicly recognized sphere, representing a space that includes millions of people 
watching, listening or reading from a great distance. As such, these meso-public 
spheres are mediated by large circulation newspapers and by traditional mass 
media companies (Webster and Blom, 2004).  Finally, the macro-public sphere 
resembles hundreds of millions of citizens connected by international media on a 
nation state level. 
As emphasised by Keane, the micro-public sphere is a vital communicative 
space for all social movements. These social movements typically comprise low-
profile networks of small groups, organisations, initiatives, local contacts and 
friendships. Additionally, such local networks utilise a variety of communication 
means such as telephones, faxes, photocopies, camcorders, videos and personal 
computers to question and change "the dominant codes" of everyday life. The 
micro-public sphere consists of communicative spaces such as mosques, 
churches, clinics, or even a political chat over a drink with friends. However, 
paradoxically, and as Keane suggests, the micro public spheres mainly draw their 
strength from the fact that they are mostly latent. Although they appear to be 
functioning on a private scale and are distanced from official public life, political 
parties and media publicity, they do in fact play a crucial role in challenging 
authorities precisely because they operate in unlimited ways that are worthy of 
the attention of civil society (Webster and Blom, 2004). Critically, social media 
transformed this micro-public sphere by opening up new possibilities and 
opportunities of communication between Egyptians. Although not at the forefront 
of the global explosion in social media use, Egypt was not immune to the rise of 
‘mass self-communication’.  
The influence of social media in the Egyptian media system was already 
emerging prior to 2011. Internet and mobile phone penetration, the primary 
method for access to social media, had been increasing throughout the twenty-
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first century; this did not only occur in western and northern states but also in 
less-developed countries. In particular, mobile social media services had become 
increasingly important in countries that had previously lacked a good IT 
infrastructure (Weber, 2011). Egypt is one such example of social media - in the 
form of blogs, Facebook and Twitter - evolving to become significant platforms 
for communication, organisation and political mobilisation (Lynch, 2013). 
Although blogs were initially published solely in English, the development of 
Arabic software led to the proliferation of blogs in Arabic. These blogs became 
widespread, thereby attracting a wider domestic audience. Elseewi (2011) 
contends that social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter were 
replacing the "transnationally-–produced Arabic serial dramas", making ordinary 
citizens "the stars of their own mediated narratives.” Beyond the cultural arena, 
however, blogs and social networking sites also worked to enable “alternative 
political voices to find audiences” (Elseewi, 2011) and Egyptian bloggers were 
becoming prominent because they tackled issues not discussed in politically 
controlled media channels. As such, these social media platforms offered a new 
uncensored avenue that invited media and public deliberation in discussing the 
social and political issues facing the nation. 
Prior to the 2011 uprisings, social media, in its use by Egypt’s citizens, became 
an agent for freedom, especially as compared to traditional media. For instance, 
April 2008 marked "the first Egyptian instigated cyber activism attempt" in which 
activists created a Facebook page to support textile workers in Mahalla's general 
strike (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011). This was also referred to by Lynch as the 
'Kefaya wave' that sought to challenge, via online blogging, Mubarak's son and 
his presumed inheritance of power (Lynch, 2006). Through social media, the 
Kefaya movement exposed issues that had been previously repressed into the 
public sphere and succeeded in galvanising public debate over these once-taboo 
subjects (Lynch, 2013). The Kefaya movement was a sign of the potential impact 
social media users could have on political debate and, as such, on the 
enhancement of the public sphere. Similarly, in 2010, a group of students created 
a new site (or group) on Facebook and Twitter called 'Rassd', meaning observe; 
this included audio-visual material as well as textual content. Sakr (2013a) 
observes that Rassd published videos of fraud and bullying relating to the 2010 
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elections. Throughout its lifetime, and particularly during the period of the 
uprising, Rassd survived government hacking and smear campaigns and 
eventually went on to expand its news operation. 
Perhaps the most significant examples of social media depicting the micro-
public sphere, however, were the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page and 
the use of social media by the Kefaya movement. Both these examples of social 
media activism began prior to the onset of the uprisings and continued beyond 
them. In terms of the former, “We are Khaled Said”, July 2010 marked its 
beginning. At this time, 3.58 million Egyptian Facebook users joined the "Kolona 
Khaled Said" or "We are all Khaled Said” Facebook group started by Google 
employee and Internet activist, Wael Ghonim (Sakr, 2013b). This group was 
based on the brutal physical abuse of an Egyptian male - Said - by police officers 
after he posted an online video of two police officers exchanging money after a 
drug deal.  
While the details of this group were discussed in Chapter 1, it is important to 
note that in Said’s case and others, social media played an empowering role in the 
sense that it enabled the protesters to tell their own stories of the uprising while 
bypassing and disrupting the official narratives of Egypt’s state media. Using 
social media tools, ordinary Egyptians - without professional journalistic 
credentials - could (and did) spread images and information that had been 
intentionally blocked or distorted in the country's formal news media. As 
indicated by the British-Egyptian actor, Khaled Abdallah, this was one of the first 
revolutions in history to be filmed by its people rather than by a news 
organisation; this was only possible because of the Internet, information 
technology and social media (Sakr, 2013a). Blogs and social media sites supplied 
a plethora of first-hand information and images; ordinary bystanders witnessing 
brutality from a balcony or from other proximitous locations, managed to release 
images that they had taken with the camera of their mobile phones. Thus, Twitter, 
Facebook, online bloggers and mobile telephones all played a crucial role in 
propelling the 'rising tide of opposition' and succeeded in challenging the state 
controlled national media as they spread images and ideas of resistance and 'mass 
defiance' across Egypt (Cottle, 2011).  
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Moreover, the images, messages and narratives of the opposition were quickly 
and easily spread into the public sphere because of social media. People all over 
the world were able to access first-hand photos and reports from the scenes of 
events on the streets of Egypt (Nanabhay and Farmanfarmaian, 2011). This 
helped to build and strengthen ties among activists, and increased political 
deliberation between protesters in Egypt and those who supported the uprising 
internationally. Information about unfolding events was soon disseminated 
through social media technologies, offering encouragement and sympathy, 
inspiring and boosting Egyptian protesters and linking them not only with each 
other but also to their Tunisian counterparts (Khamis and Vaughn, 2013), and 
Egyptians abroad (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011). Therefore, whilst Egyptians were 
watching events unfold in Tunisia, they were planning their own timely moves, 
and exchanging encouragement through support, ideas and information. 
Examples of this include messages exchanged between Egyptian and Tunisian 
protesters, wherein the latter advised the former to protest at night for safety, to 
use social media to convey their messages abroad for increased international 
pressure, and to wash their faces with Coca-Cola in order to reduce the effects of 
tear gas (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011). 
The effect of social media did not disappear even when the government 
disabled Internet access within the country. In response to this decision, protesters 
called friends abroad on landlines to ask them to tweet messages on their behalf, 
allowing them to continue taking advantage of the international connectivity 
afforded by social media despite government steps to hinder it. Similarly, “Speak 
to Tweet” - an initiative created by a team of engineers from Twitter and Google - 
and SayNow (a Google-acquired company that enabled activists to call with voice 
messages that were posted as Twitter messages) worked to diminish the 
government’s attempts to silence the protesters’ international connectivity (Amin, 
2011). Indeed, the very fact that multinational and international companies such 
as Google and Twitter had become involved in the Egyptian uprising serves to 
demonstrate that social media was a method for attracting international support 
for the protests, and acted as a way to connect the micro-public sphere to the 
meso-public and macro-public spheres. As activists posted images, videos and 
written content regarding police torture of protesters and other events that 
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occurred during the revolution, international journalists abroad were given on-
time updates of these events from individuals on the ground. In this way, social 
media enabled protesters to bypass the politically-controlled Egyptian media and 
tap into a network of journalists that operated outside the Mubarak regime’s 
jurisdiction and did not need to self-censor. As a result, information was released 
by Al Jazeera and other international news organizations that could not be 
released by the politically-controlled Egyptian media. In this way, social media 
helped to extend the political space, establish connections with other social 
movements, publicise causes and bring to light instances of government abuse. 
This allowed worldwide recognition to be gained regarding the Egyptian cause. 
Furthermore, it serves as an example of Keane’s micro-public sphere and its 
impact. However, this thesis seeks to study the rural populations’ use and 
participation in this micro public sphere.  
In addition to enabling the protestors to disseminate their own narrative of the 
uprising, social media was also used as a tool of cooperation and collaboration. 
Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) have suggested that savvy activists were able to 
access social media to initiate and organise a broad spectrum of dissension 
activities through the use of computers and smartphones, and that the various 
forms of social media technologies were utilised to organise and implement 
collective activities, as well as to promote a sense of collective identity and 
community among users. This is perhaps most evident in the emergence and use 
of the #Jan25 hashtag which appeared in more than 25 unique tweets per minute 
that day (Zirulnick, 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011). These tweets varied in 
content, comprising everything from warnings of tear gas explosions, to 
notifications of free food being handed out to protestors. This is one example that 
demonstrates the way in which social media facilitated cooperation among 
members of the public.  
It is evident, therefore, that social media was used by protestors to tell their 
stories of the uprising, to bypass state-controlled media narratives while 
expressing their opinions directly in order to gain support for the uprising around 
the world, and to foster political collaboration and coordination. As a 
consequence, a number of scholars have argued that social media and the digital 
sphere in Egypt significantly contributed to a mobilising of protests, which 
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eventually led to the ousting of Mubarak in just 18 days. According to Linda 
Herrera (2011), the protests revealed the significant role of digital communication 
in the destabilisation of political structures to a level that provoked a response 
from the regime. However, Francis Lee (2015) argues that the revolution in Egypt 
cannot solely be blamed on what has come to be referred to as the 'Facebook 
Factor' as a range of other elements undoubtedly played a role in the ousting of 
President Mubarak. This disagreement has led to a growing debate among 
scholars of media studies regarding the role of online activism as evident by 
social media use in Egypt during the period. The major considerations of the new 
media phenomenon emerge from a ‘liberation technology’ hypothesis to that of a 
critical political economy (Diamond, 2010). Perhaps more moderate research on 
this area is slowly forming and it contextualizes an online public sphere linking it 
to other structural elements. Yet there seems to be little consensus on the idea of 
the online platform as a new form of public sphere in Egypt.  
According to Herrera (2011), the growing popularity of Facebook in the Arab 
world, particularly in Egypt, is a response to the limits of the political economy 
within the nation’s media landscape. The state controlled media was limited by a 
lack of resources, indicating a co-opting of most influential and prominent 
journalists, and largely ignored the service of the public. Moreover, she argues 
that the state-owned media lacked credibility through failing to mirror the 
increasingly plural public sphere and, as such, did not adequately guide processes 
of deliberation on issues which are socially relevant. Private media was controlled 
by media moguls. As such, private media was largely profit-oriented, and served 
the economic and political interests of its owners, meaning that it did not reflect 
the growing pluralism within Egyptian society as a consequence. Lee (2015) 
observes that in such a context, digital media such as Facebook serves as a 
communicatively-positioned public sphere. Due to its flexibility - and the 
difficulty that exists in practically administering regulative measures - social 
media provides the marginalised and the voiceless with a chance of 
circumventing the traditional exclusion barriers, avoiding censorship, and 
embodying the idea of a counter-public sphere or of a loosening of the constraints 
on the public sphere prior to the uprisings. This view suggests a public sphere 
which is anti-hegemonic and articulates specific societal positions or discourses, 
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and which therefore could play a pivotal role in undermining the Egyptian 
regime. However, all studies focus on urban citizens only; this thesis will differ in 
the fact that its focus is on rural citizens. 
On the other hand, critics of the liberating role of social media in the uprising 
note that the blogosphere of Egypt had already become vibrant in earlier years, 
even before the uprising (Dutton, 2013). This had effectively covered sensitive 
topics such as harassment and torture perpetrated by the government. 
Additionally, owing to the otherwise controlled alternatives for political 
participation, Herrera (2011) suggests that the use of Facebook in the country was 
already noteworthy before the uprising. At the same time, social media was not 
the only channel that encouraged the public to be critical of the government. 
Broadcast media was responsible for opening up the debate and promoting 
various viewpoints in Egypt. In particular, satellite channels can be praised for 
this because they are slightly less controlled than their public channel 
counterparts. Although social media provided an avenue for individuals to 
express their opinions, it was not necessarily the first platform to facilitate the 
evolution of the public sphere. Anders Olof Larsson and Moe Hallvard (2015) 
take this further by arguing that television was responsible for promoting public 
and critical-rational debate, whilst also facilitating knowledge of the actions of 
the government. 
Perhaps more critically, even though a wide range of research on digital media 
and the Arab Spring has focused on the level of access and use of social media, 
there has been only a limited investigation of normative criteria for other public 
deliberations. After the uprising that led to the ousting of President Mubarak, 
most researchers focused on examining the role of Facebook in perpetuating 
protests, mainly paying attention to access as a criterion of analysis. However, 
Werner Faulstich (2002) argues that the position of digital media as a possible 
online deliberative platform and extension of the traditional public sphere should 
be critically assessed. The democratic value of the public sphere is not predicated 
solely on access. According to William Dutton (2013), studies on western public 
spheres and democracies show that growing access does not necessarily imply a 
high level of deliberative quality, or even a logical and consensus-oriented 
process of decision-making. Dutton argues this despite the knowledge that social 
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media has been shown to lead to high levels of diversity and pluralism. Moreover, 
Lee (2015) suggests that where digital or social media should offer an ideal 
channel for diverse and pluralist political debates, it needs to connect with 
traditional forms of civil society and media, which depicts the meso-public sphere 
model explained by Keane.  
From the previous sections in this analysis, it is clear that Egypt, like most 
other Arab countries, has a history of restrictive and monopolistic media contexts. 
For this reason, Egyptian citizens seem to have limited experience vis-à-vis 
negotiating their pluralistic interests in digital or rather online deliberations. As 
such, one of the main concerns of this study will be to analyse the deliberative 
elements of Egyptian digital media and their contribution to the post 
revolutionary public sphere in the country by focusing on the changes in political 
interaction. While focusing on rural citizens, it will take into consideration 
political interaction and not social media access only. 
Overall, the precise role of social media technologies in the uprisings of 2011 
remains a matter for debate. While Western mainstream media narratives at the 
time framed the Arab Spring uprisings as 'Twitter revolutions' (Bennett, 2011), 
scholars and writers such as Evgeny Morozov find that social media cannot be the 
reason behind revolutions. He finds that a Facebook and Twitter revolution is “a 
naive belief in [the] emancipatory nature of online communication that rests on a 
stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downside” (Morozov, 2011). Lynch (2013) 
states that, although protestors undoubtedly made use of social media, it is 
“surprisingly difficult to demonstrate rigorously that these new media directly 
caused any of the outcomes with which they have been associated". This thesis 
will seek to make a contribution to this debate by analysing the impact of the 
symbiotic media relationship between traditional and social media on the public 
sphere by focusing on television and social media and its impact on rural Egypt. 
Through this, the intent is to develop a more accurate understanding and analysis 
of the manner in which these two - television and social media - interact, 
especially when combined as seen in the case of Egypt. This will, of course, 
require an analysis of each media independently before discussing their 
interaction.  
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3.3.1. From Spectating to Political Interaction: How Social Media 
Fermented Mobilisation Both Online and Offline 
Discussing the malleability of social networks and the opportunities and 
challenges these presented for young, politically motivated youth in Egypt, Paolo 
Gerbaudo (2012) presents Shabab-Al-Facebook: the youth of Facebook. With 
over 60% of the population under thirty, the youth, who as previously discussed 
grew up in a society where the media was consciously molded by a dictator, were 
now given the opportunity to gain raw and unfiltered information through a 
network of affiliates, adding to the lure of technology. Despite this, Gerbaudo 
argues that, because social media was firmly embedded in such a 
demographically young country, the Western media may have bought into the 
idea that this media (and the emotive atmosphere surrounding it) was solely, or 
even primarily, responsible for the political changes that occurred. Gerbaudo cites 
the dramatic toppling of Mubarak as leading to the appearance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who quickly showed that they were ready and willing to continue 
the repression of the previous regime. Similarly, the rise of the current leader 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who came to power following the end of Muslim 
Brotherhood rule, is largely characterized by the use of the same strategies and 
tactics. Through this scheme, Gerbaudo (2012) presents social media as a catalyst 
for social empowerment, which, without clear direction between the myriad of 
individuals it draws together, can ultimately disrupt or negatively impact any 
unity and progressive social change. 
The failure to build consensus across chaotic meetings of individuals, many of 
whom were drawn together out of a sense of patriotism and yearning to have 
greater democracy, ultimately exposed rumours and false information, much of 
which was placed by social media ‘trolls’. A conduit initially viewed as 
empowering can also be used to spread paranoia; individuals connecting via 
Facebook, often with genuine information on their profile, can become dangerous 
if perceived as talking to some one who may conspire against them. Despite the 
portrayal of the Western Media, it is clear that the removal of Mubarak was not a 
unanimous decision among Egypt’s populace, with some Egyptians preferring his 
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regime due to loyalty, or the direct or indirect benefits they received because of it.  
Social media is presented by Gerbaudo as having quickly become a battleground 
between those organising rallies and meetings and those attempting to expose 
anonymous profiles, calling them out as traitors, criminals and even espousing 
claims that they were funded by Zionists to destabilise a Muslim country. 
 While, as previously discussed, social media allowed individuals to go beyond 
the traditional views of the public sphere for small, physical assembly, it fluidly 
evolved that such strict control over public assembly was lessened as a result. 
Given the dispersed nature of social media, its prevalence aided in the 
development of an uncoerced space for discussion that was not subject to the 
same level of strict control. When considering three of the core liberties for 
democratic freedom and expression - assembly, association and expression - 
Mubarak was certainly aware that for whatever bad words can be whispered 
between individuals, it was the actual assembly of crowds that could threaten his 
leadership. Gerbaudo presents social media as a necessary and logical response to 
the journey between individuals seeking to protest, yet growing up with full 
awareness of what would happen to them if trying traditional methods. While 
Gerbaudo (2012) highlights traditional methods of public assembly being hushed 
agreements to meet at sanctuaries of protest such as the handful of opposition 
newspapers, these were well monitored by police and could easily be contained 
with the instigators being duly harassed and punished. At best such acts would be 
minutes in duration, involve a hastily made banner and have a few slogans 
shouted to whoever happened to be walking by. With only a marginal impact on 
passers by, most likely concerned with not being associated and arrested, there 
was no conceivable awareness by any international media stream.  
The use of social media to generate fluid assembly also helped to buttress this 
crucial missing link of understanding.  In Revolution in the Age of Social Media, 
Herrera (2014) argues that many veteran protesters understood that many people 
believed they were either funded by a subversive source, or were simply mad. At 
the core of this view was a firm generational belief across social classes that 
Mubarak was an ingrained institution; without genuine and open discourse, few 
believed in the possibility of positive social change.  It was perhaps in this belief 
between groups on social media that organisers sought to have people follow 
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them yet were anxious not to be seen as direct ‘leaders’. The emotive nature of 
protest calls for a persistent sense of spontaneity to fuel a cocktail of emotions - 
including anger and excitement - that fire off protests. 
This is perhaps not as realistic as it sounds since any key movement includes 
the support of notable figures; a prime example of this in Egypt was Wael 
Ghonim famously starting the “We are all Khaled Said’’ as organisers sought to 
turn debate and yearning into action, social media became a platform to unite 
these individuals initially, first online but with the intention of translating this into 
physical action. Slogans such as ‘’The Regime Must Go’’ serve as examples of 
the way in which newly forming social groups began to make the transition from 
virtual reality to physical protest. It is the anxiety that organisers held for those 
who may emerge as group ‘leaders’, which may be attributed to the fear that they 
were simply going to replace one dictator with a future other, who could be 
accredited to their own movement. In a nation with heavy corruption, poverty and 
inefficiency, such concerns could translate into reality in the event of a power 
vacuum. For veteran organisers with experience of agitation, they held the 
knowledge that a political void will always be filled with negativity for the 
emergence of any real democracy. 
The empowerment of the individual, regardless of their social class, through 
participation with a handheld device (offering greater anonymity than Internet 
cafes) speaks to the citizen moving from spectator to active participant in the 
search to establish a fairer, more open democratic society. In The Eyes of the 
People, Democracy in the Age of Spectatorship, Jeffrey Green (2011) argues that 
the societal institution of democracy has generated a legion of spectators, those 
who simply exist yet do not actively participate in politics. Green argues this may 
be the case in Western nations where stable democracies have generated a kind of 
apathy to public assembly, shunning it as a thing of the past, and believing that “it 
can’t happen here’’. In these nations, uprisings and brutal repression are limited 
to watching a far away land on the evening news. Those individuals - being 
unaccustomed to civil disobedience, civil unrest, and political uprisings - fail to 
grasp the level of psychological involvement that social media promotes among 
its users who wish to engage with the political process. While it is difficult, 
though by no means impossible, for a Westerner born into a stable democracy to 
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imagine the controlled environment faced by participants in the 2011 uprising, 
such images of swelling numbers of protesters fails to connect with what Green 
calls the ‘’citizen being ruled’’, individuals whose lack of interest for political 
engagement far exceeds their actual participation. Whether the Europeans sitting 
watching television can accurately understand the plethora of emotions and 
physical dangers that one faces when moving from spectator to participant is 
unclear, yet for those taking part in the 2011 uprising, it was this yearning to 
become an active participant that moulded their involvement to topple a dictator. 
However, one wants to clearly study these emotions of citizens in rural Egypt 
during the uprisings.  
In Mediation and Protest Movements, Bart Cammerts, Alice Mattoni and 
Patrick McCurdy (2014) present these individuals now moving to be participants 
and argue that social media played a direct role not merely in organising 
individuals but in fueling their capacity to act. The establishment of communal 
dialogues across Twitter, Facebook and other social platforms established a wide 
system of networks not merely to consume media such as sharing experiences of 
protest events, but also to mould the discourse that was slowly evolving between 
the entrenched government and its supporters and those who aimed to topple it. 
Cammaerts et al. (2014) argue that media went from being consumed to actively 
produced and openly distributed among these widening social networks in order 
to gain new members, to shape how mediation would occur, to challenge those 
calling for more violent means, and to counteract the spreading false information. 
Protests are argued to represent performances that enshrine the physical product 
stemming from excited and passionate online debate.  
The push by a movement to place themselves directly in harm’s way, and the 
use of the depiction of the human body to protest and change the organic nature 
of society, is discussed by The Native Blogger of Cairo: Creative Insurgency in 
the Arab World by Marwan Kraidy (2017). Kraidy argues that those who took 
part in the 2011 uprising are part of a long history of individuals using their 
bodies to physically protest oppression - from the infamous image of a Buddhist 
monk committing an act of self-immolation to the use of animal iconography by 
activists such as the Mubarak laughing cow - to rally those who were fearful of 
physically protesting against a patriarchal and foreboding leader. Acts such as 
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these are argued by Kraidy to stem from other known Middle-Eastern satirists 
such as the Syrian artist Ali Farzat who highlighted abuses committed by the 
Syrian regime. They act as symbolic events that, even if crushed, have largely 
achieved much of their objectives, particularly as a catalyst for further acts of 
political mediation between protesters and a drawing point for new members. The 
authors argue that it is this symbolism that promotes participation, and that it does 
this through recognition that enshrines resistance and a show of strength to 
mobilise beyond the virtual world against state oppression. The role of 
technology is not without its weaknesses. A particular concern is that members 
who are caught may be compelled to surrender their phones and login details, 
which may expose other members of a network to further police intimidation.  It 
is this argument that fuels “trans-media mobilisation’’ (Kraidy, 2017) among 
individuals, turning them into activists to form a unified national movement 
identity for the 2011 protesters. 
In Social Media in the Arab World: Communication and Public Opinion in the 
Gulf States, Barrie Gunter et al. (2016) discuss the presence of wider Arab themes 
across the Gulf, which were found through social media in the 2011 uprising. As 
this chapter has shown, the awareness by Egyptians young and old alike that the 
state had a tight grip upon media outlets was well known. Through this schema, 
they argue that the Arab press gave a ‘form’ of news that was read more out of 
habit than genuine insight. As social media opened the door to largely uncensored 
discussions, this created a flurry of debate for topics such as art, sex, comedy and 
music. When the medium is the message itself, the authors state that the discourse 
used by different groups is understood to differ from what they would say and do 
in real life. The authors cite awareness by protesters that the Egyptian Military’s 
Facebook page, which has millions of followers, uses rhetoric that greatly differs 
from the brutal and corrupt reputation that they hold. The juxtaposition of reality 
and virtual reality presented individuals who may normally be quiet and 
subservient to the government in their daily life, yet avidly, even violently anti-
government online. This in part stems from the iconoclastic role held by social 
media, turning what was traditionally a majority of consumers for information 
into a roughly equal number of creators and consumers of digital content. This 
was in part fuelled for 2011 activists through the increased and instant form of 
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connectivity they shared with one another. Traditional barriers of isolation faced 
by those seeking to discuss and form groups with others were largely made 
porous through social media platforms. Despite this, the authors highlight that 
any such movements which fail to build unity and consensus across social 
networks can lead to polarisation and fracturing among members.  
In totality, these elements, from the emergence of a political activist from the 
previously dormant identity of political spectator to the excitement and rapid 
spread of ideas and news would have arguably made the 2011 uprising impossible 
in their absence. Despite this the novelty of such methods of protest may offer 
diminished utility should they be needed for future acts of social dissension. A 
consistent after-theme that is discussed across several of the references presented 
here was an acknowledgement that future attempts may not be so immediately 
successful at mobilisation. Governments across the world, in particular the Gulf 
states have taken notice of the largely un-policed social media platforms with 
larger, faster and more robust crackdowns expected for those who agitate for 
social change online. It is important however, to further expand upon this and 
develop a broader understanding of the way in which such media networks 
converged and developed a fluid and wide ranging media landscape across Egypt 
which we will now turn to. 
3.3.2. Al Jazeera and Social Media: The Impact of the Emergence of a 
Convergent and Symbiotic Media Landscape in Egypt.  
In making an assessment on the role of social media in the 2011 uprisings, it is 
important not to consider social media in isolation, but instead as part of the 
varied media ecosystem which characterises 21st century communications. 
Jenkins’ (2006) influential work on media theory describes a process of 
‘convergence’ whereby the online and digital media world has facilitated the 
emergence of a multitude of channels and sources as well as a collapse in the 
distinctions between media producers and consumers. This has several effects. 
First, this “diversification of communication channels...expands the range of 
voices that can be heard” (Jenkins, 2006). While some voices may be more 
prominent or prevalent, Jenkins notes that this diversification ensures that “no one 
voice speaks with unquestioned authority.” Moreover, because of the collapse of 
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the producer-consumer distinction, access and political participation may 
increase, and the political scene may involve a greater sense of community, a 
stronger sense of trust in collaboration and collaborative problem solving, and a 
decrease in the reliance on so-called “official expertise” (Jenkins, 2006). This 
brings to light another effect of Jenkins’ view on convergence: the idea of the 
monitorial citizen. The monitorial citizen is one whom, according to Michael 
Schudson (1999), came about as the result of an explosion in information 
technology and the widening gap between the available information relating to 
politics and an individual’s ability to process it. As such, a monitorial citizen 
engages in political acts in a more individualised manner and is “not an absentee 
citizen but watchful, even when he or she is doing something else” (Schudson, 
1999; Jenkins, 2006). Examples of this include viewers of television programs 
such as The Daily Show, who are being both entertained and informed through a 
show that mixes parody and reporting. This type of citizen, in this kind of media 
atmosphere, is one who will be accustomed to considering the news as something 
to be discovered through investigation of “competing accounts rather than 
something to be digested from authoritative sources” (Jenkins, 2006). 
In this way, these separate forms of media, being part of the same ecosystem, 
will interact in such a manner as to complement or improve one another. 
Examples of this include “photographs of dead Americans returning from Iraq in 
flag-draped or the photographs of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, both of which 
entered the mainstream media as digital photographs, shot  and circulated outside 
official military channels” (Jenkins, 2006).  Jenkins quotes Jesse Walker, an 
editor at Magazine Reason, who states that the new media acts to transform the 
old media, ensuring that it is more transparent, quicker, and more interactive, 
because it has to be - rather than because it wants to be - in order to remain 
relevant in the face of competition and public critiquing (Jenkins, 2006; Walker, 
2004). For this to occur, one need not do something as drastic as flying to 
Baghdad to act as an impromptu war correspondent. In fact, Jenkins brings to 
light the idea of “Photoshop for Democracy,” noting that something as simple as 
passing a political picture to a friend (or sending one through social media) is “no 
more and no less a political act than handing them a campaign brochure or a 
bumper sticker” (Jenkins, 2006). In Egypt, in the build-up to the 2011 uprisings, 
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an example of this can be seen: the “Khaled Said” Facebook Group, as mentioned 
previously, was created to highlight issues of police brutality and citizen safety 
through the showcasing of these instances in a picture form. 
In fact, the relationship between social media and traditional media serves as a 
strong example of the manner in which convergence can lead to separate forms of 
media, being part of the same ecosystem, can act to complement or improve one 
another. Jenkins discusses ‘viral’ content on the Internet to highlight the 
relationship between these two forms of media; he notes that “[broadcasting 
provides the common culture, and the Web offers more localized channels for 
responding to that culture.” Jenkins ultimately finds that, while the online media 
may provide new ideas and alternative perspectives, the mainstream media will 
be “monitoring those channels, looking for content to co-opt and circulate” 
(Jenkins, 2006). This is of course particularly relevant to Egypt where, as already 
shown and will continue to be shown, the traditional media did in fact use content 
from social media to highlight significant events in the uprisings. The media in 
Egypt did, in the way Jenkins describes, transform and adapt on the basis of this 
convergence.   
Media convergence can be driven as a top-down process when driven by 
corporations and a bottom-up process when driven by consumers, but both of 
them coexist in such a way that media companies and, more recently, consumers 
themselves have learned how to accelerate the flow of content across delivery 
channels (Jenkins, 2006). Social media is the newest, quickest and most 
accessible channel yet devised, the result of the rapid rate at which consumers 
have learned to use different media technologies in order to “bring the flow of 
media more fully under their control” (Jenkins, 2006). This has ultimately 
facilitated communication between people by connecting more social media 
platforms to each other and between social media users and traditional media 
professionals.  
Admire Mare (2013) and Andrew Chadwick (2013) argue that there is a 
convergence between social media and mass media. Social media has been 
transformed from a personal perspective towards a focus on public views. Rather 
than relying on traditional media, social media has become the primary source of 
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breaking news. Rasmus Nielsen and Kim Schrøder (2014) posit that the 
increasing influence of social networks has led to a growing dependence among 
professional journalists on social media. Journalists reporting any news, such as 
elections or political activity, have to rely on social media to keep up. The recent 
trends have made social networks the de-facto channel for news. However, this 
need not imply that social media has replaced traditional media. Michael 
Stefanone et al. (2010) argue that social media in turn has been heavily dependent 
on professional journalism and mainstream media as the fuel for its news. Despite 
their ability to transfer information readily, traditional media is still the source 
that injects the most significant amount of fresh information into the daily news 
cycle. On many occasions, social media has been attributed as an informal source; 
individuals still rely on television and newspapers to verify information. 
Therefore, traditional media is attributed as an authoritative source of news. 
Stefanone et al. (2010) observe that television continues to carry the bulk of 
political news and is often used for political advertising.  
Critics such as Sarah Joseph (2012) have observed that social media might not 
have had such a massive impact and mass media might have played a more 
significant role in the process. The claim for the influence of social media stems 
from Mubarak’s influencing of traditional media, allowing them only to report 
favourable news on the government, which is related to the agenda setting 
function. It is more appropriate to consider it as a tool that was responsible for 
mobilising part of the total population to unite together against a regime that had 
repressed it up to that point. It better empowered the people to "know their rights” 
and ensured that they were “able to claim them" (Sakr et al., 2015). It is important 
to point out that social media alone would not have had such a phenomenal effect. 
Mass media played a pivotal role and even helped break down the barriers that 
social media had been subjected to, such as restricting communication and event 
coverage to mainly urban areas, since citizens in rural areas were less likely to 
have Internet availability. According to Nick Couldry, the intertwined 
relationship between traditional and social media during the uprising needs 
further analysis (Couldry, 2012). It is evident that, in many of the studies 
conducted, the focus on rural Egypt with regard to this symbiotic relationship is 
lacking or has been neglected in academic literature. As such, this thesis proposes 
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to consider this symbiotic relationship specifically within the realm of rural 
Egypt. 
Therefore, even though it has been widely assumed that it is the new 
communication technology, represented by social media, which played the most 
significant role in mobilising people, other meso and macro-public spheres seem 
to have played an equally important role. In other words, there was a hybrid 
multiplication effect from all media (Chadwick, 2013). As Sakr explains, there is 
"evidence of hybridization between online and offline media" (Sakr, 2013a). 
Camera phones, YouTube, and blogs contributed to the circulation of television 
images, Facebook mobilised protests in Egyptian streets, television talk shows 
highlighted the protests, and word of mouth fed all of the above. Sakr (2013a) 
notes that the sheer “multiplication of different media space” such as 
broadcasting, reporting, printing, online and offline, all exerted tremendous 
pressure on policy makers. Such a situation arises because voices silenced in one 
space might instantly be heard in another, and attempts at censorship very quickly 
exposed. However, Andrew Chadwick (2008) explains that not every voice on 
social media will necessarily reach everyone as well. Therefore, the hybridization 
of media is important because it helps the circulation of more voices than social 
media would facilitate alone.  
It may be argued, therefore, that a new defining characteristic in the area of 
media coverage has been the growth and expansion of the symbiotic relationship 
between traditional and social media. Such a symbiotic relationship has been 
extensively revealed by how mainstream media journalists have interrogated 
social networks for news and in turn, how the users have generated content 
derived from traditional media. Mare (2013) acclaims the role of social media in 
spreading cognitive dissonance, enabling citizens to be aware of the events 
happening in other regions. In Egypt, social media provided the avenue through 
which the public were able to learn of the atrocities committed on their fellow 
citizens; this is evident in examples such as “We are all Khaled Said”. Although 
social media has been increasingly the source for news, Stefanone et al. (2010) 
argue that coverage based wholly on social media would result in fragmentation 
of national conversations and a narrowing down of perspectives to those of 
limited scope since like-minded participants only communicate among 
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themselves. Stefanone et al. relate the phenomenon to the echo-chamber effect. 
Therefore, mainstream media is still needed in society to facilitate wider coverage 
and discussion of national issues, as well as for its ability to prompt public debate 
over core issues within the public sphere. In this sense, Aljazeera’s coverage of 
“We are all Khaled Said” is an example of this facilitation. The popular usage of 
social media has meant that the mainstream media no longer have full control 
over information in the public sphere for debate. However, Mare (2013) points 
out the need for mainstream media such as television to continue providing a pool 
of shared information upon which the public sphere may base their conversations 
and debates. Therefore, both forms of media are needed and their relationship is 
instrumental to providing citizens with a clear and broader coverage of the state 
of the nation. The idea that an online user on any social media platform or page 
may affect the user of traditional media, and vice versa, is referred to by Jenkins 
as the politics of convergence (Jenkins, 2006), which is why, in this thesis, social 
media is studied in a converged media environment. 
In Egypt, social media complemented other media forms such as satellite 
broadcasting during the uprisings (Alexander and Aouragh, 2014). A clear 
example of the complementary relationship between old and new media was that 
of Al Jazeera which started streaming videos from Tahrir Square which had been 
uploaded by citizens on social media (Lotan et al., 2011). Additionally, 
mainstream media sometimes highlighted certain events during the uprisings 
which then made people turn to social media to express their opinions about them 
(Russell, 2011). For example, in Egypt, Facebook provided a platform for 
different activist networks - including the April 6 movement - to communicate 
with one another through the "We are All Khaled Said" page. (Storck, 2011). So 
it has been common for news to emerge from social media and then to become 
voiced and broadcasted in the traditional media, and vice versa. Another example 
is Wael Ghonim’s interview with Dream TV on February 7, 2011 about his 
administration of the “We are All Khaled Said” page and its popularity during the 
2011 uprisings. Within two days after the interview aired, 190,000 followers were 
added to Wael Ghonim’s Facebook profile and began sharing and commenting on 
his interview on social media (Nurwisah, 2011). Therefore, news that emerged on 
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social media would not go viral to the extent it did in Egypt without traditional 
media, since it is more accessible.  
This symbiotic media relationship had an impact on encouraging citizens to 
participate in the public sphere with regards to political deliberation and 
interaction, which led to an evolution in the Egyptian public sphere during and 
after the uprisings. Armed with “camcorders, video phones, and first-person 
accounts, citizen journalists [can capture] major news events and [spread] the 
word by posting information” online. This information, in many cases, finds its 
way onto traditional news sources. In fact, during the Egyptian revolution, Sadaf 
Ali and Shahira Fahmy (2013) note that the relationship between social media 
and television was important in creating the balance between gate-keeping and 
citizen journalism. A symbiotic relationship could be observed between 
broadcaster and television networks and the revolutionary activists on the streets. 
The success of television media rested on the coverage of the protests. Before the 
uprisings, the united front between various outlets and media collectives pushed 
for the struggle against Mubarak’s regime. State-owned media praising Mubarak 
whilst denouncing the activists on the street resulted in relatively factual coverage 
by other networks. In a number of cases, journalists played a role in the rebellion. 
Simon Cottle (2011) observes that in one of the news centres, journalists locked 
out an ardent Mubarak loyalist who facilitated coverage of the actual facts on the 
streets. Steven Heydemann (2015) observes that different forms of media began 
working in a concerted form resulting in a powerful consensus that developed 
their level of content and influenced the Egyptian public, which in turn led to the 
evolving of a public sphere because citizens felt that there is more accessibility to 
expressing their opinions by participating in the public sphere, and as a result 
their despair started decreasing. 
Online and offline media evolved and matured into a form of political 
synchronisation that was instrumental during the uprisings against the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which followed the uprisings against Mubarak (Tufekci and 
Wilson, 2012). The relationship between traditional and social media was more 
evidenced in the protests against the rule of Morsi in 2013. Anti-Muslim 
Brotherhood press and social media were responsible for coverage of the 
inhumane acts committed by the government against protesters on the street. It 
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may be observed that the functions of traditional and social media have 
overlapped, leading to competition for coverage. Larsson and Hallvard (2015) 
argue that the two forms of media coexist rather than compete through 
convergence of various aspects in reporting and coverage. However, the 
convergence between social and traditional media is facilitated because of the 
technological characteristics of the architecture of social media.  
3.3.3. Convergence in Relation to Technological Characteristics 
The convergence between traditional and social media was facilitated because 
of different factors such as the technological characteristics that will be explained 
in this section. Due to these technological characteristics of the architecture of 
social media, along with the participation of users on social media, one can build 
a clearer picture of how convergence was created and how it played a role in 
facilitating deliberation between people.  
Scholars have described the various features and architecture of social media 
and networked technologies. Danah Boyd states that in a networked society there 
are prominent features related to the technology involved (Boyd, 2014). These 
include persistence, visibility, spreadability and searchability. Persistence is the 
ability to maintain any form of communication for an unlimited time. Visibility is 
the feature by which users may interact with each other from every corner of the 
globe. John Thompson states that visibility is described as a "double-edged 
sword", since it enhances popularity and increases opportunities for 
communication, yet it is less controllable than other means of communication so 
it is a source of a "distinctive kind of fragility" (Thompson, 2005). Spreadability, 
the third characteristic, allows users to share messages at no cost. Finally, the 
searchability quality of finding any content easily is an added advantage of social 
media and the Internet (Boyd, 2014). Without these technological features, a 
networked society could not facilitate deliberation to the extent it currently does. 
If the 'architecture' of the technology on social media did not allow convergence 
to happen via the characteristics explained, less deliberation would have resulted 
between social media users on different platforms. Miller McPherson et al. (2006) 
highlighted that, in reference to a Pew Internet study, Internet users have larger 
networks of relations, implying that increased communication between citizens is 
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a question of quality vs. quantity (Rainie and Wellman, 2014). However, the 
argument with regard to the uprising is not a matter of the quantity but the 
quality. If the quality of the social media had been weak - with quality being 
defined as the impact of social media on satellite TV and the impact of social 
media as seen by the number of those using social media as compared to those 
affected by it - then the extent of circulation of news via traditional forms of 
media would have been minimal. This, in turn, would have affected the existence 
of convergence. 
Whether communication between citizens on social media is a result of the 
introduction of this new technology or not is a controversial issue among 
scholars. Jose Van Dijck’s focus on the effects of cultural practices in the usage 
of social media is based on the idea that communication between citizens is not 
mainly based on the presence of technology, but relates, at a deeper level, to peer 
pressure and to technology that values hierarchy (Van Dijck, 2013). Moreover, he 
supports Bennett and Segerberg’s idea that what people call 'social media' should 
be instead called 'connective media' since it describes the technological features 
of social media rather than the social results or norms of the technology (Van 
Dijck, 2013). The culture of connectivity driven by connective media is identified 
as a separate area of research, and it might well be a concept that requires further 
examination (Nolin, 2014). It is vital to highlight that Van Dijck advises against a 
study of the back end as distinct from the front end since social media is 
considered as a stage of self-expression, whilst social practices and platforms are 
considered by him to be equally relevant. The conservative opinion is that the 
word 'social' suggests these stages are user-positioned, involved with participation 
and human association. Van Dijck considers social media to be an automatic 
system of production and operating influences, tracking and coding relations 
among individuals, things and ideas. Nolin would describe it as "creating the web 
social", which may be interpreted as "making sociality technical", with reference 
to the fact that these connections are facilitated by technological means (Nolin, 
2014). The energy for connectedness among individuals is the product of social 
media businesses, and the approach for making profit is to apply coding 
technologies to make connectivity. As a result of this, social media businesses 
often highlight their influence to human connectedness whilst restraining back 
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end connectivity, pushing to make it nearly imperceptible. With reference to 
Orwell's 1984, van Dijck characterizes this kind of rhetorical practice as a sort of 
Newspeak (Nolin, 2014). 
Boyd (2014) explains that peer pressure makes users start using social media 
platforms, thereby affecting their communication norms. Peer pressure on users to 
use a certain platform rather than another is sometimes a crucial feature 
highlighted by scholars. In fact, users feel forced to do something owing to the 
norms of other users (Van Dijck, 2013). However, the values of hierarchy that 
Van Dijck finds are the main reason for helping social media to function the way 
it does are a combination of people’s usage of the technology, and of platform 
owners who serve the needs that social media users want, thereby serving the 
hierarchy, which could not be otherwise achieved without such technology. Lisa 
Gitelman goes further here and highlights how recorded sound and digitally 
networked text first appeared as local anomalies only to become deeply 
embedded in the logic of public life and memory, to the point where the World 
Wide Web effectively ensures its own historicity by being used (Gitelman, 2008). 
Similarly, Jeff Jarvis agrees that technology usually creates its own norms. For 
example, the technology of the automobile changed the norms of road use from 
the 1930s to the 1990s since, prior to the existence of the car, the norms of road 
use were different (Salmon, 2013). Thus, if the technology behind social media 
does not serve the users’ hierarchies, it will not function in the way it currently 
does. This explains why the architecture of social media technology is related to 
the resultant communication norms and cannot be considered a separate aspect 
since norms are set as a result of that technology. Thus, such a change in the 
norms of communication between citizens has resulted in connecting social and 
traditional medias. 
Holly Crawford (Crawford, 1999) highlights the fact that social media 
provides a connection between offline and online worlds. Essentially, this is 
because social media offers an "immediacy of audience access" by virtue of the 
architecture of this technology. The debate over technological determinism might 
not seem relevant to the subject of Egypt’s 2011 uprisings at first glance, but it is 
nevertheless important as it describes the ways that social media may introduce 
new means for people to communicate. Henry Giroux highlights that different 
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types of media motivate political engagement since they open spaces for criticism 
within the public sphere. Despite the success of social media being a question of 
quantity versus quality, scholars are divided on which is more important owing to 
observations on the topic being highly situational (Giroux, 2012). Moreover, this 
technology is not replacing collective identity yet; it is merely complementing 
face-to-face communication by allowing avenues that were not available through 
other means of technology (Boulianne, 2009; Jenkins, 2006; Giugni 1998). 
According to Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave, such technology allows a 
two-way form of communication, unlike mainstream media (Walgrave and Van 
Aelst, 2006). The debate of technological determinism in this chapter is not to 
prove that it is the sole important aspect with regard to social media, yet it only 
demonstrates the importance of certain characteristics relating to the technology 
without neglecting the criticisms. Therefore, the norms resulting from the 
architecture of the technology helped to facilitate communication and create a 
symbiotic relationship between online and offline media.  
Social media has introduced new norms of communication between citizens. 
According to Bertram Raven, social influence theory is based on the influence of 
other people, groups, or norms. According to social influence theory, three social 
processes affect individual behaviour: compliance, identification and 
internalisation (Kelman, 1974). Compliance means that individuals act in 
agreement or compliance with people who are important in their lives. For 
example, users may consider complying with the opinions of their managers 
(Zhou, 2011). Identification resembles the idea of being part of a community and 
not being left out. For example, social media users might feel they are more 
interactive in the community because of their participation online, which 
manifests the influence of groups (Zhou, 2011). Internalisation explains the 
acceptance of changes owing to agreement with other people (Dholakia et al., 
2004). This theory validates how certain social media users may have been 
influenced to use social media or a certain platform because of the influence of 
others surrounding them, to whom social media had already become normalised. 
Such a position increases the number of users and validates why people change 
their communication norms in the event they need to identify with other users. As 
a result, the technological characteristics previously explained, in spite of 
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increased user participation being an issue of quality versus quantity, have 
introduced a new set of norms related to the technology itself, which resulted in 
the symbiotic media relationship between social and traditional media. These 
norms include communication with those outside of standard or pre-established 
groups, the routine of communication, and the social technology’s use for 
discussion.  
Such norms have merged the online and offline worlds, which brings us back 
to the topic of convergence. Van Dijck indicates that, with social media norms, 
online and offline worlds are now integrated (Van Dijck, 2013). There is no 
longer a clear-cut distinction between where one ends and the other begins. In 
other words, the dividing line between offline and online worlds has become 
blurred. This extension of the norms to and from the online world could not have 
occurred without the architecture of technology that helps in allowing users to 
communicate and participate instantly. In fact, the public and private spheres 
have also overlapped as a result of this enmeshment. According to Couldry, the 
idea of norms changing is depicted in the 'myth' concept. He explains that the 
"myth of mediated centre" is the media institution that offers society a 'centre' of 
values and knowledge. However, with norms within society changing because of 
social media, a new type of myth called the 'myth of us' has emerged, owing to 
users producing media content on social media (Couldry, 2012). The flow 
between the 'myth of us' and the "myth of mediated centre" explains the 
convergence and flow of information, over and into each other, between social 
and traditional media. Zizi Papacharissi (2010) suggests that what occurs is a 
sphere of connection and not isolation, as it serves primarily to connect the 
personal to the political and the self to the polity and society. 
This connection between the offline and online world emphasises the 
complementary role between traditional and social medias, which in turn has 
helped in loosening the grip on controlling media, and motivating the political 
deliberation of users in the public sphere rather than feeling despair, which 
impacts political interaction. In Egypt, activists such as the April 6 movement 
used social media to spread messages because they knew that social media users 
would pass on the message to the community around them via mobile phones or 
by word of mouth. As such, even if they do not have social media access, the 
96 
message might reach them (Srinivasan, 2014). This shows that all spheres are 
connected and that boundaries between media have become unclear since the 
spread of politics on social media. If the technology that facilitates social media 
does not allow the previously-stated technological characteristics, it will not 
allow the possibility of instant usage and circulation of information (Papacharissi, 
2010). However, this is considered to be the main pillar that allows users to 
communicate, share their daily updates and connect their offline world to the 
online one. It, therefore, connects all forms and sources of information. As a 
result, if the norms of communication between citizens had not changed on social 
media, the complementing role between both medias in Egypt would have not 
occurred to the extent it did. Although social media users formed a minor 
percentage of the population, their new norms of communication are what created 
an avenue for the complementary role of both media. Without these new norms of 
communication, social media would have not had news to disseminate, so it 
would have had nothing with which to complement traditional media. Therefore, 
the emerging norms of communication explained by Van Dijck and Papacharissi 
are related to the idea of the architecture of social media that led to the emergence 
of convergence, which, in turn, led to the evolving of the Egyptian public sphere 
by encouraging citizens to participate in it.  
3.3.4 Changed Norms of Communication and Technology 
Shifts in technological, ideological, generational and communicative trends, 
are encompassed by the agenda setting theory (and associated research concerns) 
and as explained in the last section, are of importance in relation to Egypt and the 
events leading up to and succeeding the 2011 uprisings. This is because the 
events in question demonstrably reflect rapid and profound shifts in society-state 
relations, shifts that are necessarily reproduced in numerous socio-structural 
versions (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). Revolutions, after all, have “multiple 
causes, including internal power struggles, relations, support, or ideological 
influences from other countries; and social and economic conditions that harm 
certain groups” (Turk et al., 2014). Thus, it is logical that the Egyptian uprising 
was not simply brought about by social media, or any one other isolated factor; it 
pertains, rather, to complex, multifarious and interconnected causes of which 
social media are but one. Moreover, the relationship between social media and 
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traditional media within this broader framework is equally complex, seeing as the 
current globalised and technologized digital media landscape “has significantly 
upset the established mechanisms” of the communications industries (Meiselwitz, 
2017). As a consequence, it follows that the nature of how people engage with, 
interpret and react to media has similarly experienced radical shifts. Indeed, in 
general, media consumption patterns are prone to exhibit the “co-existence of 
rapid and radical shifts” (Powell, 2013). The Egyptian situation might, 
furthermore, be seen as a prime case-in-point of such rapidity. As Joshua Stacher 
quite accurately explains: “in a mere eighteen days, Egypt went from a model of 
authoritarian durability under Mubarak to experiencing a historic political 
revolution” (Fiedler and Osiewicz, 2015). Resultantly, the case entails 
transformational rapidity in the extreme. So, in addressing the transformations of 
the Egyptian mediasphere, even if one confines analysis to the decade before the 
uprisings alone, one is dealing with vast and precipitous political, social, 
structural, cultural, technological and communicative change – in degrees which 
are perhaps without precedent.   
The increasingly political nature of the shifts in media technology and 
consumption habits have already been addressed by agenda-setting theorists 
(Schudson, 1995), especially inasmuch as they relate to “fostering democratic 
citizenship” (Johnson, 2013). However, the particulars of the Egyptian 
mediasphere surrounding the 2011 uprising represent a highly unique case study 
in which each discrete phase in (what turned out to be) the revolutionary process 
saw distinct adaptations in the dynamic relationship between the public, the 
media, and the agenda which obtained. On this analysis, palpable distinctions 
could be identified within the “nature of the media system” itself, in the times 
running up to, during, and following the uprising. As Anthony Olorunnisola and 
Aziz Douai argue:  
During the revolution the media played a role in mobilising 
political activists and coordinating protestors on the ground, 
as well as documenting arrests and abuse against the 
protestors, thus promoting political activism inside Egypt and 
boosting awareness on the international front. This role 
changed to engaging in nation building, democracy building, 
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and consensus building in the post-revolutionary phase, with 
a remarkable shrinking in the mobilisation function, which 
prevailed during the revolution (Olorunnisola and Douai, 
2013).  
So, the agenda-setting function and processes at work apparently shifted in line 
with the demands of the specific contexts at play; which is to suggest that 
multiple agendas were at issue. This implies that, in the Egyptian context, there 
were various topics of media attention, working in a pragmatic fashion to shift 
popular focus to whatever specific item demanded most immediate address. 
Accordingly, the position of agenda setting within this complex matrix of 
variegated causes and effects logically demands a critical approach with equal 
scope for complexity and diversity.   
 
3.4. Changing Landscapes of Place, Politics and Cognition: Social Media 
And Agenda Setting 
Media and technology researchers have argued that the contemporary world 
shows “signs that we are entering an era of unprecedented technological and 
societal change”, a time of “immersive virtual worlds and augmented reality” that 
is fundamentally changing the primary modes of “organising human interaction” 
(Olleros and Zhegu, 2016). It is difficult to overstate the technologically 
disruptive and socio-culturally transformative dimensions of these shifts. On this 
analysis, one can argue that all parts of the globe, and every element of human 
endeavour, comes in some sense or another under the influence of the media.  
This means that societies all over the world are  “being  reshaped,  for  better  or  
for  worse,  by  changes  in  the  global  media and information environment. So, 
too, are the everyday lives of their citizens” (Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2009). 
Furthermore, the purview of new media technology appears to comprise an ever-
expanding compass of influence, extending to domains of experience that were 
traditionally excluded from technological mediation of this kind. The “digital 
influence” in question, then, is only increasing, coming evermore to intersect the 
seemingly physical and material domains of human experience, items of 
sexuality, gender, power and identity (Kroker and Kroker, 2013). In a similar 
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vein, it is hard to exaggerate the pervasiveness, the penetration of such new media 
into multiple spheres of experience, in today’s world. Digital media devices are 
now a staple of everyday life in almost every aspect, including such mundane and 
pedestrian activities as eating and sleeping, exercise, commuting, dressing, and so 
forth (Felski, 2002). Indeed, from one perspective, it is arguably unrealistic to 
believe one can live beyond the reach of social media. This is the case even if the 
individual chooses to avoid directly interacting with software, because “much 
code is engaged,  at  a  distance,  in  the  provision  of  contemporary living” 
(Kitchin and Dodge, 2011). Hence new media represent a paradigm change in the 
very base-level ways in which society is structured.  
Necessarily, such wide-scale, deep-reaching and profoundly resonant techno-
cultural changes will exert a forceful influence on the nature, not only of mass 
communications, but of all communication. McCombs (2005) notes that the 
Internet has affected several radical transformations in the world of 
communications technologies. This included the technological advances that have 
led to numerous new platforms and devices coming to the fore. Also, it includes 
“E-mail, online newspapers, chat rooms and websites representing every 
ideological, commercial and personal niche [that] have changed the 
communication behaviours of millions of people across the world and opened 
vast new territories to communication researchers” (McCombs, 2005). The 
emergence of social media changed the traditional production/consumption 
paradigm, giving users the power to create and circulate content autonomously 
and with relative ease. This development has been accompanied by a new species 
of what has been called “interactive culture”; such culture enables users to 
simultaneously become producers, for “they participate in the construction of 
online spaces while at the same time consuming the content generated by others” 
(Gane and Beer, 2008). Hence “interactive multimedia” and “immersive 
technology” afford “telepresence” and “interactivity” in modes without historical 
precedent (Kacunko, 2015). This proffered uniqueness is evident in the 
continuous connectedness which characterises the new media-sphere, where new 
and pervasive imagined communities are in action, where subjects are perpetually 
connected as nodes in “virtual communities” constituted of “webs of personal 
relationships in cyberspace” (Wagner, 2001). The Internet has continued “this 
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turn toward living” in “networked societies”, where “boundaries are more 
permeable, interactions are with diverse others, linkages switch between multiple 
networks”; and “work and community networks are diffuse and sparsely knit, 
with vague, overlapping, social and spatial boundaries” (Wellman and 
Haythornthwaite, 2002). Considering the rapid, heterogeneous, unprecedented 
and seismic nature of these advancements in communications technologies, and 
their impact on diverse areas of society, agenda setting theory arguably faces a 
considerable critical challenge. A particular issue in this respect is analysing 
agendas will “become increasingly difficult as sources of news expand”, which, 
in turn, will render any measurement of the impact of the “news agenda” 
problematic as “people filter and personalise their news using new media 
technologies” (Chaffee and Metzger, 2001). These challenges are sizeable. After 
all, “we have witnessed the fastest evolution in communications technology in 
human history, and along with it the evolution of communication conceptions and 
theories to assess its impact” (Weinmann et al., 2016). However, the 
methodological difficulties at play are far from insurmountable. Simply, the 
critical apparatus needs to be re-calibrated to accommodate for the new forms of 
mass communications, addressing the fact that, as McCombs (2005) 
acknowledges, the Internet is now “the new frontier for research” in agenda 
setting (McCombs, 2005). 
So, today, the mass media are - in line with Moore’s Law - in a continual and 
expeditious state of evolution and adaptation. Of key concern for agenda setting 
theory, here, is the way in which shifts in the nature of communications 
technologies allow Internet users to set their own news agendas, and to locate and 
collaborate with like-minded actors within virtual communities (around the 
world) – alternate public spheres. The agenda is no longer an issue which pertains 
solely to “elite members of the press” (McCombs, 2005) dictating the narrative. 
Nowadays, polycentric communicative networks render ever more important the 
role of the shared values of a particular, ideologically aligned community. 
Previously, Margaret Deery and Robin Shaw (1999) had theorised that group 
affiliations would bear a significant influence on the individual, in terms of how 
that individual decoded media agendas. Matthew Ragas and Marilyn Roberts 
(2009) hold that groups constitute highly significant units of analysis in the 
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context of new media, seeing as they serve an essential bridging function between 
horizontal and vertical media. So understood, people are seen to associate 
themselves, horizontally, via interpersonal and social interactions, with media 
relating to their personal interests; and, vertically, via mainstream traditional 
media (i.e. media sources in which the participant plays no agenda-shaping role). 
This confluence of horizontal/vertical media engagement has been termed 
“agenda melding”, and entails that “audiences are not passive but actively select 
messages from the plethora of those available”, with individuals “expressing and 
perhaps reinforcing their personal values and attitudes through the messages 
selected” (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 2008). Specifically as this relates to the new 
media-sphere, Donald Shaw and David Weaver note that “social media such as 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and the availability of cell phones, email, and 
other media have vastly expanded the social landscape” such that we “mix agenda 
objects and attributes from a variety of media to construct a picture of the world” 
(Bruns et al., 2015). So, while agenda setting traditionally places emphasis on the 
“connection between medium and audience”, more recent approaches also look to 
the media choices audiences make, and how those “choices rise from their own 
established values and attitudes” (Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch, 2009). 
Therefore, in the words of Shaw and Weaver, agenda-melding represents a mode 
of combining different kinds of agendas whereby we “balance agendas of civic 
community and our valued reference communities with our views and 
experiences to create a satisfying picture of the world” (Bruns et al., 2015). On 
this view, then, agenda melding is not a substitute for media agenda setting; 
instead, it works to account for the reasons that media agenda-setting efficacy is 
variable among different groups, individuals and types of media. 
Increasingly, then, the critical lens of agenda theory has been directed toward 
the more complex and hybridised communicative modes, which obtain in the 
contemporary new-media landscape, with “agenda melding” coming to particular 
prominence. With regard to radical politics and social media, therefore, agenda 
melding is at the forefront because media sources outside the mainstream may 
promulgate foment and, indeed, revolution in ways which institutional outlets 
cannot. Obviously this trait of social media poses particular implications for 
repressive nations where traditional media are tightly controlled. In the case of 
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the Tunisian uprising, for example, social media afforded an unprecedented tool 
for “amassing support, communicating with like-minded people, and spreading 
the word”, thus establishing a powerful exemplar (Killian and McManus, 2015). 
A special point of strength is that social media, as networked technology 
possess something of “an ungovernable quality, resisting definition, operating 
through decentralised activities that make regulation or censorship increasingly 
difficult” (Lloyd, 2001). Moreover, because social media sources are virtual, de-
centralised and bi-directional, emanating from numerous sites simultaneously, 
they have no one physical source location (such as a broadcasting house, printing 
house, etc) which may be shut down. This creates a structural problem for 
repressive regimes who seek to occlude the information flow, because the flow 
has no tributary or outlet; instead, the information is multitudinously reproduced 
at multiple diverse sites, at numerous times. With social media, it therefore 
follows, the “efficacy is in its aggregate effect, an effect which is able to blunt 
traditional media’s singular agenda setting effect” (Meraz, 2011). In this regard, it 
follows that social media may be understood as a “reflection of the public 
agenda” (Garcia, 2014). Moreover, because social media users are participants in 
(horizontal) online communities, they have a (potentially) global group of 
collaborators who can help them spread their messages out there, even if 
governments seek to block or ban Internet traffic domestically. The issue is 
further compounded for would-be censors when such virtual communities utilise 
peer-to-peer (network) technology in order to disseminate communications. With 
peer-to-peer technology, each computer “running a distributed peer-to-peer client 
program becomes a node in a self-organising network of thousands of computers 
[. . .] because distributed file-sharing net-works have no central server, they are 
very difficult to shut down” (Fries and Fries, 2005). Accordingly such networked 
technology, in the hands of the populace, represents a grave threat to the state 
censor indeed. Hence scholars note that, within the Arab world, “ruling elites fear 
the Internet as a conduit for political and moral subversion; and this fear has 
dominated the discourse on the use of the technology” (Hammond, 2007). 
Clearly, the transformation in technology and communication norms affected the 
way agenda setting function works, among with other aspects that will be 
discussed throughout the chapter. 
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As has been demonstrated above, then, there is a scholarly trend which 
espouses the putative liberating power of social media to disrupt traditional sites 
of agenda-building and agenda-setting. Thus, new media technologies have the 
potential to “give more power to people whose agendas would not normally be 
reported in the mass media” (Chaffee and Metzger, 2001). This is largely the 
consequence of the altered power relations enabled by structural shifts in 
production/distribution dynamics, whereupon the decentralised nature of the 
Internet means that, in contrast to previous times, all users have (potentially) 
equal opportunity to contribute to news discourse and thereby to shape news 
agendas.  
In any event, there is a solid critical consensus attesting to the fact that, in one 
way or another, for better or for worse, these new technologies are fundamentally 
changing the nature of the relationship between the public and the media (see for 
instance, Gillmor, 2004; Boyd and Ellison, 2008; Karlsson, 2011).  
3.4.1. Agenda Setting, Agenda Melding: Leading up to, During, and After 
the Revolution in Egypt 
In the decades leading up to the revolution, the media sphere in Egypt 
witnessed many changes, small transformations which together led to a profound 
transformation.  
The case is complex. The true trajectory of the Egyptian media-sphere remains 
to be decided. What is clear is that online technologies and social media will 
necessarily play an important role in whatever is to come. One study declares 
“that Egypt is among the top five countries in the world in terms of Internet users, 
Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of social media and exchange-of-information 
vehicle” (El-Bendary, 2013). Moreover, in the post-revolutionary turbulence, 
social media platforms continue to provide a site in which dissident or otherwise 
marginal views may be expressed and, therefore, circulated more widely. Thus, 
the social media landscape, while increasingly fragmented, nevertheless offers a 
vital resource in enabling those voices who wish to expose the regime’s human 
rights violations, without the fear of repression coming to them; this is 
particularly relevant inasmuch as social media offer a certain amount of 
anonymity. The rapid rate of technological advancement, in conjunction with the 
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increasingly expansive applications of pervasive media, throw further uncertainty 
on the future of mass communications in general and regarding Egypt in 
particular. This does not, however, mean that agenda setting theory will have no 
place in whatever media paradigm comes to crystallise. Indeed, as Hoi Tran 
(2014) argues, even though developments which come out of online technologies 
have failed to completely revolutionise the “traditional understanding of agenda-
setting theory”, they nevertheless have transformed the “complicated 
relationships through which the media agenda is built” (Bruns et al., 2015). 
Following this analysis, it seems reasonable to assert that new developments in 
technology and communications will necessarily spawn tandem developments in 
communications theory. At this particular time, in which Egypt is still undergoing 
a transformative phase, agenda-setting theorists must pay particular attention to 
new forms and themes that emerge in the communications landscape. In this vein, 
the impact of a convergent media environment on the uprising is one such new 
form that must be considered.  
3.5. Exploring the Impact of the Convergent Media Environment on the 
Uprising using the Concept of Social Capital 
Technologically, as previously explained, social media facilitates new forms of 
communication between individuals and groups of people, which are then used in 
a convergent media environment. These forms of communication build on 
longstanding cultural norms and practices, such as the development of trust and 
relationships, exchange of information and goods, and collective action. Indeed, 
an emerging trend in the sociological academic literature of the last 30 years has 
been the discussion and analysis of the concept of “social capital” – a term used 
to describe the political, economic and social value of ‘social networks’. In order 
to contextualise this analysis of social media more fully, this section will 
highlight the key contours of recent thinking on the importance of social capital 
with a particular focus on its impact on collective political action in rural Egypt. 
Moreover, as part of the aim of this thesis is to explore social media use in rural 
areas in the context of the convergent media environment, some of the literature 
regarding the varying ways in which social capital operates in urban settings will 
also be discussed. 
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3.5.1. Background: the concept of social capital  
The term ‘social capital’ may first have appeared in a book published in 1916 
by author Lyda Hanifan who described it as “those tangible assets [that] count for 
most in the daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and 
social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit”. 
It was not until the 1980s and 1990s, however, that the term became consistently 
adopted and explored in the academic literature. Whereas ‘physical capital’ 
describes physical objects and human capital, and which attributes political and 
economic characteristics to the individual, ‘social capital’ is described in relation 
to the interactions and discourses within a group of individuals (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Coleman 1988). Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, for 
example, differentiated social capital from economic and cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986). He defined social capital as, "the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resource which are linked to the possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition" (Bourdieu, 1986). He clarifies that it is the sum of the resources, 
which may be actual or virtual, that individuals or the group accrues as a result of 
their relationships (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Similarly, Mikael Rostila 
indicates that social capital refers to the social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that are derived from them. Thomas Sander 
defined social capital as the collective value of people who know each other 
(which he referred to as social networks), and have norms of reciprocity that are 
characterised by the desire to do things for one another (Sommerfeldt, 2013).  
The literature on social capital consists of two strands: the first strand focuses 
primarily on internal relationships within a collective group or organisation 
(bonding). This refers to the establishment and use of social capital within 
homogenous groups (Putnam, 1986) and the relationships individuals have with 
people close to them, such as family and friends (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). The 
second strand of social capital literature focuses on external relationships that 
actors develop and maintain with other actors (bridging) (Putnam, 1986; Adler 
and Kwon, 2002). ‘Bridging’ describes the way in which social capital is used by 
individuals in social networks to deploy financial or human capital or form 
organisations and networks with other groups of people (Burt 1992, 1997; Portes 
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1998; Knoke 1999). Daniel Aldrich and Michelle Meyer (2014) observed that the 
horizontal networks formed as a consequence of ‘bridging’ between individual 
citizens and heterogeneous groups are instrumental in achieving cohesion and 
pushing for a common cause that is of benefit to the whole community. These 
heterogeneous groups can also be responsible for driving political change through 
the ability to share, debate and formulate ideas aimed at promoting the public 
good. 
Robert Putnam (1995) observed that social capital could be categorised into 
two sub-sources which he described as consummatory and instrumental. For 
Putnam, consummatory social capital means “features of social organizations, 
such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for 
mutual benefit.” Consummatory capital is built up by maintaining societal 
contracts, following rules and obeying laws. By contrast, instrumental social 
capital is based on one’s societal surroundings and location – social capital as 
understood in this sense is accumulated through activities that establish and 
facilitate social obligations between individuals. Instrumental social capital is 
based on the premise that individuals will donate their resources without 
necessarily seeking payment, but owing to the fact that they are members of the 
same social structure (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). Resources do not have to be 
explicitly financial but may involve time and energy. Individual devotion to 
facilitating a better environment may therefore be described as the donating of 
resources, in this case one’s self for the public good. Viewing instrumental social 
capital in this light helps describe how groups at the forefront of political protest 
contribute to society by pursuing political change.  
To what extent, then, has social capital been viewed in the literature as a factor 
in the formation of political movements and political change? Although a 
relatively new concept with regards to politics, researchers have argued that 
social capital is an important indicator of political participation. Social capital has 
been viewed as an antecedent in the development of civil society and behaviour 
which promotes the public good at the political level. It has been regarded as 
necessary for citizens and civic communities to demand more efficient public 
services and responsible leadership from their political institutions and personnel, 
raise concerns about actions undertaken by the government, and participate in 
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both elections and political protests (Zúñiga et al., 2012; Teney and Hanquinet, 
2012). Francis Fukuyama (2006) argues that social capital has even facilitated the 
politicization of apolitical environments. The potential strength of social capital 
as a vehicle for political change is also evidenced by circumstances in which 
ruling governments have attempted to disrupt the formation of social capital in 
order to maintain power (Sommerfeldt, 2013). Whether citizens are actively 
engaged and involved in the political arena or are alienated and cynical non-
participants, however, depends on the level of social capital within their 
respective community. The following section explores both non-geographic and 
geographic factors for variations in social capital. However, the discussion is 
contextualised through the latter since one of the key aspects being explored in 
this thesis is whether social media use and political participation varied in rural 
areas of Egypt during and after the Egyptian uprisings.  
3.5.2 Key factors affecting social capital in society  
Other scholars argue that there are variations in the level of social capital 
depending on a range of geographic and non-geographic factors (Stephan et al., 
1997). Social capital varies depending on certain non-geographic criteria such as 
education, access to technology, and cultural practices (Teney and Hanquinet, 
2012) as well as political and religious ideologies or other cultural norms. 
However, it is clear that geographic location also appears to play an important 
role. Sandra Hofferth and John Iceland (1998), for example, found that people 
living in rural areas are much more likely to exclusively interact and exchange 
information as compared to those living in urban centres. The sense of 
cooperation in agrarian and tribal communities is higher than urban areas, partly 
due to pre-existing social relations in small groups of people that facilitate sharing 
of social capital (Geys and Murdoch, 2010; Putnam, 2000).  According to 
Putnam, it is classified as “thin” trust because it is a generalized form of trust in 
the community as a whole not with close people and family, which would be 
classified as “thick” trust (Social Capital A Review of the Literature, 2001). It is 
possible that the growing accessibility of mass media is breaking down the 
boundaries between rural and urban social capital, as social interactions more 
closely align to national and even global norms disseminated in more 
homogenous media narratives (Valenzuela, 2013). However, demonstrates that 
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regional variations in access to infrastructure, social amenities and education still 
affects levels of social capital (Hopkins and Westergaard, 2004). Rural societal 
structures also appear to have different understandings of trust whereby certain 
local individual elites more clearly affect the decision-making of those lower in 
the hierarchy than they do in urban areas (Hopkins and Westergaard, 2004). For 
example, during the parliamentary elections in 2015 in Qalyoubia, one of Greater 
Cairo's governorates, which has a rural population, the majority of farmers trusted 
the opinions of the head of a trusted family and voted for the candidate that he 
recommended, who ended up winning the elections (Saif, 2015). As stated by 
Mohamed Moussa, one of the farmers who voted in this election, "if the head of 
the Saif family recommends someone then he is the most trustworthy candidate" 
(Moussa, 2015). Rural environments also tend to have a collective environment 
fostered by trust among individuals whereas urban centres tend to have higher 
levels of individualism (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 
2011). 
The literature seems to suggest that social capital in rural and urban areas vary 
in key ways. This is significant as the uprising in Egypt was carried forward by a 
younger, urban, and technologically-savvy elite. This demographic is more likely 
to have had a higher level of social capital in terms of access to information, 
education, and social contacts. It perhaps belonged to a more individualistic and 
larger society which made engaging in politics in urban areas more 
straightforward, yet engagement in politics in rural areas was not as 
straightforward and related to more factors such as trust in the hierarchy of 
certain rural areas. Perhaps the rise of social media is able to explain this paradox. 
The following section will consider what impact social media has had on our 
understanding of social capital and, among that, if social capital differences in 
different areas affect political participation.  
3.5.3. Social Capital and Social Media 
 Aldrich and Meyer (2014) argue that public enlightenment leads to increased 
political engagement and social media has had a profound influence on people’s 
access to political information. One particular element of a new digitally 
connected public sphere is access to social media tools that facilitate the easy 
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exchange of information and the opportunity to relate to people in completely 
new ways (Lee, 2015). The question arises, therefore, as to whether these new 
forms of social capital engendered by social media are distinct or merely an 
extension of the traditional concept of social capital. Homera Gil de Zúñiga et al. 
(2017) presents social media social capital as a novel empirical and conceptual 
construct that complements the traditional face-to-face form of social capital. 
Based on data collected in the US, in the form of a two-wave panel, the study 
tested whether online social capital and offline social capital are related.  
Additionally, the researchers sought to establish how the two forms of social 
capital can relate to various types of citizenship, both offline and online. The 
findings indicated that social media social capital and offline social capital exhibit 
distinct features and patterns, leading to different understandings of citizenship 
and varying levels of participatory behaviours in politics. Analysing their 
conclusions, based on theoretical developments in the field of pro-democratic 
political discussions and social capital, it can be argued that social media provides 
a unique form of weakly regulated deliberation and communication platforms 
which engender social capital, allowing citizens to collectively add their voice in 
the political conversations in their countries, yet whether it complements 
traditional social capital or not differs from each country to the other based on its 
circumstances. 
Another sense in which social media has altered the nature of social capital is 
in the emergence of new ‘trusted’ actors who are – at least in part – trusted on the 
basis of an established online presence. If social capital’s importance can be 
magnified in the political environment by the ‘presence of capable agents’ who 
are responsible for helping the public in decision-making - as Robert Jackman 
and Rose Miller (1998) contend - then it is possible that the online environment 
has led to the emergence of new political ‘leaders’ who foster new forms of social 
capital. With reference to Egyptian uprisings, this can be seen in the actions of 
citizen journalists and bloggers such as Wael Ghonim who fuelled the uprisings 
by informing the public about the atrocities committed by Mubarak’s regime 
(Heydemann, 2015).  
Critics of social media have pointed out how they weaken strong bonds in 
favour of a range of weaker connections. However, a number of studies have 
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suggested that weak ties are important (Granovetter, 1985) and, perhaps, 
politically so for political activity and large protests which rely on people 
cooperating with people they have never met before. Large political protests 
require ‘bridging’ connections and this is precisely what social media has 
provided. One aspect of this research that naturally arises from the research 
questions is the idea that regional differences in social capital may impact the 
usage of different media; while not explicitly investigated, this research does take 
into consideration that there are slight variations between governorates in this 
regard.  
3.6. Conclusion: The contribution of this thesis to the academic literature 
  
This chapter has provided an extensive overview of the literature concerning 
the political context of Egypt prior to the uprising in 2011, the Egyptian media 
system in relation to Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, the emergence of 
the convergent media environment affected by agenda setting techniques, and the 
emergence of social media in the context of the concept of social capital. From 
the analysis above, a number of gaps in the literature can be identified. First, 
although a number of studies have explored the role of social media in political 
uprisings and in Egypt in particular, there remains a need for further empirically-
tested findings. In particular, many studies consider social media tools in isolation 
whereas the aim of this thesis is to consider their role in the political uprisings in 
the context of a convergent media system in which satellite television was also a 
key player. One of the aims of this thesis is to take a more focused and detailed 
approach to television and social media use in Egypt’s varying regions.  Second, 
most of the studies have focused on urban Egypt while neglecting rural areas, 
which represent half of the population; yet rural areas are the focus of this thesis. 
Third, few studies have sought to understand how varying levels of social capital 
in rural areas might provide a window into how social media use affected the 
course of the uprisings and its relation to political participation.  
 To address these gaps, the following research questions were formulated to 
guide the study: 
 
111 
1. To what extent did social media change individual norms of political 
interaction with the public sphere of rural Egypt during and after 2011 due to its 
convergence with television media? 
2. How does social capital in rural Egypt affect the political interaction of 
citizens in the public sphere considering the social media access circumstances? 
3. How did media coverage of the uprisings impact micro public spheres 
and so feelings of empowerment and social capital in rural Egypt? 
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4. Chapter 3 - Qualitative Research Method, Going Beyond 
Urban Egypt 
4.1. Introduction 
This section provides a description of the research methodology adopted in the 
collection and analysis of data relating to the media environment of Egypt, before 
and after the uprisings. As observed by Gary Thomas (2011), the methodology of 
a study defines the specific stages in which the researcher will obtain data 
relevant to the research objectives. The stages of conducting the study involve 
selection of a suitable sample size, collection of data, and data analysis which will 
culminate in the presentation of findings. Thomas argues that selection of an 
appropriate methodology is central to any research study as it determines the 
accuracy of the conclusions drawn. In this case, a qualitative approach has been 
chosen. According to Alan Bryman (2012), a qualitative approach offers a rich 
and comprehensive picture of why people act the way they do and how they act 
and feel about different situations. A qualitative approach can provide new 
insights about and around the topic, which may not have been envisaged in 
research plans and objectives.  This chapter will analyse why this specific 
methodology has been selected, how it assists in achieving the research goals of 
this thesis, the limitations, and any ethical considerations associated with its use. 
It is important to begin, however, by acknowledging that in order to select 
suitable methods, researchers should be aware of their situation within 
philosophical research paradigms and should employ a coherent research design 
(Singmann and Klauer, 2011).  
4.2. Research Philosophy 
One central aim of any piece of research is to create reliable and valid 
findings. In recent years, the idea that social phenomena can be ‘objectively’ 
observed in a ‘detached’ manner has been heavily criticized in the social sciences. 
Aware of these limitations, researchers have increasingly used a ‘reflexive’ 
approach to ensure they are aware of the ways in which their own background, 
sample selections, methods, framing and communication style influence their 
research findings (Malterud, 2001). It is particularly important, as highlighted by 
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Mike Pedler (2012), that any researcher be aware of the social forces which might 
influence the manner in which he or she conducts research and analyses findings. 
As well as helping in increasing awareness of limitations and biases within the 
research, Wesam Darawsheh and Mandy Stanley (2014) argue that a reflexive 
stance promotes an enriched research engagement, which may help to provide an 
extensive analysis and conclusion to the study. Beyond my personal role, 
‘reflexive’ research in social theory is a stance that emphasizes the circular 
relationship between cause and effect. This is particularly important when 
studying a new media environment, which appears to be characterized by the 
interactive flow of information between producers and consumers, rather than the 
pre-21st century norms of broadcast and mass media. One of the aims of the 
research of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the media and the 
actions of the public by analyzing how the two factors influenced each other 
during the uprisings of 2011. Here, again, a reflexive understanding of these 
processes will be helpful. Having outlined the broad philosophical underpinning, 
the overarching approach to the research will now be considered.  
4.2.1 Research Approach 
Deborah Gabriel (2013) describes a research approach as the guiding 
theoretical principle of how a study is conducted in order to achieve the objective 
of answering the research question. According to Henrick Singmann and Karl 
Klauer (2011), researchers may adopt two main approaches to conducting 
research: deductive or inductive. In many studies, however, researchers move 
back and forth between the deductive approach, which is based on identifying and 
testing theories or hypotheses, and the inductive, which tends towards developing 
a theory from the ‘bottom up’ through case studies. For this study, three central 
research questions have been formulated, which are open to exploration, but 
implicitly contain deductive theoretical propositions which will be tested during 
the course of the research. The first of these is: 
1. To what extent did social media change individual norms of political 
interaction with the public sphere of rural Egypt during and after 2011 due to its 
convergence with television media? 
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The underlying assumption within this question is that social media and its 
convergent relationship with television has in fact made a difference to Egypt’s 
public sphere. The openness of the question, however, facilitates a more inductive 
approach whereby research ‘on the ground’ will allow flexible consideration of 
what impact social media has had, rather than being limited by narrower 
assumptions.   
The second and third research questions are:  
1. How does social capital in rural Egypt affect the political interaction of 
citizens in the public sphere considering the social media access circumstances? 
 
2. How did media coverage of the uprisings impact micro public spheres 
and so feelings of empowerment and social capital in rural Egypt? 
 
Similarly, these questions contain the underlying assumption that social capital 
does affect political participation of citizens in the public sphere and that rural 
and urban cultural differences are likely to be a factor. However, the theory 
behind social capital’s role will be built by inductively considering the data from 
Egypt’s governorates rather than starting out with a strict set of hypotheses. In 
this way, the thesis will move back and forth between the deductive and inductive 
approaches.   
4.2.2. Research Design: A Qualitative Research Approach  
In any research design, it is essential to define the systematic formula and 
method the study will employ to meet the objective of answering the research 
questions (Boeije, 2009). Bryman (2012) underscores the need to select an 
appropriate methodology to develop data collection approaches and analyses that 
lead to accurate results from which comprehensive conclusions may be drawn.  
A qualitative research approach has been chosen for this study. This method 
was chosen based on the necessity of the research to analyse the impact of the 
media during the uprisings, and attempting to understand the motivation for the 
use of social media during the period. According to Lisa Slevitch (2011), the 
qualitative approach involves the use of non-numerical data which is descriptive 
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in nature, as opposed to the quantitative approach which relies on numerical and 
empirical analysis of statistical data. Irene Gialdino (2011) points out that 
qualitative research is informed by the constructivist stance and is therefore 
subjective in nature. Constructivism emphasises the use of the researcher’s 
knowledge and understanding to interpret natural phenomenon to develop 
knowledge. When conducting primary research, it is often necessary to apply 
personal knowledge and thoughts in the interpretation of reality. As such, the 
qualitative design provides an effective approach for examining and evaluating 
the responses of the participants in the field. The use of descriptive data facilitates 
an in-depth analysis of the reasons or motivations which underpin the 
phenomenon (Mack et al., 2011). Therefore, the method will prove effective in 
the analysis of the use of social media and television during the Egyptian 
uprisings, and in the acquisition of information regarding such usage in the 
Egyptian governorates. 
The qualitative approach yields a number of advantages. For instance, Stanley 
Thomson (2011) notes that it enables the application of simple structural 
techniques in the data collection process. Hence, it is possible to acquire data 
from a wide range of sources, which enhances the validity of research and the 
generalizability derived from the analysis of data. The facility to collect views 
and experiences provides a critical component to an understanding of the actions 
of people and their motivations towards behaving in a particular way (Creswell, 
2014). Therefore, using a qualitative approach will enable an understanding of 
motivations relating to the use of social media in the Egyptian uprisings. To 
understand a certain aspect more profoundly, one has freedom of exploration 
since qualitative research is not limited to definable variables. As such, it is 
possible to make in-depth exploration through the use of complex questions. The 
ability to explore deeply enables further understanding of the central themes of 
the phenomenon being studied. Mack et al. (2011) cite that the qualitative 
approach tends to avoid prejudgments by analyzing the views of the subjects from 
their own perspective. 
However, the qualitative research method bears limitations which may impact 
how the study is carried out. For instance, Mack et al. (2011) point out that 
collection of qualitative data is often time-consuming. Hence, it is difficult to 
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conduct research using large samples, which may increase the possibility of 
generalizing the findings. Furthermore, qualitative research is dependent on the 
skill of the researcher. Since the research is intended to create a general picture 
regarding the impact and usage of mass media during the Egyptian uprisings, a 
small sample size may limit the potential to draw relevant insights that represent 
those of the entire population. However, this study collects data from different 
governorates to minimize the effects of such limitations, and ensure that the 
findings provide an accurate representation of the population during the uprisings. 
Despite the limitations, the method is considered appropriate owing to the 
importance of descriptive data, and the need for in-depth exploration of the issue 
of social media use among the population. 
In this study, an iterative approach has been employed in the service of the 
qualitative design. First, population data was used to help with selection of the 
representative sample for Egypt’s rural governorates. After identification, a 
qualitative approach was implemented to target the people living in the selected 
governorates. The specific method that was adopted for use in collection of data 
in the field is semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews illuminate 
in-depth individual experiences, perceptions and understandings of their use of 
social media, the state of the public sphere and the extent to which they feel they 
are able to participate in politics. The method was intended to enable the 
gathering of data relating to social networks, general media habits and the use of 
social media. In this way, the idea was to use the advantages of the qualitative 
approach to improve the validity, reliability and value of the study. The scope of 
each method in answering the research question is explained in more detail in the 
sections that follow.  
The aim of the sample of governorates was to select a range of governorates in 
terms of total geographical population and percentage of the population defined 
as rural. This was intended to enable an assessment of the circumstances of rural 
areas in terms of their social capital, social media and media use, and level of 
political participation that has not been focused on previously in relation to the 
2011 uprisings. In order to produce a sample that would appropriately represent 
the whole of Egypt, it was necessary to select a governorate from each of the four 
geographical regions, namely: Nile Valley and Nile Delta, Western Desert, 
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Eastern Desert and Sinai Peninsula. Therefore, the selected governorates were 
Qalyoubia, Minya, South Sinai and Menoufia. For the rural areas, Qalyoubia was 
chosen because it is a mixed governorate with villages and a city, and close to 
Cairo and the Delta governorates. The study also selects the South Sinai 
governorate because it has tribal traditions that need to be assessed whilst 
considering social capital. The focus was also on Upper Egypt’s Minya because it 
is one of the main governorates in that region. Finally, the last governorate 
selected was Menoufia because it is one of the most populated governorates in 
Egypt.  
Governorate Total Population Urban Population (%) 
Qalyoubia 5,105,972 44.7% 
Menoufia 3,941,293 20.6% 
Minya 5,156,702 18.9% 
South Sinai 167,426 51.1% 
Urban Population in Four Key Governorates in Egypt (Total & Percentage) 
Source: (CAPMAS, 2015) 
4.2.2.1. Semi-Structured Interviews 
From the demographic data, purposive non-probability sampling was used. 
This sample of individuals who gave their permission to be contacted were 
selected for follow-up semi-structured interviews. It has been noted that non-
probability sampling is useful if one wishes to study “particular phenomena with 
a potential to generate valuable insights” and that non-probability sampling can 
be used for studying “existing theoretical insights or developing new ones.” As 
such, a non-probability sample allows for precision and exploration, both of 
which are key for qualitative research. The open nature of purposive non-
probability sampling allows for an expert to select “cases with a specific purpose 
in mind” (Showkat and Parveen, 2017), further enhancing the exploratory nature 
of the research (Tansey, 2007).  
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Semi-structured interviews are carried out in a fairly open framework allowing 
for focused conversational communication. Such structure allowed for deviation 
from the structured questions as needed and in order to acquire in-depth data on 
specific aspects of importance (Peters and Halcomb, 2015). This, once again, was 
aided by the purposive non-probability sampling, which allowed for the choosing 
of a sample divided along social, political, and gender lines across all four 
governorates. This in turn allowed for wider exploration of the subject, as well as 
opportunity for unexpected themes to arise and be considered, as will be 
discussed later in the chapter. The semi-structured interviews were used to 
attempt to unravel social media aspects such as access, whilst also exploring 
barriers that respondents faced in terms of access to social media. Interviews were 
used to examine social media barriers and access in the respective governorates. 
It was also the objective of the research to uncover data regarding the political 
interaction during the uprisings whilst considering the aspect of social capital 
among political participation. The semi-structured interviews therefore played a 
central role in determining the political climate during and after the uprisings by 
learning from the respondents about their support for political movements, and 
about whether they were involved in the parliamentary elections. Such an 
approach aided in analyzing political interaction through a determination of 
political participation of people in the governorates before, during and after the 
uprisings. This method's suitability in comparison to others was affirmed in the 
sense that it allowed for a close analysis of the differences in feelings and actions 
that interviewees expressed from one area as compared to another. If other 
methods had been chosen that did not include direct contact, such as 
questionnaires, it would not have been possible to view and record reactions, 
which are important in such research for the evaluation of how different citizens 
react in one area compared to another. These reactions were significant for the 
demonstration of the validity of the social capital concept in the context of this 
research. 
Given the importance of the semi-structured interviews as primary sources of 
data for this research, several criteria were identified early on for who to 
interview. At the outset, it was decided there would be 12 interviewees from each 
of the four governorates - Qalyoubia, Menoufia, Minya, and South Sinai - for a 
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total of 48 interviewees. Each region had criteria to ensure variety, and to provide 
insight on tensions within the community as a result of politics. Different 
perspectives were needed, so there would need to be social media users as well as 
non-social media users to uncover the differences in how interviewees received 
and circulated information. Males and females were also required to highlight 
whether gender-based differences existed.    
Given these needs, six criteria were decided on. First, one individual would 
need to be influential within the governorate. This was the member of parliament, 
or the individual financially supporting the member of parliament’s campaign. 
This individual was, at a minimum, forty years old and male; generally, this 
influential individual would not use social media, though his supporters and 
campaign might. Second, one interviewee would be an opponent of the first 
individual. This opposition could take many forms; the individual could be an 
unsuccessful challenger for the parliament seat, the supporter of the unsuccessful 
candidate, or the financial backer of the unsuccessful candidate. Typically, this 
individual would also be male, and would commonly be a social media user since 
their support would not be as strong in the governorate and, as such, social media 
would be used to compensate for that lack of an established base. Generally, this 
individual would be younger than the first individual, meaning that they would 
also be more familiar with social media. The third and fourth individuals would 
be female, and both would be highly involved in supporting the current member 
of parliament (or his financial backer) and the unsuccessful candidate, or his 
supporter or financial backer. In both cases, this female would be influential in 
society, not necessarily educated, and non-social media users since word-of-
mouth representation is more common in the governorates being discussed. 
Finally, two male and two female voters who supported the influential 
individual would need to be interviewed, and two male and two female voters 
who supported his unsuccessful opposition would need to be interviewed. Ideally, 
one male and one female from each political camp would be a social media user, 
and the others would be non-social media users. The intention here was balance; 
interviewing both social media users and non-social media users would illuminate 
the differences between them in terms of how they received information, how 
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they circulated information, and how they were affected by both the information 
and social media in general.  
However, one important aspect that was decided upon was that, depending on 
the level of saturation of information, the number of interviewees per region 
could increase or decrease. In the end, this was necessary for Minya and South 
Sinai, since high levels of repetition and saturation were reached relatively early 
in the semi-structured interviews and, as such, it was not necessary to interview 
specifically based on those criteria. Regardless of social standing, gender, or 
influence, interviewees in South Sinai and Minya provided answers that proved 
similar enough to each other that no new information was being provided. This 
was the case in terms of answers to the pre-set questions and the questions that 
naturally arose from them. As such, for Minya and South Sinai, only six 
interviewees were necessary. This, as will be highlighted in the following 
chapters, relates to the cultural and communal realities of these governorates. For 
Qalyoubia and Menoufia, in contrast, twelve interviewees were in fact needed for 
each governorate. Therefore, there was a total of 36 interviewees, instead of the 
intended 48.  
During the conversations themselves, it was necessary to ask the respondents 
an opening question regarding the research, which in turn provided them with the 
option to accept or decline participating in the study, and to state how they feel 
and their position on the subject. Agreement to participate was followed by 
asking the individual pre-set questions and answers recorded using audio 
equipment and paper. All interviews were fully audio-recorded. This data was 
supplemented by information acquired from data on demographics, and 
observational notes taken shortly after completion of the interviews.  
The pre-set questions each related to at least one specific research question, 
although the answers received may have illuminated on others. In many cases, the 
questions themselves were open-ended yet allowed for engagement with the key 
topic. For the first research question - if social media changed individual norms of 
political interaction with the public sphere of rural Egypt during and after 2011 
due to its convergence with television media - interviewees were asked questions 
that related to their media consumption and involvement in political discussions. 
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Examples include questions about whether social media was considered 
important before the uprisings, if interviewees used social media for updates and 
how, their general routines during the 18 days of the 2011 uprisings, with whom 
interviewees discussed politics, and how the uprisings affected their consumption 
of media. The aim of these questions was to establish interviewee viewpoints on 
the media and political interaction, and to allow for open-ended discussion 
regarding whether there were differences after 2011 as compared to before. 
For the second research question - how social capital in rural Egypt affected 
the political interaction of citizens in the public sphere considering the social 
media access circumstances - the pre-set questions focused on community, 
interviewee opinions on strangers, where interviewee information on the 
uprisings came from, what interviewees viewed as being necessary in a 
parliamentary candidate, and how (or if) the uprisings changed interviewee views 
on politics. These questions allowed for links to be made between social capital, 
political interaction, and social media; as the following chapters will show, these 
were related and, as such, answering this research question required an analysis of 
all three factors. 
Finally, for the third research question - how media coverage of the uprisings 
impacted micro public spheres and so feelings of empowerment and social capital 
in rural Egypt - the pre-set questions delved into the trustworthiness of different 
forms of media, how controlled each form of media was, how interviewees felt 
about the uprisings and about not being physically present in the epicenter of the 
protesting at Tahrir Square, as well as the differences in their feelings generally 
between 2011 and 2013 in regards to their community and their view on politics. 
Empowerment, as an emotion, required questions that delved into the emotional 
state of the interviewees rather than simply their opinions. As such, it was never 
addressed directly in the pre-set questions; rather, the pre-set questions allowed 
for answers that would address ‘empowerment’ implicitly.  
Of course, other pre-set questions were asked that were open-ended and 
allowed for the semi-structured interview to evolve naturally and touch on the 
three research questions eventually. While this may have been time-consuming to 
an extent (Newton, 2010), it allowed the interviewer-interviewee relationship to 
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progress, while giving flexibility for unexpected themes to arise as will be shown 
later in the chapter. 
 
4.2.3. Limitations 
Although flexibility in interviews helps in the acquisition of in-depth data, Lisa 
Given (2008) suggests that it may lessen reliability. Given attributes this to the 
provision of a diverse range of information and respondents, providing 
unnecessary descriptions where simple answers would suffice. Nigel Newton 
(2010) notes that interviews may be time-consuming to set-up and carry out. In 
addition, interviews may be costly owing to the need to travel to different 
geographical regions to interview participants face-to-face. Finally, a number of 
studies have indicated that the interviewee/interviewer relationship and 
interaction significantly affects the nature of the data collected. As a result of 
these concerns, particularly reliability, secondary data (as well as statistical 
evidence) has been found, and conditions have been placed regarding its 
collection, in order to ensure reliability through diversity and range.  
4.2.4. Secondary Data Collection 
The data from the semi-structured interviews was complemented by relevant 
secondary data, including general websites, journal articles, government websites 
and mass media outlets including newspapers and their websites. The use of this 
secondary data was intended to serve two distinct purposes. Mass media outlets 
and their websites, as well as general websites, were used to cross-reference 
dates, events, and timelines as iterated by the interviewees. General websites and 
journal articles were used for the same purpose, with the addition that general 
sentiments and qualitative data related to the sample of semi-structured was also 
considered. In this fashion, the accuracy and generalizability of the semi-
structured interviews was considered in light of the viewpoints of the time, in 
order to better understand whether - and how - their sentiments were reflected 
outside of the sample.  
The secondary data collected in this thesis arose out of three distinct needs. 
First, if an interviewee (or multiple interviews) referred to a particular piece of 
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data - for example, including a Facebook page, a news channel, or an opinion 
stated by some public figure - then this was researched, and the interviewee’s 
comments were considered in light of the findings. Second, if there was some 
informational gap in an interviewee’s comments, or some sentiment of 
uncertainty, secondary data was used to verify the statement. Examples of this 
include dates, locations, or statements made by news outlets or government 
figures. Given that the topic of this study - the 2011 uprisings and their immediate 
aftermath - occurred between 3 and 7 years before the semi-structured interviews  
took place, some confusion was to be expected; secondary data filled this gap. 
Third, secondary data from the above-mentioned sources was used to provide 
contextual information regarding the time period, the timeline, and the political 
background in which this topic is embedded, and for the purpose of assessing 
after-the-fact statements from the semi-structured interviews in light of 
statements made at the time by citizens, the media, and other relevant parties.  
In addition to relevant secondary data, statistical data was collected in relation 
to populations, demographics, urbanisation and Internet usage in the 
governorates. Once again, this arose out of several needs. The difference between 
statistical data and other secondary data however lies in the fact that the former 
was primarily relevant prior to the onset of the semi-structured interviews. First, 
given the importance of the semi-structured interviews and the consolidation of a 
range of governorates in terms of geographical population and percentage of the 
population defined as rural - to enable an assessment of the circumstances of rural 
areas in terms of their social capital, social media and media use, and level of 
political participation - statistical data regarding the governorates was necessary. 
This included which governorates to choose, Internet usage in each area, 
population size, and urban versus rural populations. On the macro level, the 
urbanisation level of Egypt was also significant. 
There was however one notable exception, wherein statistical data was 
collected after the onset of semi-structured interviews. This was done to assess 
interview findings in terms of sub-thematic concerns, such as age difference, 
changes in voting behaviour, and Internet usage increase. Since these will be 
discussed in the following section, it is sufficient for now to note that statistical 
data always operated secondary to the semi-structured interviews in the sense that 
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its initial use was to identify necessary information for choosing the governorates 
assessed, and its later use was to provide quantitative feedback for the qualitative 
findings of the semi-structured interviews. In any case, the specifics of their use 
will be detailed in the following section. 
4.2.5. Data Analysis 
According to Karen Robson and Lawrence Neuman (2014), data analysis 
covers the approaches with which collected data is evaluated and interpreted in 
order to identify relationships with the proposed research questions. In order to 
effectively analyze and relate the information obtained from different 
respondents, it was necessary to have a structure for organizing and evaluating 
the data. Therefore, thematic analysis has been used for analyzing the data 
recorded from the semi-structured interview. According to Bryman (2008), the 
purpose of thematic analysis is to organize data so that one can “extract core 
themes that could be distinguished both between and within transcripts.” The 
primary benefit of thematic frameworks stems from the purpose of data analysis 
in general; Bryman (2008) notes that, since the data analysis phase is 
“fundamentally about data reduction,” unless one finds a way to reduce the 
amount of data collected “by grouping textual material into categories like themes 
[...] it is more or less impossible to interpret the material.”  
The strategy used for organizing the thematic analysis conducted in this thesis 
is Framework, which was developed by the National Centre for Social Research 
(Bryman, 2008). This is a form of matrix “for ordering and synthesising data” by 
constructing an index of themes and subthemes (Bryman, 2008; Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003), as seen in the Appendix. These themes can be common ideas, 
recurring motifs, or repetitive phrases, thoughts, or terms that occur within or 
across the semi-structured interviews. Through thorough re-reading of interview 
manuscripts, these common motifs are discovered and “applied to the data, which 
are organized initially into core themes, and [...] then displayed in terms of sub 
themes within the matrix and for each case” (Bryman, 2008). As the next section 
will highlight, some themes for this thesis were considered prior to the semi-
structured interviews  - and brought forward through the initial questions that 
make up the interviews - while others arose naturally.  
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Given Bryman’s insights, this research has used a thematic framework for 
organizing and deriving meaningful insights from the interview data. A thematic 
framework was also used to analyze data collected on the influential media during 
the Egyptian uprisings, in order to facilitate the drawing of relevant conclusions 
about the research. Since it is always possible that important questions and issues 
not extensively explored may emerge in subsequent analyses, especially in a 
thematic analysis where some themes are considered beforehand and others arise 
naturally based on the semi-structured interviews, it was necessary to determine 
whether participants would be willing to participate in a re-interview if necessary. 
In any event, re-interviews did not prove necessary.  
The second component of data analysis entailed comparison and identification 
of insights from statistical data obtained from official agencies and secondary 
sources. For instance, the statistical data collected provided an insight into 
Internet coverage in Egypt, which, in turn, facilitated the determination of 
Internet access before and after the uprisings. Other insights that were obtained 
from the statistical data collected are information relating to the age group of 
those who use and have access to the Internet, in comparison to the age group of 
individuals actively involved in political activities such as voting. Another aspect 
was a focus on the identification of relevant insights with regard to voting 
percentages between 2011-2015 per governorate. This entailed a comparison of 
the age groups involved in political participation, the changes in terms of 
enrolment in new political parties, and the number of candidates participating in 
parliamentary elections compared to pre-2011, since there has been only one 
parliamentary election post-2011. 
The data analysis approaches were aimed at comparing the data obtained from 
the rural governorates in order to develop trends that relate to social media and 
television media usage in the regions. Statistics from secondary sources regarding 
Internet usage, television and social media were compared for different regions to 
determine trends in the media environment. The statistical data was used to 
corroborate the findings of the qualitative research. In addition, analysis also 
entailed comparing and relating information between the primary and secondary 
research in order to get a comprehensive view of the media environment before 
and after the uprisings. In the end, the objective of the analysis was to compare 
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the overall results of the study to the hypothesis presented by previous research 
regarding the media influence on the uprisings in Egypt. 
 
4.2.6. Themes of Primary Research 
Given the use of thematic analysis in this research, it is important to consider 
the themes themselves as well as their effect on the thesis. It must be noted here 
that the use of semi-structured interviews allowed for some themes to be 
considered beforehand, and for others to arise naturally as a result of 
commonalities in interviewee input and evaluation of their responses with the aim 
of extracting “core themes that could be distinguished both between and within 
transcripts” (Bryman, 2008). The core themes that were considered beforehand 
were change in political engagement before and after the uprisings, trust in media 
before and after the uprisings, strength of social ties prior to and after the 
uprisings, and convergence within the media in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings. The two themes that arose naturally through the semi-structured 
interviews were the normalization of social media, and the expansion of social 
capital. 
These themes aided in the analysis of social media’s role in affecting political 
interaction and interaction norms in rural Egypt, the role of social capital in the 
2011 uprisings, the effect of social media on social capital, the viewpoint 
regarding the media during and after the 2011 uprisings, and the effect of social 
media and social capital on the public sphere. Given the three central research 
questions of this thesis, these themes enhanced the investigation and were 
considered throughout the analysis. As such, this section will highlight the 
relevant themes in terms of their relationship to the three central research 
questions of this thesis. For a deeper look into these themes, the Appendix 
provides a sample of the Framework matrix by which each theme was organized. 
 
In terms of the first research question - the role of social media in relation to its 
effect on political interaction and interaction norms in rural Egypt - there were 
two common themes across all four of the governorates in which semi-structured 
interviews were conducted. The first of these was convergence. When asked 
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questions related to the media - such as how the uprisings affected their 
consumption of media, or the main form of media interviewees used during the 
uprisings - statements relating to convergence appeared consistently across all 
four governorates. Several sub-themes became evident when reviewing the 
transcripts, including: 2011 and convergence, and 2013 and convergence. The 
second theme, strength of social ties, also appeared consistently across the four 
governorates. Questions relating to discussion of politics, parliamentary elections, 
and community all yielded commonalities, and became sub-themes as a result. 
All four governorates placed importance on these areas and, as such, its 
importance as a theme was confirmed.  
The second research question, which addressed the effect of social capital on 
political interaction among rural Egyptians in the public sphere with a 
consideration of rural interaction with social media, also led to several themes 
becoming evident in the semi-structured interviews. The primary theme, that was 
considered beforehand for the purpose of this thesis was that of political 
engagement before and after 2011. A key sub-theme here was engagement in 
parliamentary elections as compared to presidential elections. A second sub-
theme was social capital as relating to political engagement, and whether the 
former strongly impacted the latter. Interestingly, one theme that arose naturally 
from discussions related to this research question was the normalisation of social 
media over time, which implied a connection between social capital and social 
media that had not been initially considered in the case of rural Egypt. This 
became a topic of interest; the following chapters delve deeply into this. 
The final research question, which covered the effect of media coverage on the 
uprisings in rural Egypt in terms of the media’s role in invigorating micro-public 
spheres and contributing to the strengthening of social capital in rural Egypt, was 
analysed using interview data which fit into two broad thematic areas. The first of 
these themes was trust in the media, with the sub-themes being state media as 
compared to private media, social media as compared to state media, and use of 
social media in state and private channels. A second theme, and one that arose 
naturally from the transcripts, was the expansion of social capital across 
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governorates both rural and urban, with the prime sub-themes being bridging, 
engagement in presidential elections, and discussion with strangers. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was mentioned that the three central research 
questions were formulated with implicit deductive theoretical propositions, but 
were broad enough to facilitate a more inductive approach whereby research ‘on 
the ground’ would allow flexible consideration of what impact social media has 
had. The themes that arose naturally from the transcripts of the semi-structured 
interviews exist primarily due to the flexibility of this approach, and their 
exploration in this thesis lies in the openness of the research questions as well as 
the broad flexibility of the semi-structured interviews themselves. 
In any case, as previously mentioned, these themes have proven useful for the 
analysis of the three central research questions, as well as in terms of fulfilling the 
aim of this thesis as a whole. For each research question, these themes were 
explored, allowing the data to be organized in such a fashion as to support a 
systematic qualitative analysis. As mentioned, the Appendix provides more 
detailed information by highlighting a sample of the Framework used for each 
theme. 
 
4.2.7 Ethics for Primary Research 
Ethics in research govern the application of ethical principles in the process of 
conducting studies. Bryman (2012) emphasizes the concept of informed consent 
and discusses the need to reveal as much information as needed to the 
participants. The principle of informed consent requires researchers to gain 
permission from an individual before conducting the study.  Susan Kirk (2007) 
argues that informed consent can only be given upon clear comprehension and 
appreciation of the facts and consequences of the action. The first step in 
formulating an ethical approach is the full disclosure of the objectives and 
intentions of the study. Hence, the research ensured that participants were aware 
and understood the nature and objectives of the study, so that they were able to 
give their consent in an informed manner before proceeding. An information 
sheet was provided to all participants, including an outline of the aims and 
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objectives of the interview, information about how their data would be used, and 
an option of withdrawing from the study at any time by contacting the researcher.  
Bryman (2012) suggests other important aspects of research ethics such as 
anonymity and confidentiality. As Kirk (2007) suggests, ethical concerns are 
likely to arise over the right to privacy which might stem from covert methods 
that violate the principles of informed consent, leading to the potential invasion of 
privacy of the participants. Ethical concerns are likely to arise owing to potential 
sensitive information that may have been shared during the study, facilitating the 
need to protect the identity of the participants. To avoid any ethical concerns, this 
research sought to ensure that confidentiality was upheld. Since the interview 
sessions were recorded, respondents were informed of this and assured of 
confidentiality of any sensitive information revealed.  
4.3. Conclusion 
The discussion of the methodological approaches used within this research 
provides a guiding principle on how data was acquired, organized, and analyzed 
in order to draw findings and conclusions to inform the answering of the research 
questions. The selection of qualitative research methodology is considered pivotal 
to the study since it becomes the basis for an underpinning of the outcomes and 
findings of the research. The design entails the collection of descriptive data, and 
the data collection process is achieved through primary and secondary 
approaches. This enables the development of extensive analysis owing to the 
dynamic data obtained. Qualitative data was obtained mainly from primary 
sources. The research sought to employ interviews as the primary methods for 
collecting data. However, data was also acquired from secondary sources 
including census data, Internet coverage and usage, and social media usage. Since 
primary research is part of the data collection method, ethical considerations were 
engaged to ensure that correct principles were upheld throughout the interaction 
with the respondents and handling of their personal data. After the collection of 
data, analysis ensued to derive conclusions from the data gathered.  
In conclusion, all the methods chosen for this research are the most suitable for 
the type of research, as explained in each method chosen. They have helped to 
provide the information necessary to answer the research questions previously 
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stated. The semi-structured interviews led to the gathering of information 
regarding television and social media use in relation to political participation and 
the factor of social capital, as well as others as highlighted in this chapter’s 
discussion of themes and the Appendix. Finally, the statistical data assisted in 
presenting figures that support the research being addressed as a secondary 
source, and therefore helped in gathering the information needed to be analyzed 
to form conclusions for the research questions and the aim of the thesis. 
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5. Chapter 4 -  Convergence: Social Media, Television, and the 
Changes in Political Interaction Norms During and After 2011 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role of social media by studying the 
way it’s been used in relation to political interaction and its impact on rural 
citizen interaction norms during the 2011 uprisings. Through this, the first 
research question - To what extent did social media change individual norms of 
political interaction with the public sphere of rural Egypt during and after 2011 
due to its convergence with television media? - will be assessed.  
The primary aim of this chapter is to clarify the link between social media and 
television. By doing this, the chapter will avoid assessing the impact of social 
media solely, without taking into consideration traditional media and the changes 
in the media environment that took place during the 2011 uprisings which 
impacted political and social capital norms due to the link between social media 
and television (convergence). These media changes have provided an appropriate 
context for important shifts in individual norms of political interaction with the 
public sphere of rural Egypt during 2011 and after due to convergence of social 
media with television media. This chapter will focus on changes in individual 
political norms due to the 2011 uprisings and until 2015, which will include the 
2013 uprisings, the presidential election before it, and the parliamentary elections 
of 2015 because of the convergence of social and traditional media. In terms of 
traditional media, television will be the primary focus because it is the most used 
form of media in rural Egypt as previously explained. Particular data about each 
form of media being studied in this thesis, collected from the interviews, will be 
highlighted and analysed. The chosen data was considered relevant for this study 
and helpful in understanding the media environment of the uprisings’ impact in 
rural areas of Egypt and the timing and effect on political norms on the rural 
population. Taking into consideration that the 2011 uprisings offered the 
opportunity to test different theoretical approaches concerning the influence of 
social media, some statistical data and theoretical studies will be presented and 
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discussed throughout this chapter to complement the analysis of the interviews, 
their aim being to offer additional perspectives on this immense topic and 
deconstruct it from several angles.  
Comparisons between social and traditional media are made to reach a better 
understanding of how much each online and offline information channel has 
contributed to the 2011 uprisings, together with different cases that were 
constantly referred to in the interviews presenting different social media pages or 
satellite channels that were of considerable relevance during and after the 2011 
uprisings. Both online and offline forms of political interaction have been 
presented and analysed in the context of rural Egypt, for a clearer understanding 
of the extent to which these media sources have impacted and mobilised citizens 
in these neglected areas.  
It is important to note here that, although each governorate chosen for analysis 
in this thesis has similar characteristics that impact their norms in terms of their 
culture, there are differences between the four chosen regions as well. These 
similarities and differences in characteristics have been addressed previously in 
order to build a proper analysis about these rural areas; these must be kept in 
mind throughout the remainder of the thesis for a full understanding of the impact 
rural Egypt and social media had on Egypt’s political scene and interaction norms 
respectively. These characteristics relate to the individual norms of the 
governorates and, as a result, it is important to appreciate how social media 
impacts their norms of political interaction before making conclusions about the 
impact of political interaction norms directly. Moreover, the role of convergence 
in each area must be explained as well in order to assess the real impact of social 
media and the extent of its impact among with the timing on norms of political 
interaction.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section comprises a 
breakdown of the four forms of media that existed during the 2011 uprisings as 
identified by the findings of this thesis, each stage being characterized by a 
difference in the media’s contribution and intervention during a specific period of 
the 2011 uprisings. Interviewee data is used to highlight the clear demarcations 
between these forms in terms of contribution and timeline, and the extent to 
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which they actually did exist as asserted here. This breakdown of the uprisings 
will also be necessary information for the following section, which will deal with 
the protest patterns in the four geographic areas chosen for semi-structured 
interviews and analysis both before the 2011 uprisings and in their first stage. The 
third section will then address the Egyptian social media public mobilisation 
during the 2011 uprisings, focusing specifically on the “We are All Khaled Said” 
and “The April Movement” Facebook groups. This will be followed by a 
discussion of mobilisation and demobilisation frames and, finally, a brief 
discussion on online versus offline forms of political interaction in 2011. 
Ultimately, the discussion in these sections will support this chapter’s ultimate 
aim of clarifying the link between social media and television, and ensuring the 
effect of convergence is adequately considered. Through this, the effect of social 
media on the norms of political interaction in rural Egypt’s public sphere will be 
more visible and clearly understood, since the convergence between social media 
and television will be related in relation to this chapter’s main question.  
5.2. Four Phases of Media Contribution During the 2011 Egyptian 
Uprisings 
During the 2011 Egyptian uprisings, four phases of the media’s contribution 
and intervention have been identified; each phase was bound to a singular time 
period within the 2011 uprisings’ timeline, and involved clear differences in 
media use and contribution. These phases were identified as a result of consistent 
demarcations being made during semi-structured interviews regarding different 
media contribution dependent on what point in the 2011 uprising’s timeline was 
being discussed. Secondary literature was then used to delve deeper into these 
phases. 
One needs to understand how rural Egyptians were impacted by different 
media types during the timeline of the 2011 uprisings and the four distinct periods 
of it. The influence and usage of media in rural Egypt was not examined by other 
academics to relate it to their change in political norms in order to have an 
accurate image of the frame of the events to analyse the changes in norms in rural 
areas. This is the reason why throughout this chapter we take into consideration 
two of the most important Facebook pages – “The Sixth of April Movement” and 
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“We Are All Khaled Said” (hereafter “April Movement” and “Khaled Said”) – as 
social media examples and two Egyptian satellite channels as traditional media 
examples, Dream TV and ON TV, since they were mentioned in the interviews 
frequently. Dream TV was Egypt’s first private satellite channel, starting in 2001. 
It is owned by a businessman who, after opening the channel, had constant legal 
issues with the government in most of his businesses; as a result, his viewpoints 
consistently opposed Mubarak’s regime and he allowed talk shows to present 
their opinions openly. ON TV is younger, starting its activity in 2009. It is a 
private Egyptian satellite channel, gaining a huge number of viewers because its 
presenters came from very different political groups and represented a wide range 
of political perspectives particularly opposing the regime. Some of its presenters 
were former Al Jazeera presenters such as Yousri Foda. After the 2011 uprisings, 
some of the ON TV presenters engaged in political life and founded new political 
parties.  
The first phase - awareness 
Rural citizens did not use social media to a great extent before the 2011 
uprisings started, due to different barriers to social media that have been 
discussed previously. For example, Interviewee K in Qalyoubia, mentioned  
"I barely used social media before what happened during the uprisings" 
(K, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
Interviewee A, in South Sinai, stated that 
"I sometimes used social media before the uprisings but mainly for 
entertainment, when the uprisings started I was not sure how 
credible the information was that was being updated about the 
uprisings itself" (A, 2018, in South Sinai). 
In Minya, Interviewee D, said, "one was not used to use social media and 
particularly for politics" (D, 2018 in Minya). In Menoufia, Interviewee 
E, explained "he did not have much time to use social media during 2011 
uprisings because was busy, and concerned about securing families and 
neighbors" (E, 2018 in Menoufia). 
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In all instances, social media was not a priority. If used, it was primarily for 
entertainment. Generally, it was given low priority as shown by Interviewee E 
from Menoufia’s statements. However, for social media users interviewed, usage 
fluctuated during different stages of the uprisings. The first stage of the media’s 
role was identified as taking place before January 25th – the day considered the 
beginning of the 2011 uprisings. The period before January 25th consisted of large 
mobilisation campaigns via social media such as the previously mentioned 
Khaled Said page and April 6th Movement page on Facebook, aiming to gather as 
many followers as possible to encourage involvement in future protests. This was 
inspired by the Tunisian revolution. On January 16th, the “April Movement” 
posted online that government members had been warned via text-messages they 
would suffer the same fate as the Tunisian President and government, which had 
been overthrown days earlier. However, “Khaled Said” stated a day prior to the 
uprisings beginning that the aim of the protest to come was not to overthrow the 
Mubarak regime; rather, the aim was to force him and his government to listen to 
the citizens’ demands. The page’s posts related to the general need for a new 
political philosophy, with increased focus on the public’s needs and economic 
grievances such as “the emergency laws, the dictatorship of the regime, the 
double standards in enforcing the law, as well as the deteriorating economic 
conditions” (Tinoco, 2013). Both pages used various effective strategies to get 
people’s attention and prepare them for the protests. They posted national songs 
and online and offline posters and banners containing all kinds of patriotic 
messages, such as: “We can, yes we can, with hope and honesty, we can!” or “I’ll 
sleep and wake up on a new dream: Egypt for sure, is returning back to me!” 
Social media used social capital resources and contacted educated people such as 
doctors, professors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers and asked them to join the 
marches. “Khaled Said” focused, for instance, on using technology to contact 
people and it received unprecedented positive responses all over the country and 
from abroad (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011). Social media users organised text-
message campaigns before January 25th and encouraged people to spread the call 
for protests among mass media and celebrities. For example, Interviewee I, in 
Qalyoubia, explained, 
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"when the Internet was blocked and telecommunications was not stable 
some protestors started circulating information about updates going on in 
Tahrir Square" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee C, from South Sinai, mentioned, "sometimes updates were sent via 
text messages as well not only updates on social media" (C, 2018 in South Sinai).  
The use of text messages was a clear confession by social media users that 
they were aware social media was not the norm of communication for all 
Egyptians. Page members were encouraged to use pictures, with the protests 
details appearing as their profile picture, and to share videos and posters on their 
official Facebook pages to make them visible for their family members and 
friends. On one hand, both above-mentioned Facebook pages urged the Egyptian 
citizens to be of “one heart” and, several days before the protests, they posted 
details about protest times and locations, together with phone numbers of people 
from various governorates who could give information about these protests. They 
were aiming to organise simultaneous protests in different Egyptian cities. On the 
other hand, the pages’ administrators advised people to avoid any provocative 
religious and political slogans in order to prevent blame or persecution from the 
police. Phone numbers of lawyers affiliated to the “Front of Defending 
Demonstrators” were posted online, to make people feel secure. Furthermore, the 
pages posted messages underlining the importance of responding to political 
provocations with calmness and good faith. 
The day of January 25th was not a random choice for the protestors; it held 
significance. January 25th was Egyptian Police Day, commemorating the army’s 
resistance to the 1952 British massacre in Egypt, prompting the army to organise 
a coup against King Farouk later that year. The choice of this day, together with 
all other calls for action made both pages’ administrators and supporters 
confident that January 25th would again represent a turning point in Egypt’s 
history. Prior to the January 25th  uprisings, Dream TV highlighted the planned 
protests, reporting only that these movements were organised (Tinoco, 2013). 
Interviewee E in Qalyoubia, explained, 
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"Mona El Shazly the television presenter on Dream TV at the time of the 
2011 uprisings mentioned that some protests will start prior to the 25th of 
January by a few days by referring to the facebook page ‘We Are All 
Khaled Said’" (E, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
Interviewee I in Qalyoubia, mentioned, 
"ON TV, however, showed a bigger interest in the online wave of 
activism and reported that over 60,000 participants had 
announced their intention to participate in a revolution against 
corruption" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Many other political movements announced their participation in the protests, 
such as the Kefaya Movement. The Muslim Brotherhood did not publicly 
announce it would adhere to it; it questioned the seriousness of the events, but 
gave its followers permission to participate, if they felt it was right. For example, 
Interviewee B from South Sinai explained, 
"I knew people who were Muslim Brotherhood members or supporters 
that were informed by their heads in the Muslim Brotherhood hierarchy 
that they can participate in the 2011 uprisings at least until the events 
were clearer, regarding whether they will be for a few days or lead to 
actual change" (B, 2018 in South Sinai). 
Dream TV continued to make statements about the impact of the Tunisian 
revolution and about the organisation of protests in Egypt, while presenting as 
well that a pro-Mubarak protest attracted 200 people, and on the organisation of 
police forces that were prepared for the day of January 25th.  
According to the semi-structured interviews, when the interviewees were 
asked about when they first learned of (or heard about) social media pages such 
as those discussed their answers indicated that their discovery occurred during 
this first phase. They mentioned the following:  
Interviewee A Qalyoubia: "heard about the 2011 uprisings [in that phase] 
mainly from television programs that referred to the different pages on social 
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media such as Khaled Said and the April 6th Movement"(A, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Qalyoubia’s Interviewee F also heard about the 2011 uprisings at the same time, 
and in the same way (F, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee D in Menoufia mentioned: "different television talk shows on 
private satellite channels such as Dream TV referred to social media pages such 
as Khalid Said the night before the first day of the uprisings" (D, 2018 in 
Menoufia). Interviewee G concurred regarding this timing (G, 2018 in Menoufia).  
Interviewee B in South Sinai: "heard mainly about social media usage of 
pages on satellite channels" (B, 2018 in South Sinai). Interviewee F agreed (F, 
2018 in South Sinai). 
Interviewee A in Minya: "heard about social media pages on a television 
program on a satellite channel" (A, 2018 in Minya), and Interviewee D, also 
from Minya, heard the same (D, 2018 in Minya). 
Therefore, it is clear satellite television was their original starting point of 
finding about the beginning of the 2011 events and referred social media users to 
certain social media pages.  
 
The second phase - monitorial 
The second phase of the media’s role refers to the period between January 25th 
and 28th, when thousands of Egyptian citizens went out onto the streets 
throughout Egypt. The police responded with violence, starting a series of violent 
and deadly events. Friday, January 28th represented a turning point for the 
uprisings because it witnessed an unprecedented number of people participating 
in the protests and, in addition, this time they had only one request: Mubarak’s 
resignation and the end of his regime. That evening, President Mubarak offered 
his first television speech, speaking about a movement of saboteurs who were 
trying to destabilise Egypt and subject the people to terror. Although he 
announced that he accepted the resignation of Ahmad Nazif’s government, people 
decided not to leave Tahrir Square and other protest centres until Mubarak 
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resigned. The “April Movement” and “Khaled Said” pages were reposting the 
events on the ground. The “April Movement” focused its posts on the violence of 
the police forces against the peaceful protesters, reporting kidnappings of activists 
across the country and highlighting the unprecedented size of the protests. It 
constantly encouraged adherence to the ethos of the protest movement and 
organised a public strike demanding, for the first time, President Mubarak’s 
resignation. Similarly, “Khaled Said” used, again for the first time, the word 
“revolution” on their online posts, starting on January 26th. Dream TV and ON TV 
mentioned the thousands of protesters demanding their rights for decent lives and 
jobs, while also sharing relevant posts that had been initially released on social 
media. Unlike state channels that only mentioned smaller reports about the 
thousands of protesters, while their main emphasis was on the disorder caused by 
protests. They also emphasised that the Upper Egypt citizens had not responded 
to the calls for protests. They called the protesters “rioters” and accused them of 
inciting people to violence, also underlining the fact that the Egyptian stock 
market had suffered losses of around 30 billion Egyptian pounds, suggesting the 
leaders of the protest movements should be arrested. They made every effort to 
put the protesters in a bad light. The protesters were presented as aggressors 
causing economic losses, facilitating prisoners’ escape, stealing weapons and 
sabotaging public and private properties. As a result, Internet and mobile phone 
services were cut by the government to limit the converging of news by private 
satellite channels like Dream and ON TV on picking up information from social 
media platforms, in their desperation to stop the people, while they eventually lost 
control of the numerous citizens who were on the street after this breakdown 
(Tinoco, 2013). However, during this phase, the media was not broadcasting or 
informing citizens what was happening within rural Egypt. Therefore, from the 
semi-interviews conducted, one started collecting insights on their behaviour.   
All interviewees that were social media users in Qalyoubia explained they 
were not used to using social media prior to these incidents for politics. They 
mainly used it for socializing and entertainment. For example, Interviewee I, 
explained, "my usage for social media was mainly to socialize with my friends 
and relatives that have social media accounts on platforms" (I, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia).. 
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However, all non-social media users in Qalyoubia explained that they began 
hearing about social media pages from people around them that used social 
media, or from different television programs. For example, Interviewee B said, "I 
started hearing about social media updates [between January 25th and January 
28th] on television programs." (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, it was slightly different in terms of grouping all social media 
users or non-social media users. For example, some social media users continued 
to use social media only for entertainment and socializing, while others started 
using it for politics as well. On the other hand, all non-social media users were 
not necessarily concerned about politics generally during this phase because some 
of them were very concerned about securing their neighbourhood, neighbours, 
and families. As such, their interest in following media was minimal; they were 
aware that important information would arrive through word of mouth updates or 
their relatives’ experiences.  For example, Interviewee J, explained: "I wanted to 
make sure my family and people I care about were okay before being updated 
about politics" (J, 2018 in Menoufia). Similarly, Interviewee L, stated: "Security 
was a main issue and my focus was on it more than what was going to happen at 
this point" (L, 2018 in Menoufia). 
In South Sinai, during this phase, social media users were following news on 
social media pages, yet had not used it for politics or news prior to the uprisings. 
However, they were not relying on it alone because they were being updated via 
television and word of mouth from the heads of tribes who had connections with 
people in the police and government. For example, Interviewee A, explained:  
"Social media was mainly for socializing before the 2011 uprisings yet, 
after the uprisings, following news on it was becoming more popular but 
information coming from the heads of tribes and interconnected family 
was still very important and what people relied on the most, along with 
television" (A, 2018 in South Sinai).  
Similarly, Interviewee E, stated:  
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"Although social media usage changed, from being just for entertainment 
and socializing to being updated about politics, it is still not as important 
as information from the head of tribes" (E, 2018 in South Sinai).  
In Minya, social media was not used for political interaction to the same 
degree as other areas; while, in some cases, social media provided information 
relating to politics, the priority in Minya was to use it for social purposes. 
However, many non-social media users received updates through television 
channels which shared social media content as part of their programming, 
reflecting the convergence between social and traditional media at the time. In 
any case, both social media users and non-social media users in this area were 
concerned mostly about security during this phase, more than any other area.  
Political interaction was not a priority. This was clearly related to the fact they 
felt they were distant from urban areas and that, as security was already an issue 
in urban areas, rural areas would be even more insecure.  
For example, Interviewee E, mentioned: 
"Security at this stage was my major issue among with many others 
because on the 28th of January the police seemed to collapse all over 
Egypt and many attacks and crimes were happening all over Egypt. 
Putting in mind that Minya is farther from many of the urban areas, and 
police is not as prevalent as in urban areas, many families I know were 
terrified and concerned about what would happen to us" (E, 2018 in 
Minya).  
Similarly, Interviewee A, explained: 
"Cairo was collapsing security-wise at this time so imagine further areas 
such as where we are placed; so honestly my main concern was securing 
everyone I could and that is why I started getting involved in securing 
our neighborhood among with other men" (A, 2018 in Minya).  
These examples highlight that the sense of insecurity for citizens of Minya 
was, to them, based on the idea that urban areas were more secure and had 
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increased police presence. Even if untrue, these comments show this viewpoint 
played a role in the decisions of Minya citizens during the time period. 
In all four governorates, to varying degrees, social media began to be 
considered a source of information. While, as shown, this was not in line with 
previous usage, social media began to be viewed as an option, albeit one that was 
not as significant as word of mouth or television.  
The third phase - concern 
The third stage of the media’s role refers to the period between January 29th 
and February 2nd 2011. President Mubarak named a vice-president for the first 
time in his 30 year dictatorial rule, giving him instructions to start negotiations 
with the opposition. He also formed a new government, but the protesters 
remained on the streets and continued calling for his resignation. On February 1st, 
Mubarak delivered a second televised speech, cataloguing people’s demands as 
legitimate and promising he would do his best to fulfil them. He stated that he had 
no intention of running in the September 2011 elections, which would have been 
his fifth term and that he just wanted to spend his last months as president 
arranging for an organised and peaceful power transfer to a new president. He 
made emotional statements, reminding the Egyptian citizens that he had served 
for over 60 years, and that he would like to die peacefully in his beloved country. 
His speech had some echoes, dividing the citizens in two. A significant 
number of protesters believed Mubarak had offered enough to cease protests and 
that he should not be humiliated anymore, given his age; the other group declared 
themselves outraged by his “fake” speech. Some supporters of the President even 
gathered in Tahrir Square to march for Mubarak, with violent clashes erupting 
between the two opposing groups and resulting in deaths. For example, 
Interviewee I from Qalyoubia, mentioned, 
"the uprisings were one of the most important events in Egyptian history 
giving a chance to citizens to express their rage clearly against Mubarak 
and his regime, which is why I participated in Tahrir Square events" (I, 
2018 in Qalyoubia). 
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On the other hand, Interviewee B from Qalyoubia, stated, 
"citizens could have given Mubarak a chance to perform what he 
promised in his 2nd of February speech because he clearly understood 
that people are now out of their silent mode and he seemed like he was 
saying the truth" (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
This division among the population is the reason why the February 2nd was 
declared the bloodiest day of the 2011 uprisings and has received the name of the 
“Battle of the Camel”. The events of this day turned the crowd once more against 
Mubarak whose resignation became again their common goal. 
Since the Internet had been cut between January 28th and February 2nd, social 
media platforms did not play a significant role during these very important 
events. Despite this, it is important to note that cutting the Internet did have an 
effect in this phase; the lack of online communication channels catalyzed some 
citizens to become involved directly through offline methods, including going to 
Tahrir Square or other protest sites. For example, Interviewee I in Qalyoubia, 
explained, 
"when the Internet was blocked I wanted to go to my friends in Tahrir 
Square because I could not reach them and felt like I am missing on a 
historical event that I want to join because I cannot see much updates 
about it" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee G, in Menoufia, mentioned 
"after the Internet communications were blocked many people felt 
they had to physically join Tahrir Square to show their strength 
regardless of Internet communication" (G, 2018 in Menoufia). 
In any case, after users regained their online presence, the online activists’ goal 
was to weaken sympathy for Mubarak by permanently posting movies 
cataloguing police abuse of citizens, which satellite channels started circulating 
constantly to reach out to more areas all over Egypt. As Interviewee A in 
Qalyoubia explained, "the television circulated social media news as well"(A, 
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2018 in Qalyoubia). Interviewee B from South Sinai, stated, "many of the news 
circulated on social media was then amplified on television channels as well" (B, 
2018 in South Sinai). The national state channels, however, took a different 
approach; these channels called for people to return to “normal life” and end the 
chaos.  
It is important to remember that, regardless of whether interviewees were 
social media users or not, there was no access during this phase to Internet. 
Therefore, all citizens were updated about events in Cairo via television or word 
of mouth from people they know that commuted to and from Cairo. However, 
whether they were social media users or not was related to what they were 
concerned about during this phase. For example, non-social media users were 
more focused on security for their families and neighbourhood parallel to politics, 
while social media users were not focused on security as much.   
For example, Interviewee G in Qalyoubia, a social media user, explained "I 
started commuting to Cairo after the Internet was blocked because I felt I needed 
to be closer to the centre of events not just around my people" (G, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). 
Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee I, another social media user, said: 
 
"the social media updates I was seeing on social media platforms 
before the Internet was blocked aroused my feelings to actually go to 
Tahrir Square because of the amount of people there when the 
Internet was blocked because I felt I am missing the motivator of my 
feelings towards what was happening. Tahrir Square was not the only 
place with interaction but it was a symbol, like the pyramids being a 
symbol of Egypt, yet all of Egypt has much more historical sites" (I, 
2018 in Menoufia). 
 
In Minya, Interviewee E, a social media user, stated: 
 
"one had to start finding updates from people they know or from 
television because of the Internet blockage, yet the blockage did not 
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hinder us from being involved or lose interest in knowing what was going 
on because it was the whole nation being involved"(E, 2018 in Minya). 
 
In South Sinai, Interviewee C, a social media user, explained: "I started getting 
news during the blockage from television and word of mouth from people closer 
to Cairo on the phone" (C, 2018 in South Sinai). 
 
On the other hand, Interviewee E, in Menoufia, a non-social media user, 
explained: "the amount of chaos going on all over Egypt made me very concerned 
about our families and neighbourhoods parallel to the events going"(E, 2018 in 
Menoufia).  
 
In Qalyoubia, Interviewee B, a non-social media user, explained: 
"I was very concerned about the security of the neighbourhood and 
families because after the blockage of the Internet and the clear 
aggression between different people everyone felt insecure and I was 
following television to find the updates but to also see to what extent is 
the aggression between people. It was like an explosion of different 
feelings from different people leading to seeing things that were not 
visible in Egypt before to that extent"(B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D in Minya, a non social-media user, said: "I just 
wanted to make sure my family was okay security-wise because of the chaos and I 
was following the updates to find out when I could go back to work because of my 
needs" (D, 2018 in Minya). 
 
While finally, non-social media user Interviewee F in South Sinai, said: "after 
the Internet was blocked social media users stopped updating me on social media 
updates so everyone relied mainly on television, yet security was the main focus 
to find out if people can move around safely or not"(F, 2018 in South Sinai).  
Therefore, whether they were social media users or not, the differences mainly 
came depending on the circumstances they were living in and sense of feeling 
they felt in their community of the rural area they are in.  In this sense, some 
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citizens became more involved in offline forms of political participation, while 
others increased their use of television or focus on security for their area. As such, 
this phase was characterized primarily by concern, and the beginnings of 
catalyzation.  
The fourth stage - catalyzation 
The fourth stage of the media’s role took place between February 3rd and 11th 
and began with a reduction in protester activities, after the “Battle of the Camel”. 
They were still asking for Mubarak’s resignation and opposed his last attempt to 
regain the people’s support on February 10th. He had a television speech in which 
he announced that he transferred power to the recently named vice-president. 
Nevertheless, his speech angered people even more than before. On February 
11th, the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces finally met without the 
President. The crowd was thrilled when the vice-President announced his 
resignation. At this stage, Facebook users continued to post evidence about the 
fact the regime was manipulating the masses and the messages that people were 
receiving via different national channels of communication. The April 6 
Movement emphasised that the regime was seeking to play for time by trying to 
have a dialogue with the people via national television, while killing, torturing 
and arresting thousands of people. The April 6 Movement described those who 
resisted until the end as free Egyptians who had not fallen for the regime’s 
manoeuvres. Both Facebook pages posted many live events from Tahrir Square, 
describing it as a “virtuous city”, in order to encourage people to continue the 
protests and to show to the whole world that Muslims and Christians protected 
each other during their respective prayer times, that no one was discriminated 
against, and that no crimes against humanity took place. Similarly, like the 
previous phases, satellite channels converged the videos and posts of social media 
users for celebrating and shared the feelings of the people in Cairo all over Egypt.  
During this phase, the Internet blockage was removed. Therefore, the social 
media users in rural areas were back to using social media and updating their 
social circles, which included non-social media users at the time. Focus by rural 
citizens was mainly on the resistance by the regime and the political and 
structural changes. However, some areas focused more on using social media to 
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remain apprised of when they could return to work and bring in income for their 
families because many of them didn’t work in companies, but rather on a daily 
income basis.  
For example, in Menoufia and Minya, some of the non-social media users 
explained: 
Interviewee K from Menoufia said, 
"I was concerned about what will happen to the country and its impact 
and if the change is for the best, but I don’t have time to spend not 
working because my family needs money and I work on a daily-basis 
income" (K, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Similarly, Interviewee E in Minya, mentioned that "I wanted to know what 
would happen but, in the end, my main issue was staying home securing my 
family and not bringing in money for my family" (E, 2018 in Minya). 
However, this was not mentioned in Qalyoubia or South Sinai by interviewees 
in the same circumstances.  This is primarily because each governorate was, to 
some extent, unique in terms of historical and socio-cultural concerns. Minya’s 
interviews were generally characterized, as previously mentioned, by a focus on 
financial security. Menoufia’s interviewees similarly mentioned this, though to a 
lesser degree. In Qalyoubia and South Sinai, this was less of an issue due to 
greater financial security in Qalyoubia and a tribal support network in South Sinai 
that minimized this concern.  
As shown in this section, the four phases of the uprisings appear distinct, and 
are clearly demarcated by different forms of media contribution. As a result, it is 
clear that social media usage during the 2011 uprising was not consistent, 
whether one was rural or urban. Usage of social media, the reasons for that usage, 
and the extent of that usage, varied based on the time-period, whether one was a 
social media user prior to this time, and which specific governorate one resided 
in. Due to this variety, it is important to understand the view that rural citizens 
had on protesting in general, as well as their history of protesting, and the 
variations that exist between governorates in relation to this topic. This will allow 
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for a greater understanding of the variation in interaction norms and social media 
usage prior to, and during, the 2011 uprisings.  
5.3. Protest Patterns in the Rural Areas Prior to (and During) the First Stage 
Despite numerous analyses on the role of urban citizens in politics, rural areas 
have also played a significant role in the political sphere, and rural involvement in 
political matters has had an impact on society at large. In this section, the 
tradition of protests in rural Egypt will be demonstrated in the data presented in 
order to show how rural citizens were concerned politically about the country 
even before their exposure to social media or its popularity. This political 
concern, prior to the 2011 uprisings, was a noticeable characteristic of these rural 
areas and their populations. For example, in the interviews conducted, it was 
shown that (in Menoufia and Qalyoubia in particular) citizens of rural regions had 
a strong political sense, even prior to the uprisings, and that this political sense 
was characterised by strong relationships within their social groups. In Menoufia, 
Interviewee B explained that: 
"we constantly followed the news on television even prior to the 
popularity of social media and were concerned about the needs of the 
population from living, not from the media only" (B, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Similarly, Interviewee C in Qalyoubia - explained that, 
"regardless of media we are always concerned about politics because it 
affects our infrastructure and living needs in further areas from urban 
parts of Egypt" (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
On one hand, rural citizens proved disinterested in the information presented 
by social media, especially when over 50 years old, and on the other, their access 
to social media in particular was quite restricted due to infrastructural and 
financial barriers. Besides young people, most interviewees from rural areas had 
never used the Internet and social media for information before the uprisings, yet 
they had been politically active and participated in various ways, formal and 
informal. This involvement included acts such as starting small illegal political 
parties, discussing problems with their social circles, presenting concerns to their 
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member of parliament, and voting for parliamentary candidates. The urbanisation 
changes that their societies suffered because of the so-called democratic political 
strategy of Mubarak’s Egypt affected them at various levels. They had no access 
to land in the same way they did before; they were forced to pay higher fees to 
rent the land; and they suffered numerous humiliations concerning access to basic 
human needs, such as having a decent infrastructure or even drinking water. 
These difficult living conditions led them to protest several times, long before 
2011, creating a path - even a sort of tradition - in protesting against the unfair 
political regime (Saad, 2016). As such, as this section will highlight, the rural 
regions of Egypt had a long history of political involvement, formal and informal, 
and this political involvement operated largely independent of social media. 
Changes in the rural areas in the 1980’s made the Egyptian middle class more 
visible than it had previously been. Many changes in the daily life-style of 
common people appeared: traditional mud-brick houses were replaced with 
concrete red-brick ones, furniture was adapted to a more urban style, and 
electrical appliances together with rooftop satellites started appearing in almost 
every home. The rural areas suffered a strong process of urbanisation. Tensions 
between the old and the young, between the educated family members and the 
uneducated have also appeared and triggered different forms of protest both 
inside and outside the family domain. Some negative changes also occurred after 
this urbanisation phenomenon, one of the most important concerning agricultural 
dynamics. Interviewee E in Menoufia reflected this when he explained,  
"after the urbanisation that happened and many fellahins getting rid of 
their land we had to find jobs anywhere even if we had to go to Cairo on 
daily basis, which makes life very exhausting because transportation is 
very crowded and takes over 2 hours" (E, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
However, as underlined by researchers, the various changes to rural life 
generated a severe decline in the agricultural sector, a phenomenon that was 
deliberately neglected by the state, which reduced the role of small farmers in the 
economy (Wikileaks, 2010). After this period of urbanisation, approximately 80% 
of former farmers had jobs in a sector other than agriculture. The process of 
liberalisation reached its climax in 1992, due to a legislative measure – the Law 
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of 96 – permitting market forces to be the only player determining rent-values of 
land. This led to a dramatic situation for both rural and urban citizens because 
unemployment increased due to the fact that they lost land, among with many 
price increases in crops that were being grown on their lands. Interviewee E in 
Menoufia, stated,  
"It’s been so long that we have been living in tough circumstances after 
we lost our family land and had to spend so much money on 
transportation to get employed in further areas. For example, I work in a 
factory in Cairo ... and it takes me almost 2 and a half hours, on a daily 
basis in the morning and again at the end of my shift, on top of the 
exhaustion, and the money spent on the transportation" (E, 2018 in 
Menoufia).  
The 1992 legislative measures generated a major crisis during 1997, which 
was a culmination of the long-term changes in political orientations, of strong 
structural shifts in terms of the rural area structure and a power shift at a national 
level. Some academics define this period as the start of continuous rural 
resistance, because these five years witnessed major acts of rural protest that 
could have been much worse, given the dramatic reality of poverty. However, the 
resistance reflected in this period is not quite close to the 2011 uprisings in terms 
of time and could be considered part of the area’s history. Despite this, more than 
3 interviewees above 50 years old in each governorate spoke about the nature of 
politics in their area as far as these times in order to show they were informed 
citizens and had an awareness of Egypt’s political situation over the years and 
different periods in Mubarak’s regime. For example, interviewee C in Qalyoubia 
said, 
"many urban citizens or people are unaware of our life style and assume 
we are ignorant people that are not aware of the country’s needs, yet we 
know so much because we have suffered a long time based upon political 
and legislation decisions, more than other citizens" (C, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia).  
Similarly, interviewee B in Menoufia explained, 
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"the history of the area we are living in has formed or impacted to a 
great extent people’s form of resistance and anger towards the 
Mubarak regime long before the 2011 uprisings" (B, 2018 in 
Menoufia).  
Nevertheless, the resistance movements did not have much of an impact and 
the rural population ended up simply coping with the situation, rather than 
obtaining results (Assad and Rouchdy, 1999).  
On the one hand, researchers qualified these coping mechanisms of the rural 
population as resourceful creativity and, on the other hand, they analysed the 
dramatic consequences that these coping strategies had on the Egyptian economy 
and social development. Law 96 coincided with the beginning of the school year 
and, since rural citizens suffered from high levels of poverty, their first solution 
was to cut expenses. To do this, they started preventing children from going to 
school, a measure taken especially for girls. The desperate situation put Egyptian 
families who used their children for agricultural labour (rather than sending them 
to school) under pressure. Another alarming and dramatic coping strategy 
consisted in a change of diet which involved eating less in terms of both quantity 
and quality of food. The peasants who used to grow their own crops became a 
part of government bakeries, reducing, at the same time, meat consumption and 
dairy products. “Sleeping early in order to avoid feeling hungry” was reported “as 
one strategy used by evicted tenants to cope with the new situation” by the 
Egyptian Land Centre for Human Rights (Saad, 2016). The farmers required to 
pay rent for their land also faced a dramatic growth in rent which generated a 
general tendency to endanger the necessary food resources for their families.  
Interviewee E in Menoufia explained, "many tenants (fellahins) lost their job 
as tenants and that is why many of us go to Cairo on a daily basis for work" (E, 
2018 in Menoufia).   
Similarly, Interviewee D in Qalyoubia added, 
"we had to sell everything we owned to live including the jewellery of my 
wife, and many of my relatives and friends did the same, which made us 
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feel humiliated among our family because we put them down" (D, 2018 
in Qalyoubia). 
The side effect of this situation had gender implications. The trust women had 
in their men as the major breadwinners decreased dramatically. Moreover, in 
Qalyoubia for example, the fact that farming was (and is) the primary rural 
occupation, this lack of trust ultimately led to the population’s female population 
becoming stronger. This was reflected both by interviewees in Qalyoubia and in 
the participation of females in elections being the highest in Egypt. In contrast, 
Menoufia, which abandoned farming as an occupation entirely, did not 
experience this strengthening of the female population. 
Interviewee L in Qalyoubia explained, 
"I had to act and find a way for my children till my husband finds a job 
so I worked as a seamstress for a while" (L, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
Similarly, another female interviewee H in Qalyoubia, over 60 years old 
responded, 
"we are considered strong and free women in comparison to other areas 
around us because we work and help our families, we don’t consider 
women working a shame" (H, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
 The coping mechanisms used by the rural population in order to survive those 
hard times also had political costs. Peasants protested in various ways during the 
1990s by “fighting against unjust landlords or by participating in broader 
nationalist struggles” (Saad, 2016). Unprecedented political activity was 
registered in rural areas during this difficult time, including protests against 
legislative measures taken by the government and the organisation of over 200 
“formal agricultural conferences that played a vital role in conveying farmer 
opinions to the authorities” (UK Government, 2013). 
Protests manifested in various ways, including telegrams that were sent to the 
press, President Mubarak or the Minister of Agriculture. Different petitions 
emerged and people gathered together to sign them. Many rural citizens hung 
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black banners on their roofs. Others formed large groups to stop trains, block 
highways or destroy agricultural cooperative registers. Around 7,000 tenants 
gathered together under the Tagammu’ Party’s initiative and organised small 
protests. All these resistance acts were more remarkable than they seemed at first, 
because these people faced brutal interventions by the police, including torture, 
arrests, and detention. The officials enforced a brutal ban of public meetings in 
order to cover up the dire situation of the rural population (Saad, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the peasants did not stop their resistance and the 2000s brought a 
new wave of unprecedented protests by rural citizens that proliferated and was 
much more diversified and better organised. The Land Centre of Human Rights 
recorded an astonishing 61 different forms of protest across the rural areas of 
Egypt, resulting in more than 1300 arrests (Lchr-eg.org, 2020) in the ten years 
prior to the uprisings during the controlled media environment. If the previous 
acts of protest were almost exclusively concentrated at the agricultural centre, the 
new wave of protests addressed more complex political issues, attacking in a 
direct manner the nature of state power, the state’s institutions and the symbols of 
capitalism, demanding better infrastructure, portable water and better housing. 
Interviewee H in Qalyoubia, explained,  "infrastructure investment always 
required pressure on the government to be done" (H, 2018 in Qalyoubia).   
The thousands of rural citizens participating in protests that preceded the 2011 
uprisings shared many characteristics and values with the protesters during the 
2011 uprisings. For instance, people began gathering in larger groups to protest 
on a larger scale, depending on the situation that demanded such actions. 
Concerns for road safety and an increased number of accidents, for instance, 
gathered more than 1500 rural citizens to block roads for two consecutive days, 
demanding the amelioration of the strains on infrastructure and the installation of 
speed breakers before entering a village. Many accidents in which children, 
young people and their parents had been killed turned into violent demonstrations 
on behalf of the villagers because their demand for safer roads, which ran through 
their villages, had long been ignored. They held the governors responsible for the 
accident victims from their villages and protested for many days when such 
tragedies happened (Maati, 2011).  
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Protests demanding access to clean water were also very numerous and 
virulent during the 2000s and this was also the case in other governorates besides 
those focused on in this thesis. For instance, at this time villagers from different 
villages organised protests in front of the Governorate’s capital Zaquaziq to 
protest about the lack of drinking water. They also engaged the media in their 
endeavour and reported their situation to different newspapers. For the same 
reasons, other villagers from different villages gathered together, setting fire to 
car tyres and blocking international roads. They persisted with their protest until 
Mubarak gave instructions to the government for the resumption of the water 
(Ismail; n.d.).  
Violent protests against the installation of mobile phone towers have also 
taken place in rural Egypt, the main concern being health and the protection of 
the environment. Even though the protests were well organised, they became very 
violent almost every time. Interviewee C in Minya explained, "previously when 
we had a protest fearing mobile towers one of the protestors was shot" (C, 2018 
in Minya). Similarly, Interviewee D in Menoufia, said "we constantly had 
protests about the places of mobile towers for the health of our families but it 
resulted in violent conflicts" (D, 2018 in Menoufia).  
 In Menoufia a long and bloody conflict emerged between the villagers who 
were protesting and the official police forces that were defending a wealthy 
landlord and member of the National Democratic Party, which was being paid for 
placing the mobile tower on his land. People had banners with messages such as 
“The Government is finished, the age has started where the right is to be taken by 
the power of people”. Interviewee F in Menoufia explained, 
"even women protested against the mobile tower issues because they 
were concerned about the health of their children and tried destroying 
the mobile tower by going into the yard of the landlord where it was 
placed" (F, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Women led the operation, because it was thought that it would prevent the 
crowd from being attacked. Both men and women were beaten with the engineers 
and the workers being severely injured in the process (Mousa, 2015). 
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All these patterns of street protest, with people showing their anger, started in 
the rural areas and led the road to the 2011 uprisings. The protests were 
characterised by high levels of organisation, in the different regions of the 
country at the beginning, putting into practice very well devised tactics, such as 
blocking highways or protesting in front of governorates’ institutions. Most 
important is the fact that almost all the time these protests proved to be effective 
and people attracted the government’s attention and responses ranged from 
attempts to quell the protests, not only through violent interventions, but also 
through responding to their demands. The rural protests were highly political with 
citizens only not protesting for their necessities, but also for general demands 
related to the quality of Egyptian life. Their initiatives eventually were part of the 
2011 uprisings. Another huge wave of organised labour protests, including 
violent strikes, sits-in or various demonstrations were taking place all over the 
country, culminating in the three day strike of al-Mahalla al Kubra Spinning and 
Weaving Company in 2007. These workers gained a bonus increase promised to 
them and their success inspired many other workers from other industries to 
follow suit. Similarly, major strikes took place in the textile industry, in Menoufia 
and in some other governorates. Interviewee A in Menoufia, stated,  
"when the factory workers in Mahalla gained their rights it encouraged 
us to protest for it as well and, at the time, I did not have time to follow 
the media closely, yet had time to fight for my right" (A, 2018 in 
Menoufia).  
All these past examples show the political sense that rural citizens had because 
they were trying to express their opinions to the government even before the 2011 
uprisings. They were not secluded politically from urban Egypt, yet they were not 
focused on by the media because of the assumption that they were not politically 
interacting and by intentionally being avoided by the nation state’s agenda setting 
channels to avoid covering their protests. The erosion of the boundaries between 
rural and urban areas of Egypt inspired people to protest for common goals, even 
though on the surface, the rural problems seemed different from the urban ones.  
Protest patterns that formed in rural Egypt prior to the 2011 uprisings show 
how involved they were in being politically interactive as part of their norms 
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because they were trying to protest for their needs when they could, or when they 
had the time; when they did not protest it was due to life needs, whether financial, 
infrastructural or otherwise. Considering the large phenomenon of urbanisation, 
the rural population is not as ignorant or secluded as people might assume on the 
outside, bearing in mind that the percentages of urbanisation were raised by 80% 
from 1996 to 2008. Researchers argue that the Egyptian villages suffered visible 
transformations towards urbanisation, but, at the same time, they lack the 
majority of the facilities available in urban life, such as electricity or drinking 
water: “Most of those neo-urbanites, no longer engaged in agriculture, have to 
earn their living and make their settlements habitable by themselves—without 
services from the state and, indeed, without its recognition” (Bayat and Denis, 
2000). Therefore, the increased features of urbanisation without being 
accompanied with the necessary services have caused villagers to take to the 
streets and organise serious protests across the country, inspiring urban citizens 
too and opening a wide road to the 2011 uprisings. For example, Interviewee A 
from Minya, mentioned, 
"many services around where we live have been ignored by the 
government because the spot is not on areas like where we live since it is 
far from the capital, which built rage within citizens but with despair 
because our voice is not necessarily reflected in the media. Therefore, we 
often had to try to create more noise than normal to get attention in front 
of governmental institutions" (A, 2018 in Minya). 
 Consequently, one should pay more attention to the political norms of the 
rural citizens in the 2011 uprising to assess their political interaction. Therefore, 
having discussed these protest patterns, taking into consideration the previously 
discussed barriers to social media in the area, it is now necessary to use this 
information to analyse the impact of social media within a convergent 
environment on affecting political interaction norms. This will be done in the 
following section through an evaluation of online and offline mobilisation frames 
throughout the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath, in order to assess their effect 
on the uprisings themselves and the interaction norms of rural citizens in relation 
to these uprisings. By doing this, the thesis will move closer towards reaching 
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some conclusions on the extent of change on political interaction norms in rural 
Egypt during and after the 2011 uprisings.  
5.4 Television & Social Media: Mobilisation & Demobilisation Frames 
during the 2011 Uprisings 
Although, social media usage was minimal in rural areas during 2011, one 
needs to find the link it created to the political interaction for rural citizens that 
used social media. As already stated, the events of 2011 that ended President 
Mubarak’s long regime, revealed the huge potential of social media, by playing a 
crucial role in the mobilisation of public will, defined as “a social force that can 
mobilise organically, or with external support and influence, to become a political 
lever for social change it has the potential, if adequately resourced, organised and 
mobilised, to serve the impetus for social change” (Salmon et al., 2010). 
Researchers in the field have underlined three interconnected ways that social 
media contributed to the 2011 uprising: “enabling cyberactivism, a major trigger 
for street activism and encouraging civic engagement” by determining the 
organisation and mobilisation of activists and their political protests (El Nawawy 
and Khamis, 2013). Philip Howard defines the concept of cyberactivism as “the 
act of using the Internet to advance a political cause that is difficult to advance 
offline, (...) its goal being often to create intellectually and emotionally 
compelling digital artefacts that tell stories of injustice, interpret history, and 
advocate for particular political outcomes” (Howard, 2011). These uses should be 
kept in consideration when taking into account rural social media users as 
compared to urban users,  and the ways in which each contributed. 
For example, the We Are All Khaled Said” page, created by Ghonim, was the 
most popular page on social media for rural citizens. Interviewees from all 
governorates mentioned this. Interviewee F in Qalyoubia, mentioned: "the first 
page I heard about when social media was discussed was the one related to 
Khaled Said" (F, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Interviewee A in Menoufia, explained: "I 
always heard news about Khaled Said page when social media was mentioned" 
(A, 2018 in Menoufia). Interviewee D in South Sinai, stated: "I joined the Khaled 
Said page when the uprisings started" (D, 2018 in South Sinai). Interviewee B in 
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Minya, said: "the first page I constantly followed was Khaled Said page then 
joined others" (B, 2018 in Minya). 
Ghonim felt the suffering of the Egyptians under Mubarak’s regime. He was 
reliably informed that over 40% of Egyptians were living below the poverty line. 
He was also well aware of the level of corruption that took place in the 
administration, the economic downturn and the urgent need for real political 
change. By anonymously creating this Facebook page he raised awareness among 
the young educated people of Egypt and gave them the courage to ask for justice. 
As he contended, “the main purpose of the Facebook page was to mobilise public 
support” for Khaled Said’s case (Ghonim, 2012). In his book, entitled Revolution 
2:0, he outlined very clearly the aims of his Facebook page: to raise awareness by 
making people read its posts, to prompt them to interact with its content and with 
one another, to get them involved in its online campaigns, to encourage them to 
get involved in sharing and developing its content and, most importantly, to 
entreat them to take action by taking to the streets:  
The page needed to speak directly to its members and convince them to be 
active participants […] and it […] was also important to break free from all 
barriers of fear that controlled so many of us.  
(Ghonim, 2012) 
Using the Facebook tool, Ghonim organised the first silent and nonviolent 
protest that took place in Alexandria. People wore black T-shirts and stood side 
by side with their hands up. The success of the first activists’ group gave him 
hope and courage to extend the scope of his Facebook page to an international 
level. He took this decision after surveying around 1,300 people who supported 
him – a total of 78% (Ghonim, 2012). A measure of the huge influence his page 
was having can be seen by the fact that it reached around 250,000 followers in 
less than two months. This event created a sense of unity between people and 
made them overcome the fear that had previously made them accept an abusive 
political regime. The Internet communication, via this page, promoted a culture of 
tolerance and acceptance, despite the fact that the majority of its members were 
anonymous. Most of them used only their initials or nicknames; this anonymity 
gave them more flexibility in communication and interaction. The page actively 
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shared the events of the Tunisian Revolution, which created a wave of great 
enthusiasm among Egypt’s youth. The page played a critical role when the events 
of January 25th 2011 exploded and received very important support during the 
“day of anger” on the 28th of January 2011, when the police cracked down on 
protesters. Ghonim claimed that during these events his page represented all 
Egyptians and did not reflect the agenda of any political party, and that its 
message opposed all forms of injustice, brutality and torture. Interviewee D from 
Menoufia, explained, “‘We Are All Khaled Said’s page expressed many issues 
Egyptian citizens lived within and represented the rage a lot of people around me 
felt" (D, 2018 in Menoufia). Similarly, Interviewee E from Qalyoubia, stated, 
"We Are All Khaled Said page summarized what could not be explained on media 
monitored by the government or controlled by the government" (E, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). This Facebook page created a shift in the political scene and gave 
power to social media users. However, when analysing the interviews in the rural 
areas for this thesis, it was clear that they all heard about the page and were 
informed about it but that this information came either from television programs 
on satellite channels like Al Jazeera - which then encouraged some of the young 
interviewees to start checking it directly on social media - or by social media 
users that lived in Cairo rather than being participants on the page from the first 
day.  
Interviewee J in Qalyoubia, explained: "The first time I heard about the 
Khaled Said page was on a television program that was on Al Jazeera Channel or 
Dream TV; I do not remember exactly" (J, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Similarly, 
Interviewee I in Menoufia, said: "I constantly heard about the Khaled Said page 
on different television channels, which encouraged me to see what was on it" (I, 
2018 in Menoufia). Moreover, Interviewee E in South Sinai, stated: "I don’t think 
I heard about the Khaled Said page except from one of the television programs on 
the first day of the uprisings" (E, 2018 in South Sinai). Finally, Interviewee D in 
Minya, explained: "I never knew about the Khaled Said page except from the 
television talk shows" (D, 2018 in Minya). 
The remaining interviewees that did not use social media, even after they 
heard about the page from television, got to know the updates of the page from 
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people in their own social circle that started using it. Therefore, they were 
updated about it constantly via word of mouth in their circle.  
Interviewee C in Qalyoubia, explained: 
"I was never a social media user till now, yet my son and younger 
relatives were so I started to ask them what was going on the Khaled 
Said page and other pages as well" (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee B in Menoufia, said: 
"I never used social media but my campaign manager for the 
parliamentary elections started then and used to update me on the news" 
(B, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Interviewee B in South Sinai, stated: "I knew about it from my niece because I 
was not good with technology" (B, 2018 in South Sinai). Finally, Interviewee D 
in Minya, mentioned: "social media was too sophisticated for me but any of the 
younger family members used to update me about updates on social media" (D, 
2018 in Minya).  
Many of them joined social media later but not when the 2011 uprisings 
started when they found that some updates from places such as Tahrir Square 
were circulating information quicker than television. This was obvious in the 
following responses: 
Interviewee C in Menoufia, explained 
"I had to learn to use social media because I was very worried about 
what was going on and sometimes news on social media was quicker" (C, 
2018 in Menoufia). 
Interviewee A in Qalyoubia, said: 
"I learned after the uprisings to use social media because I felt 
sometimes I can have quicker access to instant updates generally, yet I 
did not have time from the stress we lived with to learn about what was 
going on during the 2011 uprisings" (A, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
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Interviewee D in South Sinai, mentioned: 
"I joined Facebook and started using social media closer to the 2013 
uprisings due to usage of it by then and because of the hatred me and my 
family had towards the Muslim Brotherhood. During the 2011 uprisings I 
was not as interested because, as a governorate generally, we had 
sympathy towards Mubarak and were upset about the outcome of 2011 
because he gave us security during his times. Sinai generally needed 
security stability more than anything due to its location and security 
circumstances"(D, 2018 in South Sinai). 
Interviewee D in Minya, explained: 
"I started using social media a year after the 2011 uprisings because I 
felt no change happened with all what happened in 2011 and now I 
needed to state my opinion" (D, 2018 in Minya). 
A significant influence to consider as aforementioned, is the role played by 
word of mouth, face to face networks and communications, which is obvious in 
the past interviewee comments of non social media users that used to ask the 
social media users around them about social media news during 2011 uprisings. 
In Egyptian society, they are referred to as shillas or trust circles surrounding 
people who share common interests and grievances. These face-to-face 
interactions played a crucial role in spreading news in rural Egypt.  
Interviewee F in Qalyoubia, explained: "Khaled Said page and such 
pages on social media bonded people together when they were from 
different areas rather than our area" (F, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Similarly, 
Interviewee I in Menoufia, stated: "When I started using social media to 
follow updates about Tahrir Square I felt I was closer to the people in 
these areas by hearing about their updates" (I, 2018 in Menoufia).  
Also, Interviewee D from South Sinai, mentioned: 
"The use of social media pages during the uprisings led to a connection 
with other Egyptians from different areas, which broke the feeling of 
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always feeling that South Sinai is on its own and secluded from the rest 
of Egyptians" (D, 2018 in South Sinai). 
Interviewee I from Menoufia, commented: "It was the first time I feel that 
Egyptians from different areas of Egypt were discussing one issue" (I, 2018 in 
Menoufia). 
Therefore, it gave rural citizens some sense of uniting by an invisible bond of 
shared feelings with people in other areas that were then spread to non-social 
media users in their rural areas via convergence and circulation of the information 
on traditional media and through word of mouth. Mark Granovetter (2011) has 
described this type of movement in his so-called theory of “the strength of weak 
ties”. In contrast, in South Sinai and Minya their bond with people in different 
areas of Egypt was slightly different. For example, Interviewee E in South Sinai, 
explained: 
"due to our location being far from the urban capital and 
geographical characteristics while living in a tribal culture we were 
focused more on the impact of what was happening on our area 
because during the Mubarak regime we were in peace compared to 
other times. Therefore, one was following what was happening on 
social media with more focus on what is the destiny of our area if the 
regime changes not on the impact on all of Egypt and if it will benefit 
the whole country. As a result, this stress made me not bond much 
with people in other areas through social media, and instead I just 
used it to be updated" (E, 2018 in South Sinai).  
In Minya, Interviewee C, stated: 
"I checked what was going on to be updated about the situation 
because I was very concerned about the security in the area so our 
neighbours and families don’t get harmed" (C, 2018 in Minya).  
Therefore, clearly the Gornevetter theory was more obvious in Menoufia and 
Qalyoubia than in South Sinai and Minya due to their local differences. For 
example, South Sinai’s location always made people feel that they were in an 
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unstable situation, which in turn made them more concerned about their local 
impact by what was happening; this motivated some people who use social media 
to follow updates for that reason. Due to the tougher financial circumstances in 
Minya and distance from urban areas the sense of insecurity they have in the 
community led them to focus on social media to try to be updated about the 
security of their area rather than bonding externally like Qalyoubia and Menoufia 
when they used social media. However, in each governorate the focus point they 
had when using social media by any social media user was spread in their circle 
via word of mouth and originally referred to on television, yet encouraged them 
to be updated on social media.  
5.4.1. Mobilisation and Demobilisation Frames 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this information regarding the changes 
that traditional media and social media went through during the 18 days of the 
Egyptian 2011 uprising. Online social media had a major contribution, indeed, 
but they have represented only a spark from the 2011 uprising itself. The Said 
page and April 6 Movement page successes were due to several factors. First of 
all, they had based all their success on the social capital concept (which will be 
analysed closely in the next chapter) meaning that they knew that Egyptians cared 
a lot about social relationships and created strong bonds inside their small social 
circles.  Even though limited Internet connection was available all over Egypt, 
particularly in the rural areas due to the culture of rural citizens as well as the 
infrastructure of the area, the information gathered from social media was then 
spread through word-of-mouth or satellite television. Online activists counted on 
the fact that, in the rural areas, people would at the very least talk about what was 
happening on social media and ask the community members who did have access 
to the Internet what was happening in the political scene, since word of mouth 
culture is very common in the rural areas. (Stefanone et al., 2010). Moreover, 
when important news was circulated on social media, satellite channels picked it 
up and circulated it as well as previously explained in the convergence concept. 
According to the interviews, most rural citizens rely mainly on television as a 
form of media, which means that they did not necessarily need social media to 
find out the updates happening. However, social media had the power to 
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contribute to the building of a stronger social capital, by bringing new people 
together and forging new relationships across the different areas of Egypt. 
Finally, modern technologies, such as mobile, had made it possible to access the 
social networks from anywhere and at anytime, giving them the opportunity to 
post live coverage which allowed them to gain trust among the citizens who were 
being manipulated by the state through made-up scenarios transmitted via the 
classic information channels (Tinoco, 2013). Therefore, the changes that 
happened during the 2011 uprisings in the previously explained phases with 
regards to the start of clear spark of social media usage and its relation to 
television media mainly impacted rural citizen norms by becoming part of the 
media access they look upon and by time increase in usage but not necessarily in 
relation to affecting political interaction.   
Concerning the television media, the cases of the two previously presented 
satellite channels can be analysed in relation to their convergence with online 
social media. Dream and ON TV constantly circulated or converged information 
from social media such as interviewing Wael Ghonim and discussing his 
Facebook page and posts on Dream TV or Yousri Foda constantly interviewing 
governmental positions to discuss with them the situation and videos posted on 
social media on ON TV.  While, on the other hand, the national state channels 
continued presenting their agenda as the government’s channel. Social media 
pages, however, kept presenting the national state channels’ claims while posting 
the reality alongside it in order to prove the state channels were deceiving their 
audience. First of all, it intentionally set an agenda that moved people’s attention 
from the most important events taking place in their country to some less 
important facts or to situations that could make them sympathise with the 
Mubarak regime and hate the “rioters”; it simply failed to write about important 
facts happening on the streets, such as the protests, the violent police intervention, 
the various acts of an informal political nature, and more. Secondly, it turned the 
attention of citizens in a different direction, in order to keep them distracted and 
repeatedly reported about a shocking terrorist event that took place in Egypt on 
New Year’s Eve, claiming that Egypt was again the victim of terrorist 
organisations (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016).  
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As evident from the above mentioned facts, the private television channels and 
social media have created various mobilisation and demobilisation frames. The 
mobilisation frames are characterised by the “collective definition of issues, 
which requires emphasising their social character and stressing collective 
responsibility as well as suggesting solutions on a structural level” (Deci and 
Ryan, 1991). In terms of social media and private channels, their framing proved 
successful in that it aligned with the issues that its viewers wished to consider. 
The lack of success of state channels is due to the fact that, as previously 
mentioned, it refused to consider those same issues. Interview data from all four 
governorates highlight this to be the case. 
For example, in Qalyoubia, Interviewee K mentioned: "I always followed 
private satellite channels because the state channels were not saying the truth" 
(K, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Interviewee L in Menoufia, explained: "The state 
channels are controlled to a great extent by the government" (L, 2018 in 
Menoufia). Interviewee E in Minya, said: "I barely believed anything on any state 
television channel, yet was interested to see what the government wanted to 
convince the people with" (E, 2018 in Minya). Interviewee F in South Sinai, 
stated: "No one watched the state channels because they did not say much about 
what was going on" (F, 2018 in South Sinai). 
The Facebook pages together, with the private satellite channels, which 
according to the interviews are the channels rural citizens watched have created 
this social frame by encouraging citizens to take part in the 2011 uprising and to 
demand political changes, emphasising that the protest had to be well organised 
and structured in order to realise the collective goal of a new Egypt. On the other 
side, national channels sought to demobilise the protests and presented facts in 
ways designed to downplay their significance, claiming that the events were 
organised by special groups who did not reflect wider public opinion (Tinoco, 
2013). However, rural citizens interviewed used nation state channels just to see 
what the government wanted to tell the people, while understanding it was not the 
truth.  
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The differences between state and private channels had a marked effect during 
this time period. Television, especially Al Jazeera, played a very important role 
during the credibility crisis, because:  
One of the features of the uprising was the gradual undermining of state TV 
and newspapers, to the extent that journalists began to resign as the public saw 
the ludicrous coverage for what it was. Also, instrumental in this process was the 
contrast provided by transnational satellite TV channels, like Al Jazeera, whose 
reporting was often influenced by information and footage coming from citizen 
journalists on the ground. 
 
(Idle and Nunns, 2011) 
In Qalyoubia and Menoufia, almost all interviewees mentioned that Al Jazeera 
was one of the main channels that they watched from the non-Egyptian satellite 
channels. In Minya and South Sinai, interviewees that watched television 
exclusively were aware of the updates on Al Jazeera. Generally, all interviewees 
that mentioned Al Jazeera clarified that the importance of it was the updates it 
provided that were not provided by other Egyptian channels in the same detail or 
to the same extent.  There are at least two important aspects that have to be 
underlined, concerning the credibility crisis. The first concerns the contrast 
between the independent, authentic and vibrant non-mainstream media and the 
restricted, controlled and much more constrained state media. There were very 
clear differences between the citizens who were reporting live real facts 
happening on the ground and the propagandistic national media that delivered to 
the public orchestrated agenda setting through the national television. 
The second aspect refers to the discrepancy between the reality of the 2011 
events during the uprisings and the national Egyptian television coverage, which 
was presenting a distorted image that, was unreflective of the reality and was 
playing down the severity of the protests. Al Jazeera played a crucial role by 
presenting minute by minute comprehensive and explicit images and details of 
the events with even less control on their news feed then private Egyptian satellite 
channels. The channel represented the perfect synergy between the online and 
offline media, because it was a traditional form of media, which also broadcast a 
lot of online material. This led the Egyptian government to close their Cairo 
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office and block the channel’s transmission via satellite, which is a confession of 
the strength of television similar to the implied confession made by shutting down 
the Internet service. Nevertheless, Egyptians found a way to watch Al Jazeera via 
some other satellites such as Arabsat and Hotbird (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). 
As a result, rural citizens mainly followed private satellite channels not state 
channels because they were less controlled in presenting news. 
Conflict is another feature of the mobilisation frame, stressing the difference 
between “us” and “them”, where “us” represents the people, and “them” 
represents the regime (Deci and Ryan, 1991).  The conflict has been largely 
presented on Facebook and by satellite channels, while national state channels 
deliberately tried to demobilise people by presenting Egypt and President 
Mubarak as victims of foreign external forces trying to destabilise the country. In 
the end, it’s obvious that the online social media had an important role in the 
2011 uprisings, but its force became real only when it was combined with 
television. The two media – the new and the old – became truly strong when they 
worked in a synergistic way. When the Internet was shut down, the satellite 
channels were the only source for transmitting the news and keeping people 
together. Television media had various levels of contribution to the resignation of 
a president who appeared to have one of the most stable dictatorships in the Arab 
world (Tinoco, 2013). The fact that the media connected people from the online 
environment to those who were offline offered a new dimension to social capital 
for the uprising. When the Internet was shut down and the online voices had no 
power, the offline protesters met the online ones and formed an even stronger 
force (Stefanone et al., 2010). This was obvious by the interviewees’ answers 
about when they started going to Tahrir Square and meeting people outside of 
their normal social circle during the phase when the Internet was blocked.  
The discrepancies between the facts presented by private channels on 
television and the distorted agenda setting presented by the national television 
means that the Egyptian uprisings grew bigger as the protests continued and went 
from the level of a popular uprising to a conflict that involved the national 
administration, including the Ministry of Information. This draws our attention to 
the fact that the 2011 uprisings also generated communication between the 
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President, the government, and the protesters. The relationship between the three 
parties was tense, especially given the unethical methods used to impede the 
protesters; the shutting down of Internet and mobile services in order to limit 
social media users, which has been previously discussed, is an example of this. 
While this did catalyze offline political involvement, it also increased anger 
among the populace at the time.  As mentioned previously, this lasted for seven of 
the 18 days discussed and, in any case, the people eventually discovered creative 
ways to stay informed and communicate during this blackout (Ishani, 2011).  
However, the government decision to shut down Internet and cell phone 
services was a failure and generated a bigger wave of protest. No longer able to 
communicate with their friends by means of social media and Internet, people - 
especially the young and educated - took to the streets in huge numbers, fearing 
that they would be massacred and aiming to protect one to another (Maaty, 2011). 
Consequently, the lack of online information and virtual communication 
prompted people to connect with each other in reality gathered by thousands in 
the Tahrir Square of Cairo as mentioned in the previous responses by 
interviewees. Therefore, denying Internet access directed people to a real-life 
offline activism on the streets, which led the uprising to grow even larger (Idle 
and Nunns, 2011) since demands for social, economic, political, and 
infrastructural change had all been requested by the people for years prior to the 
2011 uprisings. The shutdown was circulated in rural areas via television as well 
and motivated some of the young rural interviewees to participate in the protests 
on Tahrir Square in Cairo, particularly interviewees younger than 30 years old 
based in Menoufia and Qalyoubia, which are closer to Cairo than the other 
governorates being studied. On the other hand, online media operated on the 
presumption of the existence of huge social capital, because it had previously 
gathered a lot of disparate small groups and made a huge community out of them. 
When citizens faced the Internet blackout, they were already connected, they 
already knew that going outside onto the streets would enable them to hear a 
common voice asking for the same thing: the end of Mubarak’s regime. They 
knew how numerous they were; such knowledge encouraged them to lose their 
fear. They found the courage and the resources to join the offline protesters and to 
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form a bigger and a stronger protest. For example, in Qalyoubia, Interviewee I 
explained, 
"as a social media user and young guy in my 20’s during the 2011 
uprisings I was encouraged to go to Tahrir Square often; yet when the 
Internet blacked out I spent all my days there to be part of the event and 
get the feel of what was happening constantly in a community setting" (I, 
2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee G in Menoufia agreed (G, 2018 in Menoufia). This is how social 
media transferred its initial power offline and connected common citizens from 
both urban and rural areas under the umbrella of a common protest movement 
against corruption, injustice and poverty. In other words, the social media users, 
working together with traditional media such as satellite televisions, had the 
power to connect otherwise fairly weak ties – which referred to the online 
activists – to the strong ties, which were defined as the offline protesters, people 
who were more traditional and who went directly onto the streets (Stefanone et al, 
2010). 
Nevertheless, as previously explained in this chapter, social media had the 
power of creating a wave that impacted a lot of people, even if they were not 
using the Internet and occurred instead through word of mouth or television-
social media convergence. The online activists counted on the strong 
relationships built especially between rural people who regularly used their social 
circles for news and who asked the community members using the Internet for 
information related to the political sphere. Therefore, social media accessed a 
larger social capital than that created through the online networks and this fact 
was confirmed in the elections that followed the 2011 uprisings (Utz and 
Muscanell, 2015). Regardless of rural Internet usage for politics, these citizens 
were politically informed because of the convergence of social media with 
television.  
According to Castells, social media transcends the limits of place. Protesting 
was changing from spaces of places to spaces of flows since it was being 
extended in many areas at the same time (Castells, 2012). He defined space as, 
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“the material support of time-sharing social practices” and, "space of flows" 
(Castells, 2012), as “being part of a context whose functional logic is based on 
real time interaction, no matter in which places its constitutive elements are 
located" (Stalder, 2006). He argued that the time sharing social practices did not 
require physical existence because of the new technologies in our network 
society, which make the society function in a different way in the way 
information and communication move, yet our society is becoming constructed 
around flows (Castells, 1996).  For example, in Qalyoubia, Interviewee I, stated: 
"when I started commuting to Tahrir Square on a daily basis, 
particularly when Internet was blocked and all my updates were from 
television, I updated my social circle when I went back to Qalyoubia" (I, 
2018 in Qalyoubia).  
Therefore, blockage of the Internet led the interviewee to follow the events 
through television more and motivated him to go to Tahrir Square. This, in turn, 
led Interviewee I to pass on information via commuting on a daily basis and his 
family checking on him via telephone, leading to a flow of information through 
several means.  In the case of Egypt, the space of flows in some rural areas took 
place because of the amplifying effect of traditional media such as television and 
telephone communication, rather than through the Internet and social media. This 
was particularly true during the period where the state had shut down Internet 
services, but was generally the case both before and after this phase since the 
main Internet users were in the urban areas. Despite the fact this lack of Internet 
access has led to generalizations that political interaction was low in rural Egypt, 
this was not the case. Interviewee I’s comments highlight Castells’ space of flows 
concept, as well as high levels of political interaction in the informal sense. This, 
combined with voting levels which were consistently higher in rural Egypt than 
urban Egypt, further support the idea that a lack of social media access did not 
amount to a lack of political interaction or engagement. In Qalyoubia, for 
example, the voting rate for the presidential elections was 55.23%. Similarly, 
Menoufia had the highest voting rate in all Egypt at 62.6%. In contrast, Cairo and 
Alexandria’s voting rates were 51.5% and 50.2% (Pres2014elections.org, 2014) 
respectively, despite being urban governorates, protest centres, and areas with 
high Internet access and usage. These high rates in rural areas, as compared to 
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urban governorates, support the fact that rural citizens were being informed 
during and after the uprisings about the updates based on the flow of information 
they were getting in rural areas through their interaction with urban governorates 
because of the convergence of traditional and social media alongside their social 
capital. Studies show that new technologies are helping in spreading information 
in geographically dispersed areas (Brainard and Siplon, 2000; Elin, 2003; Myers, 
1994). However, Shaun Moores disagrees with Castells definition of place in 
comparison to his concept of space of flows since he claims that a place is a ‘self-
contained’ area while, on the other hand, he is claiming that (due to technology) 
spaces of places are becoming spaces of flows (Moores, 2003). Moores’ opinion 
describes Egypt’s situation more clearly because, in Egypt, Tahrir Square was the 
starting place of the uprisings, which is a contained area with boundaries, while 
other governorates in Egypt started protesting in the main squares of their city 
based on the flow of information they got. It clearly explains that the concept of 
“space of flows” resembles the information moving people in different contained 
areas with boundaries, yet different “places” via technological means. Thus, the 
case of Egypt shows that the “space of places” and the “space of flows” 
complement each other because the flow of information makes protestors in 
different parts of Egypt gather in certain places, which are basically contained 
areas. Thus, despite the social media barriers, the freedom to connect across space 
and the amplification that happens because of the convergence of media played a 
role in encouraging citizens to politically participate even if it was through 
informal means.   
Analysis on social and traditional media have been made in order to achieve a 
better understanding of how much each of the online and offline information 
channels have contributed to the 2011 uprisings, together with different cases that 
were constantly referred to in the interviews, presenting different social media 
pages or satellite channels that were of considerable relevance during the 2011 
uprisings. The online and offline forms of activism have been presented and 
analysed in the context of rural Egypt, in order to come to a clearer understanding 
of the extent to which these media sources have mobilised citizens in these 
neglected areas. Some studies have been mentioned to create the necessary 
contextual frame for the analysis of the thesis’ unstructured interviews that have 
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been conducted with various Egyptian citizens from the four governorates for this 
thesis.  
As already underlined in this thesis, social media networks were in the centre 
of events during 2011 in Egypt, which were “widely referred as the Arab Spring 
uprising or revolution” (Chebib and Sohail, 2011). In this chapter we investigated 
the role that social networks, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, played 
during the 2011 uprising and how they have facilitated political mobilisation and 
the “creation of a new Arab public sphere” (Chebib and Sohail, 2011), which 
indicates a change in the norms of political interaction in rural Egypt. These 
social networks have created a certain power balance between the political 
authoritarian regime and the civilian activist, allowing, to a certain degree, rural 
citizens to become informed and get involved in the events of 2011 and later on, 
in 2012 and 2013. Four distinct phases that the social media networks have gone 
through were described and analysed via the answers of interviewees to assess 
them in rural Egypt. All these phases demonstrated that social media networks 
had a role in “generating and shifting the power” of common people (Howard and 
Hussain, 2011), yet with not much focus on rural citizens, which was what was 
focused on in this chapter.  
By these new norms of communication, many people became citizen 
journalists - as defined by Sadaf Ali and Shahira Fahmy (2013) - and they helped, 
together with Facebook’s page administrators, to build a parallel agenda which, 
unlike that of the national media, presented what was really happening in Egypt. 
Moreover, for non-social media users they were updated in rural Egypt via 
convergence with television and word of mouth. In a different study, Khamis and 
Vaughn (2011) underlines the importance of Facebook, YouTube and Twitter as 
channels to make public the regime’s abuse of its citizens, helping people to get 
organised in order to combat repressions. These platforms also shaped public 
opinion by making citizens’ voices heard and presented to the people the agenda 
setting that really mattered, i.e. that which was not the product of state power. 
The study’s conclusion was that “the balance of both political and media power 
has shifted unpredictably and will continue to do so”. For example, this can be 
seen in the differences in social media usage between 2011 and 2013. However, 
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its full relation and effect after the 2011 uprisings on rural Egypt will be 
explained below. 
The dissatisfaction of elections’ results and the triumph of Muslim 
Brotherhood after the first democratic presidential elections unleashed political 
powers that threatened the uprisings in 2011. This situation generated another 
wave of uprisings in 2013 and eventually led to a military intervention that 
removed the Muslim Brotherhood president to maintain the stability of the 
country in face of the millions in the uprisings in 2013. This, in turn, led to some 
protests that “countered the counter-revolution and led to demands for the return 
of legitimacy to the people and for a respect of the outcomes of the ‘Jan 25’ 
revolution” (Castells, 2012).  
All these studies show that the role of social media networks has varied at 
different stages and has changed a lot during the revolutionary events. These 
changes resulted in a new set of power structures that have changed the individual 
norms with regards to politics of the Egyptian society. For example, in 
Qalyoubia, Interviewees G explained: "When the uprisings in 2013 started one 
was used to using social media in relation to politics more than previously and 
updating people in our circle" (G, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Interviewee J made a 
similar statement (J, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, Interviewee L stated: "The norm of using social media during the 
2013 uprisings was much more regular than in 2011" (L, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Interviewee A agreed (A, 2018 in Menoufia). 
In South Sinai, Interviewee C, explained: 
"in 2011 everything was new to how we were used to deal in terms of 
politics and media influence, yet in 2013 among with the anger we 
had towards Morsi’s rule social media usage and if not usage but 
updates through users around me was more regular and often 
throughout the day" (C, 2018 in South Sinai). 
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In Minya, Interviewee E, mentioned: "although one was used to hearing more 
about social media in 2013 uprisings more than in 2011 still television was very 
important for updates" (E, 2018 in Minya).  
Therefore, usage and inclusion of social media more often in their daily usage 
increased as time passed after the 2011 events rather than during the 2011 events.  
5.5. The online and offline activism during the 2011 Egypt uprisings  
In order to understand the real degree to which the Internet influenced the 
events during the Egyptian uprisings, it is very important to understand the 
difference between the Internet as a space where people collectively expressed 
their dissent towards the dictatorial regime and the Internet as a tool that was used 
to generate a shift in the collective consciousness, which will therefore explain 
the impact of social media on the norms of rural citizens. This level of 
understanding will bring to light the difference between the online and the offline 
activism during the 2011 Egyptian uprisings (Alexander and Aouragh, 2014) and 
after it. 
While many researchers put a considerable emphasis on the role of social 
media and the public’s online mobilisation during the Egyptian uprisings, the 
facts have proven that when the government shut down Internet services for 
almost a week - removing almost any possibility of communication and 
mobilisation - this action neither stopped, nor prevented the activists from 
gathering outside in the streets and communicating with each other. Almost all of 
the semi-structured interviews done (with the results presented in this chapter) 
show that the interviewees in rural areas do not necessarily associate the 2011 
uprising with social media. 
To overcome this perspective, some researchers have distinguished between 
the Internet as a space of manifestation which had a crucial function in the 
articulation of the collective critique towards the existing political and social 
regime and the Internet as a tool (especially Web 2.0) used in the actual practice 
of the uprisings. Their studies showed that the powers attributed to Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube are rather particular to Western collective behaviour and 
beliefs, while in the Arab world, one has to take into consideration the 
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explanatory primacy of a decades-long history of various social and political 
protests, especially when it comes to Egypt. We can start with the US invasion of 
Iraq, which generated a huge protest in the Arab world and continue with the 
2004-2006 demonstrations against calling for constitutional reforms, movements 
which also prompted judges to get involved with them, demanding to reduce the 
state’s influence in the elections. Large strikes had also taken place later on in the 
textile sector, encouraging workers to protest against Mubarak who triggered 
many other subsequent protests because of the police torture he inflicted upon the 
protesters (Saleh, 2012). The death of Said and the state’s attempts to influence 
the 2010 parliamentary elections also created frustrations and a desire among the 
people to get things changed. The events from Tunisia gave Egyptians the final 
push, showing them that change is real and possible and that a dictator can be 
toppled (Alexander, 2011). 
5.6. Conclusions 
During this chapter, different analyses and examples have been presented, with 
a particular concentration on social media, and the old media focusing on 
television as the most used traditional media form. The Internet indeed played a 
very important role in the organisation of the uprisings and in creating an 
appropriate context to develop it, but, at the same time, the old media, together 
with simple citizens from the rural areas, had already prepared the appropriate 
historical context to determine such a huge event long before it came to pass. 
Many researchers had the tendency of putting too much emphasis on social 
media, bravely stating that the Egyptian uprising was, in fact, a Facebook and 
Twitter uprising. The statistics, interviews, and references presented during this 
chapter showed that, first of all, only a small number of people had Internet 
access, in comparison to the entire Egyptian population to have an instant impact 
on norms solely. Second of all, many people in some rural areas (the most 
predominant type of area in Egypt) have limited use of Internet connection, yet 
they had been organising protests way before the 2011 uprisings actually took 
place. Thirdly, when the government shut down the Internet and mobile phone 
services, the social media became useless locally and the protests had to be 
sustained by real actions in the streets. Fourthly, the online activists realised the 
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scale of the protests and the dangers faced by citizens when they were forced to 
leave their computers or phones and protest in the street. At those times, the 
satellite channels were the only source of information for the people and the 
online activists realised that the classic face to face meetings in special places was 
much more effective and better organised. Nevertheless, in the end, findings show 
that the online and offline groups managed to work together and get connected 
during the Internet blackout, which demonstrated that both the Internet and the 
protests enhanced the creation of a stronger and wider social capital yet not 
necessarily for rural citizens. 
Given the aim of this chapter to answer the first of this thesis’ research 
questions - to what extent did social media change individual norms of political 
interaction with the public sphere of rural Egypt during and after 2011 due to its 
convergence with television media? - the assessment of this chapter yields the 
following response. Social media did undoubtedly play a role of some kind as 
examples such as “We are All Khaled Said” and the organizational context of 
organizing the 2011 uprising. However, the historical context of rural Egypt, as 
combined with the fact that the Internet was shut down during a significant period 
of the uprisings themselves, highlights that social media was not the prime 
motivator of the 2011 uprisings. Moreover, the history of political engagement 
and interaction in rural Egypt, as well as the importance placed on personal, 
cultural, and familial relationships, further limited the role that social media could 
play in changing individual norms of political interaction within the public 
sphere. As such, while social media was a motivator, these factors support the 
view that it was not the prime motivator in relation to the changing political 
interaction during the 2011 uprising and its aftermath.  
  
This chapter presented after the analysis of the interviews in rural Egypt and 
references further supports that individual norms started changing after the 2011 
uprisings was over. Moreover, people had had enough time to understand more 
about social media; this in turn affected their interaction norms with regards to 
politics towards the beginning of the 2013 uprisings. This can be seen in the 
increase in mobile Internet penetration, from 73% in 2011 to 80% in 2013 
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(Information and Communications Technology Indicators Bulletin, 2015). 
However, the next chapter will explain social capital traditions of rural citizens 
because it is related to the slower usage of social media and its impact on political 
individual norms among with what was explained in this chapter. This will 
further explain why more time is needed to affect the political interaction of rural 
citizens because they are used to discussing politics and acting upon it in a certain 
context. This chapter among with the next chapter create the link in presenting the 
impact of the changes of norms due to the different media environment among 
with the traditional social capital norms in impacting the feelings of 
empowerment and social capital in rural Egypt.  
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6. Chapter 5 - Political Interaction & The Public Sphere: The 
Impact of Social Capital on the 2011 Uprisings and its Aftermath 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the social capital of the rural areas. In particular, 
the discussion of this chapter centers on how rural citizens re-conceived and were 
mobilised to engage with many aspects of the social and political life before, 
during and after Egypt’s 2011 uprising. A prime focus here is that social capital 
in rural areas has a great impact on individual norms of political interaction and 
affects their impact on using and accepting social media usage. As such, this 
chapter addresses the second research question of this thesis: How does social 
capital in rural Egypt affect the political interaction of citizens in the public 
sphere considering the social media access circumstances? 
The data presented in the previous chapter explored the political values and 
norms commonly in relation to social media shared by the Egyptians, in rural 
areas which had often been ignored in academic literature. As a continuation, this 
chapter will focus on the impact of social capital in affecting the political values 
in rural Egypt. In order to understand the relationship of the rural population – 
represented by farmers and Bedouins since they compose the majority of the 
population in the areas covered - we have taken into account several factors. First 
of all, the previous discussion in Chapter 1 on formal and informal participation 
in rural Egypt - which detailed what political participation and interaction mean 
for rural Egypt, and the manner in which it existed before, during and after the 
2011 uprisings - was necessary in order to find out the concepts that explain the 
particular historical context of political norms in these areas, and is the assumed 
context for this chapter. In terms of this chapter specifically, the different forms 
of political participation are analysed, with the aim of clarifying the level of 
political engagement by rural Egyptian citizens and the extent to which the 
existing rural social capital has contributed to it. The comparisons between 
different forms of political participation in different rural areas to the events have 
also been a big part of this study to present the differences and similarities of the 
political environment in the areas studied. Secondly, there is a strong need to 
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rethink the context of the uprisings in terms of the role of rural citizens, the 
impact of social capital, and how social capital relates to social media, as well as 
how this has to be presented, in order to have a wider vision of the protests that 
took place before and during the 2011 uprisings while focusing on rural Egypt. 
This complements the historical context that was discussed in the past chapter 
before the uprisings in terms of the protests patterns that have characterised the 
rural area, in order to have a clearer image of rural citizens in Egypt. Last, but not 
least, an actual analysis of the political participation has been made for the areas 
deemed relevant to this thesis and the changes in the individual norms in relation 
to social capital that appeared during and after the 2011 uprisings. Taking these 
factors into account, the chapter aims to present the role of social capital for the 
rural Egyptian citizens in the uprisings that took place in 2011, in order to present 
a more accurate perspective of this crucial event in the course of Egyptian history, 
focusing on rural citizens and their characteristics. All the data has been 
interconnected and analysed, in order to obtain a more accurate image of how (or 
whether) social capital has impacted the rural citizens during the 2011 uprising. 
One facet of political interaction that will be addressed continuously 
throughout this chapter is the distinction between parliamentary and presidential 
elections in terms of rural involvement, as well as how this was impacted by both 
the 2011 uprisings and the social capital of rural Egypt. This is for several 
reasons. First, as mentioned previously in Chapter 1 and subsequently in this 
thesis, presidential elections were less important to rural citizens prior to 2011 
and, as such, their importance in the aftermath of the uprisings can serve as a 
useful indicator for changes in political interaction and interaction norms. Second, 
the importance of parliamentary elections was also considered briefly in Chapter 
1. This chapter will expand on this, in order to show that the relative importance 
of parliamentary and presidential elections serves as a useful indicator of social 
capital and, as such, changes to this importance will be useful for the analysis 
conducted throughout this study. This will allow a deeper understanding of rural 
political interaction. 
Indeed, the Egyptian 2011 uprising could have been characterised as an urban 
phenomenon, because the most visible events took place in Tahrir Square. The 
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actual physical presence of citizens forming huge crowds happened in that 
particular place. For various reasons, analysing the role of citizens coming from 
the rural areas was harder to achieve, but the landscape of the Egyptian uprising 
and the struggle for social justice and dignity would not be complete without 
bringing to light the critical role played by the rural population in this story. Their 
story may be less spectacular as compared to the farmers’ demonstrations, but it 
is at least as important as all the other groups who participated in the 2011 
uprisings.  
Despite the astonishing power of the Egyptian 2011 uprisings, the dominant 
ideas concerning the Arab population among academic circles has long been 
distorted by stereotypes related to the unchanging Arab culture and Islamic 
tradition that represents the essence of the Arab population, leading to the 
conclusion that an Arab society such as Egypt was always destined to be ruled by 
dictatorial political leaders. However, the 2011 Egyptian uprisings have triggered 
a much more dynamic discussion about Arab society, dislodging some 
stereotypes while generating new questions and research perspectives (Saad, 
2016). The 2011 uprising has brought to light some groups that researchers have 
ignored for a long time: women, farmers, workers, religious minorities, and the 
youth, among others. These categories of citizens have proven to be politically 
important during the uprisings and consider that researchers still have not put 
enough emphasis on their role. They have fought for their rights and became 
visible, carving their rightful place in the new reconfigured Arab political scene. 
6.2. The Definition Of Social Capital in Rural Egypt 
After the 2011 uprising, there was a lot of hope among the citizenry that a new 
form of formal political participation would emerge that was more meaningful, 
more representative and would allow citizens to impact governance. This is 
particularly in relation to the presidential elections since, as has already been 
mentioned and will be discussed in greater depth, formal participation in relation 
to parliamentary elections was already consistently high. Many hoped that some 
of the most important people from the informal political movements would get 
involved in the formal politics and form new national parties or reform the 
existing ones, with the idea that this would lead to greater representation for the 
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people of Egypt and the aspirations of the 2011 uprisings. Indeed, a number of 
new parties were formed in the post-Mubarak era and the protesters gave hope to 
ordinary citizens that things could change for the better. For this reason, one of 
the biggest changes resulting from the uprisings was the much larger rate of 
declared intention to participate in the elections, among both activists and regular 
citizens. 
For example, in Menoufia, Interviewee G explained, 
"the importance of voting was more obvious after the 2011 uprisings 
and finally we saw queues for voting in Egypt which was not seen in 
the Mubarak regime because during the Mubarak regime citizens felt 
that the regime would not allow anyone to win elections besides 
Mubarak" (G, 2018 in Menoufia).   
In Qalyoubia, Interviewee B, stated, 
"people were participating in presidential elections much more than 
before 2011 uprising because they felt it was not a known decision 
about the elections before even voting and that their vote could 
actually lead to change" (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
In Minya, Interviewee F mentioned, "the idea of voting after 2011 was much 
stronger in the society because one felt like his vote is actually counted not 
controlled as before 2011" (F, 2018 in Minya). 
In South Sinai, Interviewee E said, 
"the importance of presidential elections and constitutions was more 
obvious than it was prior to 2011 uprisings because before 2011 
uprisings results were pretty much controlled through restrictions on 
who could run for presidential elections" (E, 2018 in South Sinai).  
The fascinating aspect of this involvement in politics is that the reasoning 
behind political involvement - and the considerations that went into deciding who 
should be voted for - were unique in rural Egypt. Interestingly, for the citizens of 
rural Egypt that were interviewed, “social capital” seemed to have a local 
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definition that is different to the global conception of social capital. Describing 
the idea of the social capital concept in global terms refers to the ability to have 
strong political views and to make decisions on the basis of political measures. 
Areas with such citizens are considered to have high social capital measures. 
However, with regard to rural Egypt, it seemed like people felt much more 
comfortable making political decisions based on the local knowledge gained from 
their social bonds with families that are related to politics in the area around 
them. For example, Interviewee I in Qalyoubia mentioned, 
"I would still vote for the candidate known the most in the area I live 
in because - through his connections and loyalty to the land, people, 
and families - we will have a better representative than someone who 
has less connections with everyone living in the area" (I, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee G in Menoufia further explained that "voting for the candidate we 
know the most with a history in politics and knowing our land is the most 
appropriate decision for the way rural people live and think". In this way, even 
the increased declared intention to participate was based on social ties, a family’s 
history, and “loyalty to the land, people, and families" (G, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Moreover, rural citizens don’t consider that basing their decisions on such 
measures is low social capital because they believe that, for example, candidates 
with family history in the area will continue to serve the needs of the people in 
the area because they have an emotional connection to the families and land 
around them due to their family history. This assertion was common among 
interviewees, and seems to be the cause for a much larger body of individuals 
participating in parliamentary elections versus their national (presidential) 
counter-parts. For example, Interviewee B, in South Sinai, stated, "the rotation of 
candidates based on the tribe’s turn in the area ensures safety and working 
together for the best of the area - which is in a fragile situation - rather than 
voting on an unexpected basis". Interviewee B’s statement connects voting to 
stability in a clear manner: by giving each tribe a rotation and providing 
consensus on leadership, there will be minimal disruption caused by disagreement 
internally. According to Interviewee B, “voting on an unexpected basis” - or, 
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voting against the established rotation - would threaten the stability of the 
already-fragile governorate. This issue is, of course, avoided with the rotation 
system, allowing all tribes to “work together for the best of the area” (B, 2018 in 
South Sinai). Similarly, Interviewee E in Minya said, 
"candidates that have roots in the area are the best option to vote for, 
regardless of their political views, because they understand the 
different aspects of the area among the families, as well as the 
differences between them; this serves our needs better than someone 
not aware of these details" (E, 2018 in Minya). 
Moreover, this connection to the land and the families living within it feeds 
into their policies and decision-making in a way that is based on knowledge and 
trust. This is particularly clear in the South Sinai example where the “rotation of 
candidates based on the tribe’s turn” ensures stability, cooperation, and an overall 
cohesion that best suits the area. Therefore, rural citizens are not making such 
decisions thinking they are living within low social capital measures; this makes 
it seems like rural Egyptians have a localised definition of social capital within 
their boundaries. The localised definition of social capital in rural Egypt is not 
affected by the fact that they vote based on social connections and traditions. On 
the contrary, they find that voting based on social traditions and norms is 
considered social capital. Moreover, they consider it a strong form of social 
capital because they are convinced to vote this way based on experience; they 
have not been pressured to do so. It is simply that their focus is based primarily 
on the unique issues of their region, as opposed to the national concerns of Egypt 
as a whole. Furthermore, the concerns that this method of voting is related to are 
in fact real: social structure, as well as levels of safety, infrastructure, and 
financial stability do in fact vary based on region. Therefore, the difference 
between local Egyptian social capital and global social capital is that voting the 
way rural citizens in Egypt vote is considered a low form of social capital since it 
is not based only on politics, yet rural citizens did not feel that they are forced to 
do so. For example, Interviewee I in Qalyoubia mentioned, "voting based on 
social connections is based on the needs of the area, not fear; this is the best way 
to operate in our area" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
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In Menoufia, Interviewee G explained, 
"if I had the option to vote for someone else besides the candidate 
known the most in the area I would still vote for the candidate I know 
the most because he knows best about the area through his family 
since childhood" (G, 2018 in Menoufia). 
In South Sinai, Interviewee B stated, "if I had the option to vote differently I 
would still choose the way it is to ensure security and norms we live in and 
believe in" (B, 2018 in South Sinai). 
In Minya, Interviewee E said, 
"voting for someone unknown in an area like Minya is very risky and 
could make problems between families because of the traditions 
people live in and not knowing past issues between families that might 
lead to problems if not taken into consideration" (E, 2018 in Minya).  
This local idea of social capital is taken into consideration while analysing the 
interviews and patterns found from interviews in this thesis. While this section 
has only used examples of formal political participation, the remainder of this 
chapter will also highlight that this local social capital also exists in informal 
participation. Therefore, looking at the formal and informal participation in rural 
Egypt it is important to link this concept because it explains the primary evidence 
presented in terms of the impact of social capital on political participation.  
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6.3. Social Capital & The Motivations For Political Interaction in Rural 
Egypt 
 
(Erle et al., 2012) 
As shown by the map above of the geographical distribution of the participants 
in the 2011 uprisings, high participation levels were not necessarily registered in 
the urban governorates, but were more so in the governorates dominated by rural 
areas. Menoufia and Qalyoubia, two of the governorates that have been chosen to 
be analysed for this study, are prime examples of this. On the other hand, Minya 
and South Sinai registered lower participation levels, but they are also 
governorates with a lower rate of rural inhabitants than the other two mentioned 
above. Indeed, the interviews done in these governorates indicated that the 
political participation in the rural areas has been determined almost entirely by 
the social connections people have had for a long time and by their common 
desire to have a better life. Their social capital has not been particularly affected 
by political campaigns or by the information presented by the media to a great 
extent, but rather by the fact that their local leaders indicated that participation in 
protests was the best way to represent the interests of their communities. This is a 
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strong characteristic of the rural citizens, especially those who were living in 
visible poverty. 
In Minya, for instance, the interviews showed that the more financially stable 
people were, the more politically informed they were, and they even at times 
relied on social media information presented by other community members who 
had access to the Internet. For example, in Minya, Interviewee A mentioned, 
"Using social media gave an additional avenue of information to access among 
other medias" (A, 2018 in Minya).  
On the other hand, less financially stable citizens in this governorate 
(especially given the geographical distance from Cairo) tended to focus more on 
their daily financial needs. For example, Interviewee D from that region stated "I 
live in tough financial circumstances and don’t want to waste time watching 
media that could be controlled, which is why I prefer getting information from 
people I know" (D, 2018 in Minya). This makes some sense given the fact that 
social media use - and even regular consumption of media - requires time, and 
some access to a computer, mobile phone, or Internet. Lower financial stability 
would limit all of this.  
This was the same regardless of gender. In Minya, the interviews indicated that 
the females coming from less financially secure families relied much more on 
being updated by their social circles than from media sources, whether social 
online networks or even television. Their explanation was that they trusted their 
social sources more and they did not believe that getting news from any media 
source would make a difference for them.  For example, in Minya, Interviewee F 
explained, "I knew information from people I trusted and knew how they think 
because I trusted it more than media and because I had no time to spend on 
media and leave my work. I am a porter so even during the uprisings I did not 
stop working" (F, 2018 in Minya). Similarly, also in Minya, Interviewee D 
mentioned: 
"updates about news from people I trust are important because I don’t 
have time to watch media often because of my work circumstances 
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while knowing people you trust can give you the summary of the 
updates and view needed" (D, 2018 in Minya). 
Once again, it was a mixture of societal ties and financial or time constraints 
that minimized the use of social media and led to a reliance on the social 
networks already in place. 
Another example of this reliance on  “getting information from people [they] 
know” can be seen in South Sinai. Interviewee B, from that region, explained: 
"the tribal tradition we have passes on information to the members of the tribe 
and it gets passed on through their families so information through the circle 
surrounding us is enough" (B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
 
The difference between both areas is that Minya has less of  a tribal nature and 
tougher financial circumstances than South Sinai. As such, in Minya, the reliance 
on trusted individuals within social circle is based on ease, limited time to 
consume media as a result of financial constraints, and concision. On the other 
hand, South Sinai’s tribal nature (and the tribal nature of the neighbouring 
regions) means that this kind of hierarchical passing of information is cultural, 
rather than situational. In both cases however, the result was the same: 
interviewees, for the most part, trusted their social connections more than any 
other form of media, and relied on these social connections for news. 
 
Another important piece of evidence gathered from the interviews conducted is 
the fact that none of those interviewed who were older than 50 years had used the 
Internet before the 2011 uprisings, which means that the high level of 
participation in the uprisings was not determined by social media networks, as 
stated by several researchers in the field whom we have already mentioned 
throughout this thesis. Instead, their high level of political interaction and 
participation was once again determined by their social groups and especially by 
the local leaders who had the power to move their people and make them act. For 
example, Interviewee H in Qalyoubia, an influential female who was a part of 
parliament member’s family and supported him politically, explained: 
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"during parliamentary elections prior 2011 and after as well I always 
spent time with people that live in my neighborhood to explain to them 
the benefits of voting and who is the suitable candidate in the area 
because they trusted me and did not necessarily understand all the 
aspects related to the elections so sometimes needed guidance and 
explanation" (H, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Also, Interviewee B in South Sinai, stated, 
"during elections I had to collaborate with people in our community to 
explain to them the benefits and logic of any rotations for 
parliamentary elections happening so even the coming up generations 
understand why things happen this way in our tribal community" (B, 
2018 in South Sinai). 
So, once again, in the rural areas researched the power of social ties was 
greater than any form of media, social media or any other information channel. 
The rural citizens of Menoufia and Qalyoubia were, indeed, more politically 
interactive and participated much more in the uprisings, because they were more 
concerned about the financial and security problems. South Sinai’s citizens, as 
just discussed, were not as involved because their tribal form of organisation 
protected them more from the financial crisis and created a systemized form of 
culture, while in terms of politics they had different members from various 
families acting (on a rotating basis) as representatives of their community in 
relation to the official institutions of the state.  
Regardless of these differences in circumstance, one commonality among 
interviewees of the four studied regions was that they wanted to show how much 
they knew about politics and had tried participating through informal political 
acts prior to 2011; this is because they feel there has been no focus on their role in 
such an important event in the history of Egypt. This is particularly significant 
given that this political involvement occurred in a time where national elections 
were considered as having no real impact or value and, as such, any successful act 
of informal political involvement was rare. In Qalyoubia, Interviewee C 
explained, "even before 2011 people tried protesting about their needs; however 
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there was never the intensity that would make a difference because of the political 
apathy people were feeling" (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia). In Menoufia, Interviewee H 
stated, 
"I participated in some protests when something impacted our area - 
such as the mobile towers - but it was not covered immensely by 
media, so it did not necessarily reach the people and officials in the 
urban centers to make a difference" (H, 2018 in Menoufia). 
In Minya, Interviewee E mentioned, "the lack of infrastructure we live in 
compared to other areas of Egypt hindered us from spending time on 
participating in politics but did not mean we did not want to or were not aware of 
the updates" (E, 2018 in Minya). In South Sinai, Interviewee F said, 
"South Sinai is a governorate engaged in politics ever since years 
because of its volatility and situation, which makes the citizens in 
South Sinai very aware of the importance of politics and interacting 
into it. But we first needed to secure our politics in terms of stabilising 
South Sinai before anything else" (F, 2018 in South Sinai). 
These comments all highlight an interest in political participation, and a 
motivation to attempt to change the status quo. However, depending on the 
governorate, different concerns arise. In Qalyoubia and Menoufia, as shown by 
the previous interviewee comments, it was a matter of not having enough reach or 
media coverage to enact that change. For Minya, political involvement was 
limited by infrastructure but this did not limit residents of that region from being 
as politically informed as possible. The same awareness of the “importance of 
politics” can be seen in South Sinai, though in their case security concerns limited 
engagement. All of this highlights that politics, and political interaction, was of 
prime importance in these regions. However, a common comment was that lack 
of media coverage and local limitations hindered the ability of rural citizens to 
successfully make the changes they desired. Despite this, political activity was 
considered of the utmost importance, as highlighted by these interviewees. No 
interviewee disputed that politics was important.  
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Moreover, this is borne out in secondary data, where researchers in the field 
have discussed on numerous occasions a sort of tradition or pattern concerning 
the protests in the rural areas of Egypt prior to the 2011 uprisings. These 
researchers assert that this behaviour actually could have been part of the build up 
of anger towards the ruling regime more than one would expect (Nour, 2015; 
Saad, 2016). In particular, small farmers called “fellahin” had a crucial role in the 
course and development of the 2011 uprisings, which form the majority of rural 
citizens in Qalyoubia and Menoufia. However, as previously mentioned, the 
geographic, safety and cultural complications of analysing this, as well as the 
stereotypes of the ‘passive or indolent peasant’  limit one’s ability to fully rely on 
this. (Scott, 1985; Fegan, 1986; Adas, 1986). 
However, the tradition of protests in rural Egypt - discussed in the previous 
chapter - was demonstrated in the various analyses of data presented in this thesis 
to show how citizens in rural areas were concerned politically about the country 
even prior to social media usage or popularity. In the interviews done for this 
thesis, patterns showed the fact that in Menoufia and Qalyoubia in particular, the 
people have always had a great political sense, being characterised by strong 
relationships within their social groups. On one hand, they proved not to be 
particularly interested in the information presented by social media, especially in 
the above 50 years age bracket, and on the other hand their access to social media 
in particular was quite restricted due to mainly infrastructure and financial 
barriers. Besides young people, most interviewees from the rural areas had never 
used the Internet and social media channels of information before the uprisings, 
yet they had been active and participated in various ways, formal and informal. 
The urbanisation changes that their societies suffered because of the so-called 
democratic political strategy of Mubarak’s Egypt affected them at various levels. 
They did not have the same access to the land as before; they were forced to pay 
higher fees to rent the land; and they suffered numerous humiliations concerning 
access to basic human needs, such as having a decent infrastructure or even 
drinking water. These hard times made them protest several times, long before the 
2011 uprisings, creating a path, even a sort of tradition, in protesting against the 
unfair political regime (Saad, 2016). 
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This motivation of rural Egyptians to be politically involved continued into the 
2011 uprisings. A study conducted by Refaei (2012) presents statistics that show 
rural Egyptians were quite active on a daily basis during the uprising, even 
though many of them did not actually directly participate in the events. In this 
study, it was shown that the difference between the involvement of urban and 
rural citizens - 53.2% and 47.5% respectively - was negligible, despite rural 
citizens having high barriers such as limited Internet, geographic limitations, and 
restrictions due to infrastructural and financial issues (Refaei, 2012). A more 
detailed study investigating informal participation in political life, especially 
during the 2011 uprisings, reveals the factors that prompted citizens to get 
involved in the events. A very important aspect of the following image is 
represented by the involvement and engagement percentages of the rural 
population. Even though their access to the Internet was much more limited in 
comparison to the citizens living in the urban areas, the degree of their 
involvement was bigger. Figures show that, for almost every particular aspect 
investigated by the researchers, the percentage was higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas in almost every instance (Refaei, 2012). For example, researchers 
found that rural areas were more active than their urban counterparts in terms of 
discussing politics, social networking regarding politics, protest participation, and 
participation in sit-ins or acts of civil disobedience. This engagement can be seen 
in formal political participation also, with increases seen in membership of 
political parties. For example, the Tagamo party - a socialist party in Egypt - saw 
membership increase by more than double, with Interviewee G from Qalyoubia 
stating that "the amount of members in the Tagamo Party increased from 2000 
members in Qalyoubia to 5000 members" (G, 2018 in Qalyoubia), which serves 
as an example of rural Egypt’s consistently high level of participation and 
involvement.  
6.4. Social Capital and the Context of Political Participation in Rural 
Egypt 
The 2011 uprisings undoubtedly had an effect on political participation in 
Egypt, particularly rural Egypt. This is strongly related to the social capital of 
rural Egypt, and the effect on this social capital by the success of a political act as 
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significant as the ending of a 30-year dictatorial regime. Concerns that had 
existed prior to 2011 - political apathy, political isolation between governorates, 
disinterest in national politics - were all affected by the success of the uprisings. 
This effect can be seen clearly in interviewee data. For example, when discussing 
political isolation between governorates, interviewees in all four regions had 
continuously made comments consistent with the idea that “voting for the 
candidate [they] know the most, with a history in politics and knowing [their] 
land, is the most appropriate decision for the way rural people live and think.” 
This comment, made by Interviewee B, in Qalyoubia is one which other 
interviewees across all four governorates have agreed (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
This viewpoint was centred around the idea that each governorate had unique 
problems based on their social, political, and economic conditions; these 
problems could in turn only be solved by someone who was aware of these social, 
political, and economic conditions. Those outside a governorate were viewed as 
strangers and almost insignificant to the political and personal lives of rural 
citizens. In the aftermath of 2011, however, this began to change. Social 
connections were still vital - and remained the most important factor in politics - 
but an acceptance grew of Egyptians outside of each region. This was based on 
the idea that governorates shared common concerns. The realization that this was 
the case had a positive effect by decreasing feelings of isolation and increasing 
levels of communication between governorates. While this did not always lead to 
agreement between individuals communicating across governorates, it is 
important in the sense that it highlights the idea that social media played a role in 
increasing communication and involvement between governorates. This, in turn, 
increased interest in national politics and political participation at the national 
level. 
For example, Interviewee K in Qalyoubia, mentioned: "Regardless of any 
changes in the media environment...after 2011 discussing voting and politics 
became more common with people you do not know as much" (K, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia).  
Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee H, stated: 
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"Because all families know each other by reputation not necessarily 
each person voting is mainly based on social agreements before 2011 
and until now even when it has been more common to discuss voting 
with people not in your social circle after 2011 and 2013 uprisings" 
(H, 2018 in Menoufia).  
In Minya, Interviewee D explained: 
"In the end, voting is mainly based on social aspects rather than 
political campaigns, although these campaigns have increased after 
the uprisings and led to discussions about politics with strangers more 
than prior to 2011" (D, 2018 in Minya).   
While in South Sinai, Interviewee B, mentioned: 
"People always vote here based on the agreements between head of 
tribes and their family members since years till now; even after 2011 
when it was more common to discuss politics with people you do not 
know necessarily personally" (B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
Complementing this, it has also been shown that the 2011 uprisings generated 
discussions, debates and different forms of online and offline discussion among 
many Egyptian families on a daily basis that did not occur to the same extent 
prior to the 2011 uprisings. This shows that the collective perception of the 
citizens had been impacted upon and had shifted due to the 2011 uprisings. 
Clearly, the quotes just mentioned highlight the fact that discussion of politics 
with strangers became a more common phenomenon following 2011, and that this 
phenomenon included rural citizens. Moreover, the amount of time discussing 
politics in general increased to sometimes almost every day, which had not been 
the case prior to 2011. Interviewee B in South Sinai asserted that they had 
"reached the point that [they] gathered on a daily basis as a family to discuss the 
uprisings during the 18 days of protesting at Tahrir Square" (B, 2018 in South 
Sinai). Interviewees H and C in Qalyoubia agreed (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia; H, 2018 
in Qalyoubia). 
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However, it is clear that citizens of Minya and Menoufia - governorates with 
less financial stability - were not spending as much time discussing politics with 
strangers. This can be seen in the statement made by Interviewee D in Minya that 
“it is just easier to stick to what is more familiar and not spend much time on 
finding who is best because the needs of life are too demanding to focus on other 
issues,” as well as in the statement of Menoufia’s Interviewee H that “sometimes 
change may not be the best decision and people are exhausted with work, to 
cover their needs, so prefer sticking to the option they are more familiar with” (D, 
2018 in Minya; H, 2018 in Menoufia). In both these examples, the interviewees 
are referencing participation in the form of discussion within their social group as 
being ‘easier’ and ‘more familiar’, as well as implying that it is less ‘demanding’. 
This is in contrast to South Sinai and Qalyoubia, which did discuss politics, and 
more often. Minya’s citizens, as previously mentioned, experienced insecurity 
that caused them to focus more on their financial needs, while Menoufia’s 
citizens migrated to other areas on a daily basis and were exhausted more than 
citizens of the same status in Qalyoubia and South Sinai.  
However, by the 2013 uprisings, and during Morsi’s presidency, citizens in all 
these areas relied on informal political participation centered on online and 
offline discussion much more than they had during the 2011 uprisings; by 2013, it 
was something they had adapted to and were more accustomed to engaging in. 
This is evidence of a growth in social capital both internal to rural Egypt and in 
terms of the relationship rural Egyptians had with those outside their areas. 
Moreover, the strengthened social capital and increased informal political 
participation had the effect of “bridging”  (Hawkins and Maurer, 2009) and other 
theorists of the concept. In essence, in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings and 
certainly by the time of the 2013 uprisings, the local social capital of rural Egypt 
had expanded to include areas outside of one’s local geographic region. This 
expansion led to increased input in formal and informal political involvement at 
the national level; one example of this (in terms of increased formal participation) 
can be seen in the increased interest in presidential elections since, unlike 
previously, the cultural and geographic gaps between rural and urban became 
blurred. The local social capital of rural Egypt had, in effect, expanded to include 
other citizens who were once considered “strangers”. As a consequence, political 
195 
involvement was no longer fully rooted solely in the idea that each governorate 
was separate. The cohesion and push for a common cause that existed in the 
aftermath of 2011 had led to the formation of a relationship between the 
governorates, which is related to the expansion of the local form of social capital 
to include those outside of the region. It is important to consider this in the 
context of 2011 and the viewpoint of rural Egyptians at that time.  
While this increased interest in presidential and national politics had an effect 
on formal participation, namely in terms of increased voting in 2011 as 
previously discussed, there was also a large element of informal political 
participation at the national level. People’s perception of politics prior to 2011 
was quite different than it was in the aftermath of the uprisings; the main reason 
for not getting involved in the 2011 uprisings was the fact that citizens did not 
believe that they could change anything in the political sphere at the national or 
presidential level. Their political apathy - revealed by answers that indicated there 
was “lack of time” or that they had “no interest in politics” - reflects the 30-year 
influence that the dictatorial Mubarak regime had on Egyptians. This affected 
involvement in informal political acts, but could also be seen in the low voting 
rates that existed prior to 2011. Outside of interviewee data, this political apathy 
has been studied to find similar results (Erle et al., 2012). When asked about their 
motivation for non-participation in protest and other forms of informal political 
acts, 23% asserted their disinterest in politics, an equal number stated that they 
had no time, while the remainder expressed fears of personal safety or the belief 
that it would not have any effect. Only 7% of those asked expressed disagreement 
with the aims of the protests or the manner of self-expression (Erle, et al., 2012). 
This highlights that, prior to the 2011 uprisings, political apathy was higher and 
was based primarily on a sense of powerlessness to enact change. The success of 
the 2011 uprisings changed this, sparking an increase in informal political 
participation by the time of the 2013 uprising.  
Political apathy, seen in the previously-mentioned interviews, was obviously 
clear for the less financially stable in Menoufia and Minya more than South Sinai 
and Qalyoubia (D, 2018 in Minya; H, 2018 in Menoufia). Clearly, after the 2011 
uprisings, in all the rural areas people started being more open about discussing 
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politics openly with people that they did not speak to about this topic before. 
However, as time passed, political apathy decreased and, by the time the 2013 
uprising began, rural citizens were encouraged to participate more than in 2011. 
This is because they felt that 2011 proved that they could change the regime. 
However, based on the previous quotes, it is clear that political apathy exists 
more in Minya and Menoufia with citizens that have less financial stability than 
the other areas due to insecurity and exhaustion of citizens previously mentioned.  
Another important study that investigated almost the same characteristics 
concerning the level of participation in the 2011 uprisings, revealed that almost a 
fifth of the population did not tolerate any form of public demonstrations against 
the government. This group mainly consisted of people that represented the 
extremities of the society: the lowest and the highest socio-economic classes. On 
the other hand, those in the middle class were the most engaged in the protests 
and demonstrations. What is truly important for this thesis is the fact that, 
although the rural citizens had limited access to social media, the percentage of 
those who had never participated in informal political events, and did not see the 
need for them was lower than that in the urban area: for rural citizens, this was 
6.2% compared to 8.4% for urban Egyptians (Refaei, 2012). This demonstrates 
the power of social capital that exists in the rural areas of Egypt that was focused 
on in interviews. The interview data supports this view that rural people were 
used to socialising, creating strong relationships, counting on each other, getting 
the latest news from one another, and basically gathering together for any 
situation. Interviewee B from Qalyoubia, mentioned: "social relationships 
between people and families in Qalyoubia is very important" (B, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). Interviewee A from South Sinai, explained: "the tribal nature and 
structure in our areas forces families to socialize together and collaborate on 
decisions with regards to the community" (A, 2018 in South Sinai). This affected 
formal participation as much as it did informal participation. This was obvious 
from the interviews, especially when interviewees explained the manner in which 
they decided whom to vote for. The quotes below show that formal political 
involvement - regardless of whether the voting regional, parliamentary, or 
national presidential elections - had its basis in social ties and the relationships of 
rural citizens.  
197 
For example, in Qalyoubia, interviews concluded the meaning in the following 
words: 
Interviewee A noted that "regardless of political campaigns in the end voting 
was based on social connections" (A, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee B stated that, 
 "heads of big families agreed on who to vote for and then the head of 
each family explained the benefit to his family whether for the 
parliamentary elections or presidential elections mainly after 2011" 
(B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee J remarked that, 
"even if I did not want to vote for the same candidate as my family just 
for the change in the end I knew that this candidate knew more about 
the area so it is more suitable to vote for him" (J, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee C mentioned: "all voting was based on 
social connections; this is a fact and I don’t know if people want to change it" C, 
2018 in Menoufia). 
Interviewee H explained: "social connections affected all elections. Even when 
it was presidential elections, if the parliamentary candidate is supporting a 
certain candidate for the presidential elections it had an influence on rural 
citizens" H, 2018 in Menoufia).  
Interviewee I, stated: "when new candidates started running for parliamentary 
elections they needed social consent by the big families in the area so the people 
vote for them or either they would not win" (I, 2018 in Menoufia).  
In South Sinai, Interviewee A, explained: "It is simple as agreeing on who to 
vote for when based on tribal consents" (A, 2018 in South Sinai). 
Similarly, Interviewee B, mentioned: "even when there were some Muslim 
Brotherhood followers or supporters they resembled a small percentage in South 
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Sinai and voting was mainly according to the agreements made by the head of 
tribes. It is the tradition" (B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
While in Minya, Interviewee C, stated: "people either voted for the familiar 
candidate because that is how our needs get answered or just don’t vote if they 
feel there is no need" (C, 2018 in Minya).  
Also, Interviewee F, explained: "voting based on social connections and 
cultural attachment to the area makes more sense in areas that are conservative 
like Minya because they will understand the norms of each family" (F, 2018 in 
Minya).  
This data highlights the strength of rural Egypt’s social capital as it existed. 
However, it is also clear that the social capital being highlighted here is the local 
form of social capital as previously discussed and defined in this chapter, as 
opposed to the conventional global definition. Citizens in these areas are 
convinced that voting based on personal connections and social ties is safer and 
more appropriate in these areas, and that it leads to greater representation. This 
was especially the case, according to interviewees, when considering the unique 
challenges of each region and the tailored knowledge that a candidate from the 
region would have when compared to a candidate without history in the region. 
For example, in Qalyoubia, Interviewee F, explained, 
"the difference between a representative in the area with a history to 
one without is that they understand how land ownership has changed 
over the years and the origins of families to be able to understand 
their mentality and, based upon that, deal with issues if there are any" 
(F, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Similarly, in South Sinai, Interviewee B noted that 
"the rotation of candidates based on the tribe’s turn in the area 
ensures safety and working together for the best of the area - which is 
in a fragile situation - rather than voting on an unexpected basis" (B, 
2018 in South Sinai). 
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In both instances, the unique challenges of the region are relevant to the voting 
patterns, and the social aspect of voting addresses these challenges in some 
fashion. As a result, voting patterns typically adjust in rural Egypt to address 
social and societal history as opposed to political considerations such as 
campaigns or ideas. In contrast, the conventional definition of  strong social 
capital is based on political considerations only, and does not address social 
connections and societal ties. Political considerations, in this sense, refers to an 
understanding of politics that is related to decision-making based on political 
campaigning and objective, uncoerced or conventional voting. The local social 
capital of rural Egypt shares the fact that it is uncoerced; however, its difference 
lies in the importance it places on social connections to the region, societal ties, 
and the tailored knowledge that only exists if one has family history in the region. 
This is, of course, only possible because of the importance placed in rural Egypt 
on parliamentary elections; as previously discussed, presidential elections prior to 
the 2011 uprisings were not considered to be as significant to addressing the 
needs of citizens since the issues faced by rural citizens were ones that they 
considered unique to their areas, rather than the nation as a whole. As such, these 
interviews highlight that the local social capital of rural Egypt is both strong in 
the sense that it is uncoerced and based on the society’s viewpoint that voting in 
this manner will prove advantage, and unique to the historical and social 
environment of the region.  
  
In any case, it is clear that this form of gathering together and systematically 
organizing as if it is a set protocol is a major characteristic of the rural areas. It 
demonstrates that social media did not have a particularly big impact, a view that 
is emphasised by many researchers that have already been presented in this thesis, 
because these rural individuals did not need any outside impulse to act. They 
were accustomed to acting together, due to the strong familial, social, and cultural 
bonds that naturally arise in these rural areas, and which interviewees in this 
thesis have already highlighted to be of high importance. Even the actual physical 
participation in the uprisings events revealed that the urban population were 
engaged to a greater extent primarily due to geographical reasons: the actual 
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events took place in urban centres, especially in the capital of Egypt. The degree 
of involvement in rural areas when compared to urban centres must be analysed 
with this taken into consideration. Participation, if defined as presence in the 
protest sites, may lead to the assumption that urban residents were more involved. 
This, however, is not the case when one takes into consideration all forms of 
political participation, as well as the unique limitations - geographical and 
otherwise - faced by rural citizens.  In Qalyoubia, Interviewee D, mentioned, 
"I knew people that worked in Cairo and were not able to vote 
because they did not have time to leave work in Cairo and make it to 
voting in the voting center they are registered in according to the ID" 
(D, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, Interviewee K stated 
"it was hard to make it to voting although I wanted to during some of 
the elections after the 2011 uprisings because my work was not where 
I was registered and sometimes roads were not safe after the hectic 
times since 2011 to go and come on the same day for work" (K, 2018 
in Menoufia). 
In Minya, Interviewee B said "[he] wanted to vote but at some times the roads 
were blocked to where [he] needed to vote because of the infrastructure updates 
needed to be done since years" (B, 2018 in Minya). In South Sinai, Interviewee 
A, said, "After 2011 it was not safe to live in South Sinai for my family and I 
moved to Cairo which made voting every time hard because of the distance as 
well to South Sinai" (A, 2018 in South Sinai).  These examples all show a 
commonality in the sense that geographic limitations - combined with security 
and safety concerns related to the roads in the aftermath of 2011 - severely 
limited physical engagement. As a result, the assumption that urban citizens were 
more involved is erroneous if this is not taken into consideration.  
However, if we take into consideration the degree of political involvement in 
terms of the desire of people to get informed, discuss events, express opinions, 
plus the effort made to go from home to the protest or voting centres, the rural 
population demonstrated a greater level of political engagement in comparison 
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with the urban population. Studies have shown this to be the case: in regards to 
engagement through discussion, the rural population were at 39.1% compared to 
the urban population’s 31.9%. Similarly, regarding demonstrations, it was 62.7% 
rural compared to 59.6% urban, and for actions against state institutions and 
symbols, it was 90.9% in rural areas compared to 59.5% in urban areas (Refaei, 
2012). This is due to the social capital power present in the rural areas. Thus, it is 
clear that access to social media, or the lack thereof, did not in fact hinder 
political involvement in rural Egypt and that, moreover, political interaction was 
strongly related to the social capital of the regions. Unlike urban areas, rural 
Egypt was less ideally situated for protest and yet still managed to engage and 
systematically organize. As such, social capital aided the involvement of rural 
Egypt despite geographic, communication, and information constraints that did 
not exist (or existed to a lesser degree) in the urban centres that housed the protest 
sites.  
6.5. Social Ties, Forms of Political Participation, & The Effect of the 2011 
Uprisings 
Egypt’s political scene suffered dramatic changes during, and after, the 2011 
uprising. After President Mubarak’s resignation, people continued their massive 
protest, asking for an end to the oppressive and dictatorial regime. Having their 
epicentre in Tahrir Square of Cairo, the uprising had an unprecedented force and 
united many people with a common goal (Refaei, 2012). 
This common goal was a reversal of policies that stemmed from the failures 
and inconsistencies within the Mubarak regime in the preceding years. While 
acting as a democratic leader in the eyes of his international counterparts through 
his concessions allowing a number of small political liberties such as minor 
factory worker protests, minor criticisms, and the occasional disagreement on his 
decision-making, Mubarak simultaneously attempted to disrupt and weaken the 
social ties that existed in Egypt. This can be seen through his refusal to legalize 
protesting, his limitations on formal participation in the form of restricting the 
right to start political parties, as well as the fear engendered by the nation’s 
security forces through consistent arrests, interrogations, torture, and 
imprisonment. However, this dual role ultimately led to the situation that 
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hastened the end of his regime. The democratic facade opened a space - 
inadvertently - for a variety of youth movements and activities on behalf of civil 
society. These movements - prime examples being the Kefaya Movement that 
was formed in 2004, the “April 6 Movement” that was formed in 2008, and the 
“We are All Khaled Said” Facebook group - managed to exist almost unnoticed 
and breach state security as a result. As has been previously mentioned, they 
united people of very different political interests and orientations, and their 
consistent calls for political changes inspired people to create other groups, even 
in cases where they were not successful, thereby causing a shift in the collective 
consciousness. Examples of these smaller groups include “March 9 Movement”, 
“Youth Movement for Justice” or “Workers for Change”. All these groups started 
to meet each other and they discovered that they had very similar interests and 
grievances; they also realised that they had an enormous potential to succeed 
when acting in unison, as a bigger movement, rather than as smaller independent 
units. Essentially, their meetings revealed to them that they could make a real 
impact only by acting together (Refaei, 2012), which helped in creating the micro 
public sphere. This enabled them to create a bridge over the political regime and 
to gain support from many people, who could organise private meetings to 
exchange ideas, plan, and mobilise. 
It became evident through these groups that the discussions on social, 
economic and political issues could actually lead to changes in these areas if 
organized and directed in a more deliberate fashion. The studies in the field show 
that political values and norms of the protests that took place in Egypt in 2011 
have to be regarded as a whole. First of all, in terms of the demands that gathered 
thousands of people together, under the same goal. Second of all, it is in terms of 
the common values shared by those involved in informal political acts and by the 
youth movements. Thirdly, it is in terms of how all these have reflected on the 
Egyptian society after the uprisings (Joya, 2011). 
Outside of this, however, there is also the matter of how this interest relates to 
social media. On one hand, it is normal to assume that informal political 
participation was closely related to online activity, and that those engaged in 
these acts found themselves a lot more involved in the facts, news and 
203 
information that took place in the online environment in terms of engagement and 
awareness. On the other hand, due to the limited access to the Internet in the rural 
areas the fact that they were still involved in revolutionary action to such a high 
level is astonishing. This is evident in a particular study related to online activity 
and informal political engagement. In this study, it was shown that only 8% of the 
average citizens followed blogs, and that only 28% of those engaged in informal 
political acts did the same (Erle et al., 2012). This highlights that the majority of 
informal political participation may not, in fact, have been based on online 
activity. This fact can be explained by the theory of Murdoch and Putnam who 
have stressed that the level of cooperation in the rural, agrarian and tribal 
communities had always been higher due to small social groups sharing and 
exchanging social capital when gathering together (Murdoch, 2000). In fact, these 
small social groups operated as their own proto micro-public sphere since they 
allowed for the discussion and exchange of information, in an uncoerced 
environment, relating to politics as well as social and economic issues that the 
citizens found relevant.  
For example, in South Sinai, Interviewee A explained, 
"The tribal nature of South Sinai, due to the fact that each tribe lives 
in a certain part of the desert because they know the part they live in 
best, means that all tribes have to connect with each other and agree 
on a plan for the leading tribe for a current time frame. In this way, 
the leading tribe rotates every few years. The leading tribe is the tribe 
that provides the member of parliament who runs for elections for 
during that time frame so we know who is winning in advance because 
we believe this is the best way to live in security in Sinai; it is very 
close to many borders of other countries which makes it a volatile 
area" (A, 2018 in South Sinai).  
This internal cooperation exists in a different form in Qalyoubia. For example, 
when interviewing Interviewee B, a member of parliament whose brother had 
been the previous member of parliament, this interviewee received a phone call 
from his brother. In this phone call, Interviewee B was informed that a member of 
one of the families had passed away and that they had a small house; as such, it 
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was decided that Interviewee B’s own  home would be opened to the public so 
that the funeral could be held there. Moreover, because there was another funeral 
that day in another house in the area, each of the siblings would have to attend 
one of the funerals so that none of the families were upset. This was clearly a 
common incident. When asked about it during the interview, Interviewee B 
simply stated that 
“we have to help and stand with all the families in our area because 
as a member of parliament, and because of the history we have as a 
family in the area, it makes them feel better and feel like they are not 
alone during such times. We attend all weddings as well; it is our 
community from ages and my father used to do the same thing” (B, 
2018 in Qalyoubia). 
This, of course, was based on the societal ties of the region and the social 
capital within it. In the same manner that South Sinai’s Interviewee A mentioned 
that agreement was of paramount importance and everyone was aware of election 
results beforehand due to this agreement, Qalyoubia’s Interviewee B ensured that 
everyone’s needs would be met in terms of weddings, funerals, and other 
significant events. This is a form of “thick trust” that exists between an 
established social group. If the Internet had a certain contribution, then it is 
because it helped the transfer between ‘thin’ trust – which is the general trust 
between citizens of the same country or group – and the ‘thick’ trust – which is 
the trust existing between the members of a strong social group (Putnam, 2000). 
The power of social media bridged the two types of trust and created a strong 
bond between all the participants at the 2011 uprisings, even though they were 
physically or emotionally implicated. Evidently, this was one of the roles of 
social media at the time (Gibney et al., 2013). 
Referring to the interviews and studies presented which give indications 
matching the interview results among the informal participation that generated the 
uprisings, changes in the political norms had taken place to a certain extent, 
including the fact that the President resigned. However, the political system had 
not been completely changed and the political actors remained almost the same, 
even though they claimed to have different intentions, with the old values 
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remaining deeply rooted in the larger political scene and even in the larger 
majority of the population. For example, some families involved in politics that 
dealt with the previous regimes changed the head of the family to someone 
younger to give the impression that they are supporting the change as well. For 
example, Interviewee I from Qalyoubia, explained: "Saif family has always been 
in the parliament and after 2011 uprisings they changed the candidate for the 
parliament from their family to prove that they believe in change like the 
uprisings" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
It is not necessarily the case that changing the candidate is in fact real change 
because it is the same family; rather, this was seen as a public change to match 
the change happening in the country. The studies and the statistics showed that 
Egyptians could be highly involved in the local problems and that they are able to 
change things at a local and national level. Their informal political participation 
created a space for local mobilisation that led to bigger events and to further 
formal participation in political life (Friedman, 2011; B, 2018 in Qalyoubia; B, 
2018 in South Sinai) not because of social media only but the event as a whole.  
The interviews that have been done for this study revealed the fact that the 
rural population was less involved in informal political participation, such as 
social media activities or in discussions about media and television information, 
because most of these people relied on the information they were receiving from 
their social circles. Once again, it was the social ties that proved stronger than any 
other form of communication and information, as existing because of the social 
capital in the region. Nevertheless, if we only compare the actual number of 
people participating in the protests from the rural and urban areas, we can 
conclude that the urban population was less involved, because if we regard the 
statistics, the percentages of informal participation in the rural areas was greater 
than that in the urban areas. The rural citizens proved to have a greater political 
sense than their urban counterparts, even though their level of media exposure 
was lower in a very significant way. According to the interviews, their informal 
participation in political life is less traceable, because it consisted more in family 
gathering and discussions between closed groups. It is essentially operated as a 
proto micro-public sphere that relied on live communication and discussion. 
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Moreover, the interview patterns showed that people aged 50 and over do not 
trust social media directly and instead rely on their social circles to get the latest 
news and television, due to cultural attachment to television for the older age. For 
example, Interviewee H in Qalyoubia mentioned, 
"I am aware that social media has become important for people 
around me and relatives that are younger than me but maybe my 
generation made it harder psychologically to rely on it because I was 
not used to this form of media. However, I asked younger relatives if 
something on social media was found that was not on traditional 
media because I did not feel that all information on social media was 
accurate" (H, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
However, in the interviews done we interviewed as well people over 60 years 
old, which had the same belief except if they were strong opponents of the 
Mubarak regime. For example, Interviewee C - a resident of Qalyoubia who had 
been involved in politics for decades with a strong opposition to the Mubarak 
regime, and who had run, and lost, against the incumbent in the parliamentary 
elections - explained, "Social media was a very important form of media that 
helped me in expressing my political views that was hard to express on 
traditional media even prior to 2011 uprisings because it was opposing 
Mubarak’s regime" (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia). These circles rely, in turn, on their 
local leaders who they trust, follow and respect. People aged 50 and above 
preferred to get their news from their social circles or from the other younger 
family members who had access to the Internet and other media information – 
they did not use these sources of information themselves.  
6.6. Social Capital & Formal Participation in the Aftermath of the 2011 
Uprisings 
While the informal political involvement had been largely used during 
Mubarak’s presidency and during the 2011 uprising, even though it was 
considered illegal, there were also some forms of formal political participation, 
such as the presidential or parliamentary elections. In terms of the presidential 
elections, the view rural Egyptians had prior to the uprisings was very much 
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negative. The assumption was that it did not have an impact on the results and, as 
such, was not significant. However, according to Refaei (2012), this changed 
after 2011 and rural Egyptians began to view voting as more important. The view 
that voting lacked significance prior to 2011, and that it would begin to have an 
impact in the aftermath of the uprisings, is borne out in the interview data 
conducted in this thesis.  
For example, Interviewee E in Minya explained, " presidential voting before 
2011 did not necessarily make a difference in the political outcome yet it started 
impacting political results after the 2011 uprisings"(E, 2018 in Minya). 
In Qalyoubia, Interviewee H stated, 
"voting in the parliamentary elections has always been a major event 
in Qalyoubia, yet not presidential elections because before 2011 the 
outcome was known anyway. However, after 2011 people were 
encouraged to participate more in presidential elections than before 
because they felt change could start happening"(H, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia).  
In Menoufia, Interviewee J mentioned, "I was more encouraged to vote after 
2011 in presidential elections because I felt my vote could make a difference, 
unlike prior to 2011"(J, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Finally, in South Sinai, Interviewee D explained, 
"I always voted for parliamentary elections even before 2011 but not 
necessarily for presidential elections except after 2011 because it 
seemed like it was different in its relevance compared to before 
2011"(D, 2018 in South Sinai).   
These are the effects of a dictatorial regime that makes people act with apathy 
and ignorance when it comes to any political action. After Mubarak’s resignation, 
the 2011 uprisings made Egyptians overcome their fear and become more aware 
of their political rights. For instance, people continued the protest even after 
Mubarak resigned, and they have continued to create social movements and to get 
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involved in different political parties, some of them created during the 2011 
uprisings (Nasser, 2010). Moreover, given the increased communication that 
arose between regions because of the uprisings, it seems as though the idea of 
making a difference on the national level began to arise as well. For example, in 
Qalyoubia, Interviewee I explained, "Social media gave me a chance to 
understand different perspectives about politics with people I did not know and 
were from different parts of Egypt"(I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). In Menoufia, 
Interviewee H, mentioned, 
"The awareness that happened about politics in discussion between 
strangers gave me a chance to start discussing politics with people 
from other governorates not just people in my social culture and 
circle"(H, 2018 in Menoufia). 
In Minya, Interviewee A said, "Discussing politics or at least hearing about it 
from people with different backgrounds after the uprisings exposed me to a 
different experience about politics" (A, 2018 in Minya). In South Sinai, 
Interviewee E, explained, "As a citizen with a different cultural background to 
other Egyptians in different areas being able to engage through different forms of 
media gave me an additional perspective" (E, 2018 in South Sinai).   
One interesting facet of the previously-mentioned data lies in the consistent 
iteration that parliamentary elections, unlike their presidential counterparts prior 
to 2011, did matter. In rural areas such as the ones focused on in this thesis, 
parliamentary elections were not superficial events because of the social capital 
culture in these areas that led people to become very concerned about voting for 
the head of family they trust the most and believe in. They feel that, at least in 
their specific territory, they can have their say. Due to this strong local social 
capital, Mubarak’s regime regularly attempted to locate and co-opt the strong 
heads of families in the rural areas, since they were aware of the relationship and 
trust that existed between these family heads and the citizens of their areas. By 
co-opting these key individuals, who would have won their parliamentary 
elections regardless of the regime’s support, the Mubarak regime made it appear 
as though they had reached a majority in parliament under the ruling regime’s 
party. This in turn made it appear, to citizens of rural Egypt, as though voting in 
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parliamentary elections made a difference to the governance of the state and 
created a kind of connection between the regime and the citizens of rural Egypt. It 
is interesting that this policy was based on necessity; given the importance of 
social connections and social capital in these areas, as this thesis has discussed in 
great detail, it would have been difficult (if not impossible) for the Mubarak 
regime to successfully appoint anyone other than these key family heads. (C, 
2018 in Qalyoubia; G, 2018 in Menoufia) 
For example, in Qalyoubia, Interviewee K, mentioned:  
"I always participated in the parliamentary elections because it 
affected our day to day life in the area we are living in and I always 
chose those I was familiar with regardless of the campaign" (K, 2018 
in Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, Interviewee L, explained: 
"Since politics on the bigger scale was hard to affect at least I had to 
vote for the parliamentary elections because they can represent our 
needs with the government and if we choose someone we are not 
familiar with and their family representing us becomes much harder 
in terms of understanding our needs. Our parliament candidate must 
be living with us not just from Menoufia and has money and based in 
Cairo because they will never understand our needs"(L, 2018 in 
Menoufia).  
In Minya, Interviewee F stated: 
"Our parliamentary candidate is the only hope we have because even 
if they are not great they will definitely be better than the government 
so I always make sure I attend the parliamentary elections" (F, 2018 
in Minya).  
In South Sinai, Interviewee E, said: 
"Before the elections we pretty much know who is our parliamentary 
candidate and I prefer being in connection with them because through 
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our interconnected relatives and families since we are a small 
population it is best we support the candidate so when a day comes 
and I need him"(E, 2018 in South Sinai). 
  Thus it is clear, from both the interviewee data and the Mubarak regime’s 
policy of co-opting rural members of parliament into the ruling party, that 
political involvement in rural Egypt was considered highly significant. As such, 
parliamentary elections were not superficial affairs. In fact, the high level of 
political involvement in rural Egypt required the Mubarak regime to adjust to the 
realities of this strong emphasis on parliamentary elections in order to 
successfully maintain a parliamentary majority without causing strife between the 
state and the citizens of rural Egypt who placed great importance on which 
individual from their area was present in parliament. This is due to the social ties 
and resulting localised social capital of these regions. This local social capital 
meant that rural citizens placed great value on their parliamentary representative 
as their voice for representing “[their] needs to the government.” Nevertheless, 
unlike parliamentary elections, presidential elections were mainly superficial 
events presented to the population because, during those pre-2011 years, there 
was only one presidential candidate and only one political party. This led to the 
view that voting would have no effect.  
The knowledge that this was the case clearly affected political involvement. 
For example, as previously mentioned, the 2005 presidential elections involved 
multiple candidates, but citizens regarded this with suspicion and voter 
participation was low as a result (Lynch, 2006). This is, of course, despite the fact 
that the Egyptian citizens identify more with formal politics, as presented by 
Refaei (2012) and borne out in their actions regarding parliamentary elections. 
However, the 2011 uprisings affected this, both decreasing that level of suspicion 
and distrust as well as highlighting that Egyptians, while identifying more with 
formal politics, were not averse to informal political acts if needed. After 2011, 
voting participation increased in line with the new viewpoint that voting at the 
national level would have more of an impact, given the results of the 2011 
uprisings. By November 2011’s elections, voting had reached an unprecedented 
76%, showing the impact that all the factors involved in the 2011 uprisings had 
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on the citizens (Erle et al., 2012). According to statistics, 79% of those involved 
in informal political acts intended to vote in the People’s Assembly elections, and 
76% of citizens in general intended the same (Erle et al., 2012). Interviewee data 
also highlights this change in the aftermath of 2011. For example, in Qalyoubia, 
all interviewees that did not vote prior to the 2011 uprisings began to vote after 
2011. In South Sinai, the same situation occurred. However, in Menoufia, 
interviewees that lived in low financial circumstances and worked far from home 
were not as motivated to participate in all elections; they would participate if their 
working circumstances allowed them. Minya was similar to Menoufia in this 
regard.   
Admittedly, as discussed, formal political participation of some rural citizens 
was lower than in the urban areas. However, this was due only to geographical 
factors in some rural areas; of course, this affected some governorates more than 
others based on distance and infrastructure. First of all, some rural citizens work 
in other governorates than their home governorate, which would not allow them a 
direct, formal participation due to the rules of the government that people had to 
vote in their home governorates. Nevertheless, these people have always had an 
interest in being informed about what happens in their country, and this political 
and civic sense was demonstrated during the 2011 uprisings as well as by the 
interview patterns presented in this thesis. The interviews for this study in the 
previous chapter showed that when accessing social media after the 2011 uprising 
or other media channels, all the interviewees were engaged only for political 
purposes, just to be updated and to have a clearer idea about what was happening 
in their country. Usually, the community leaders conducted this operation and 
then gathered people from their community to discuss the relevant updates and 
how they should represent their community in the future. This happened in all the 
rural areas covered, with only minor differences; for example, in South Sinai, this 
occurred within the confines of a tribal system whereas for Qalyoubia it was 
family leaders (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia; I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Menoufia and 
Qalyoubia which are the governorates with the biggest number of rural 
population, also proved to have the highest rate of political participation, even 
greater than the citizens from Cairo, which was the focal point of the 2011 
uprisings.  
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6.7. Conclusions 
This chapter focused its attention on what truly happened in the rural areas of 
Egypt during the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath up to 2015, with the aim of 
discovering to what extent social media and the traditional media, when 
converged, contributed to changing individual norms with regards to political 
participation. Given the fact that Egypt has more than 50% of its population 
located in rural areas, the opinions of different scholars that the uprisings were 
urban in nature or based on social media in execution can be considered as at 
least superficial, if not exaggerated. Different studies and statistics have been 
analysed from multiple perspectives and all have shown the same patterns. First 
of all, the rural areas had a tradition of gathering people in large groups to protest 
against different unjust laws, political movements or decisions affecting their 
lives. This is what researchers have theorised as the power of social capital and 
refers to the strong connection that people have created within their small groups 
formed completely distinct from the existence of any new or old media. Second, 
rural citizens have always proved to have high levels of political sense, political 
engagement and responsibility in terms of political participation. They have 
manifested their interest in many instances prior to the 2011 uprisings and 
continued to do so during and after the 2011 uprisings. Thirdly, their access to the 
Internet has always been lower than in the urban areas, due to geographical, 
financial and traditional issues which are specific to the rural areas and rural 
communities. So, taking into consideration the evidence, if Egypt is more than 
50% rural and if the rural citizens have, on the one hand, very low access to the 
Internet and, on the other hand, high political involvement prior and during the 
2011 uprisings, the contention that social media had the most important 
contribution to the uprisings is not very accurate or, at least, it does not present a 
complete picture of the events that took place. This is why the power of social 
capital has to be taken into account in order to have a complete image of what 
truly generated the 2011 Egyptian uprisings. 
In terms of social capital, this chapter has aimed to assess how social capital in 
rural Egypt affects the political interaction of citizens in the public sphere 
considering the social media access circumstances. This chapter has highlighted 
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the existence of a local definition of social capital that, while different to that 
found in the conventional global definition, has come to exist as a result of the 
unique historical, geographic, and societal realities of rural Egypt. This local 
social capital - a social capital focused primarily on the importance of social 
connections, societal ties, and a candidate’s tailored knowledge of the region as 
found to work through family history in leadership and responsibility in the area -
– limits the idea of voting solely on the basis of political considerations, 
campaigns or ideas at the local and regional levels. The importance of this local 
social capital to the political scene in Egypt can be found in the Mubarak 
regime’s attempts to co-opt local leaders into the national party, as previously 
discussed, as well as in the high involvement of rural citizens in politics prior to, 
during, and following the uprisings of 2011. However, it is important to note that 
a version of the global conventional social capital still exists in the presidential 
elections, though even this is tinged by local social capital. The uprisings of 2011 
and, to an extent, 2013 served as an example of “bridging” in the sense that 
communication with “strangers” in the follow-up of the 2011 uprisings led to an 
expansion of the local social capital to include those outside the region and, as a 
result, an increased interest in national politics such as the presidential election. 
This bridging brought local ideas of political involvement, and the local social 
capital, to the national level. Social media did play some role in this bridging. 
This is in contrast to the pre-2011 period, where rural focus was almost explicitly 
on parliamentary elections due to the view that these elections actually had an 
effect on the lives of citizens in the area, as well as the fact that social media use 
for politics was more of a novelty in 2011.  One result of this is that presidential 
elections follow neither the local nor the global social capital definitions fully; 
instead, depending on whether citizens are from urban or rural areas, voting for 
presidential elections can be based on either political considerations (in the 
manner of conventional social capital) or societal considerations in a similar way 
to the decision-making that occurs in parliamentary elections. This issue is further 
exacerbated by the fact that political understanding, and voting based on political 
considerations, is a novel idea in Egypt given the country’s history as a single-
party state. It may be possible that eventually the local social capital will 
disappear and be replaced by the conventional social capital over time. However, 
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this is dependent on many factors, including an increased reliance and 
understanding of political considerations by rural and urban Egyptians.  
A general overview of the context of political interaction of Egypt’s rural areas 
has been presented and correlated with the data gathered in the interviews that 
have been conducted with ordinary citizens, especially for this research. The 
correlation between older and more recent data revealed that the rural 
communities maintained a strong emphasis on their traditional information 
sources - such as their local leaders, social groups and family members - as well 
as, to a lesser degree on information from the media. This is their specificity, their 
way of living, but, at the same time, this did not prevent them from getting 
involved in political life, or from organising especially informal forms of political 
participation, such as smaller or larger protests. This is the reason why the huge 
protests that took place during the 2011 uprisings were not such a novelty for the 
rural citizens who were already accustomed to confronting the authorities and 
fighting for their rights. 
Moreover, different types of barriers to social media access have also been 
presented in previous chapters as strong evidence that the 2011 uprisings were not 
based on social media use; rather, they were uprisings that represented all 
Egyptian citizens and that expressed their common voice calling for radical 
change in the political system. This affected their norms because of the whole 
experience not social media solely. The barriers that have been presented - such 
as economic, geographic, educational, language or security issues - are so evident 
that no one can or should ignore them when speaking about the levels of 
participation in the events of 2011. 
In the end, this chapter was dedicated to the analysis of a part of the data 
gathered via the interviews taken for this study and correlated with various 
studies, in order to demonstrate the tremendous contribution that the rural 
population had in starting the 2011 uprisings, and to show that social media was 
not the main factor in this picture in impacting political interaction individual 
norms. The intention of this chapter was far from wanting to diminish social 
media’s contribution; it was rather to bring to light what many researchers have 
omitted: the role of the rural citizens who were not influenced and motivated 
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much by the social networks with regards to their norms, but had the same voice 
in terms of desiring, at any price, the end of the unjust and humiliating political 
regime run by Mubarak. Moreover, previous studies were referred to so one can 
relate to them because they were done at an earlier time than when the interviews 
conducted for this analysis were done. The idea of the understanding that rural 
citizens have as well of their idea of social capital is very critical in the way they 
are impacted by social media in relation to their political interaction because they 
have a much more local view of how politics should be in their areas. Therefore, 
the fact that norms changed slowly in rural areas as compared to urban is clearly 
related to the local idea of social capital and its impact on political interaction.  
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7. Chapter Six - The Transformation of Media and Its Impact on 
Social Capital of Rural Citizens After the Egyptian 2011 Political 
Uprisings 
7.1. Introduction 
During the previous chapters of this study we have demonstrated that the 
uprisings that started in 2011 in Egypt and resulted in the resignation of President 
Mubarak and other huge changes on the political scene, was not necessarily 
triggered by social media. Moreover, the role of social capital and social media in 
rural Egypt as relating to the uprisings, political interaction, and political 
involvement have been shown. However, it is still very important to bring to light 
what happened after the 2011 uprisings and how the media has or has not 
contributed to the political changes and in convincing people to get involved in 
the political development of their country (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). 
After the 2011 uprisings, the media continued its activity and its coverage, and 
maintained its impact on the micro public spheres. Many people who did not even 
access social media sources during the uprising began to do so after the uprisings 
of 2011. There was a clear increase in the number of social media users in rural 
Egypt, with the number of Twitter users rising from 19.3 thousand in 2010 to 129 
thousand in 2011. Similarly, the number of Facebook users doubled, from 4.2 
million in 2010 to 9.4 million in 2011 (Information and Communications 
Technology Indicators Bulletin, 2015). During this period, there was also an 
increase in read-only rates and interaction in discussions related to politics on 
social media platforms directly, rather than just via convergence of social media 
news via television. In fact, by 2011, the number of social media users being 
updated on politics through their phone reached 64%; by 2012, 57% of Egyptians 
used social media to “participate in political life, sharing and expressing their 
political views and opinions, through different smart-phone applications” 
(Information and Communications Technology Indicators Bulletin, 2015). This is 
because it gave citizens a chance to express their opinion via new means than 
their previous nature.  
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This chapter focuses on the media and public sphere changes that occurred 
after the 2011 uprisings, analysing how they both changed and to what level the 
uprisings produced profound transformations. The transformation of media is 
analysed in order to find out how it impacted the micro public spheres and to 
what extent people let themselves be influenced and impacted by media coverage. 
Moreover, the chapter also analyses the power of social media with the aim of 
finding out if its effects are as strong as previously claimed in regards to the 
period of the uprisings in 2011. Also, this chapter includes an analysis on whether 
or not there was an impact and immersion of social media in the rural areas and 
the extent to which rural citizens have been empowered by it. The agenda setting 
of old and new media are also studied in correlation with two critical aspects of 
this thesis: social capital transformation in contact with media sources and 
political involvement of citizens in the political sphere. The main aim is to 
discover the extent to which the 2011 uprisings determined power shifts and 
changes in the public sphere and social capital norms in order to analyse any 
changes that happened to feelings of empowerment in rural Egypt. 
The analysis of citizens’ behaviour and their level of involvement in both 
parliamentary and presidential elections were also considered to be of great 
importance for the aim of this study, which is to discover the extent to which the 
media and social media influenced Egyptian politics during and after the 2011 
uprisings by analysing what are the changes in their feelings happening about 
politics along with their political involvement. 
7.2. The Media Background after the 2011 Uprisings, and During the 
Build Up to 2013 
In 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring and the series of political changes 
occurring across the Middle East, the media gained a lot of attention. In fact, the 
2011 Egyptian uprisings in particular received a lot of attention in terms of social 
media usage and the effect of this usage on the mobilization of Egypt’s citizens as 
they went out to the street to protest for their rights (Campbell 2011; Castells, 
2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013). In general, scholarship has placed a strong 
emphasis on the media during this time, underlining that the new media had been 
preceded by active political and social actions, and that the new media continued 
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this process by having a long lasting impact on liberalisation processes and on 
real transformations in the society to which they belong (Brisson and Lee, 2011). 
Social media was not the cause of the 2011 uprisings that took place in Egypt, 
as we have already demonstrated, particularly in the case of its effect on the rural 
citizens that represent more than half of Egypt’s population. The most important 
pre-conditions of the 2011 uprisings were economic and political. People had 
suffered for a long time from poverty and inequality, and were dominated by an 
oppressive, corrupt and rigid political system. However, in order to find out 
details about the evolution of Egyptian society in the aftermath of the uprisings, 
and to analyse it, the media is an important source that has to be analysed, 
because the media tool is a useful indicator of what happens in a society. As 
Habermas states, the ideal public sphere acts as an informal environment for the 
discussion of politics in an equal uncoerced manner. After the uprisings, the 
media was expected to become a part of this, and to act to facilitate the exchange 
between the citizens and the government. In an increasingly globally mediated 
context, the media - be it social media, national television, or satellite television - 
is an important catalyst and tool in generating changes and at the same time in 
impacting opinions, actions, and ideas. The diversity of media channels and tools 
offers flexibility and organic development and the power of online networks 
increased, even in Egypt where Internet penetration and mobile telephones have 
rapidly increased in recent years after 2011. These aspects could have been the 
missing link between the vibrant social media and the rather inactive civil 
societies in terms of political participation (Walker and Orttung, 2012). This 
assertion will be discussed in this chapter in order to highlight that it was, in fact, 
the missing link.  The diversity and penetration issues, in particular, will be 
significant since (as Habermas discusses) the adequacy of a public sphere is 
largely dependent on both the quality of the discourse itself and the quantity of 
political participation 
More recently, researchers have discussed journalism, in its various forms of 
expression, as “a culture that has to be grown and taken care of, as a system of 
shared beliefs rather than strictly professional practices” (Khamis and Vaughn, 
2011). Bordieu recognised the journalistic field as “an autonomous system unto 
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itself, a field of activity with its own laws that cannot be understood by looking 
only at external factors” (Bourdieu, 1998). The journalists are directly linked and 
influenced by the economic and political fields, and this was very clearly shown 
in the context of Egypt. The Egyptian mass media held critical importance in the 
2011 uprisings and their aftermath, in different ways. While the “national media” 
(composed of newspapers, TV or radio channels) was used massively, and relied 
upon heavily, by President Mubarak to influence public opinion, other media - 
both traditional and unconventional, such as social networks, satellite channels or 
private channels - played a crucial role in counterbalancing the state’s forces, 
mobilising people and updating them with an alternative method for gaining 
credible, objective and uncoerced information.  
For example, Interviewee A, in Qalyoubia, mentioned: "private channels were 
less controlled than state channels" (A, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Also, Interviewee E, 
in Qalyoubia, explained: "state channels were controlled by the regime according 
to their agenda" (E, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Similarly, Interviewee D in Menoufia, 
stated: "everyone mainly watched satellite channels like Dream TV and Al 
Jazeera" (D, 2018 in Menoufia). In South Sinai, Interviewee A and B, stated: 
"satellite channels are more informative" (A, 2018 in South Sinai; B, 2018 in 
South Sinai). While in Minya, Interviewee F, explained: "any state media was 
very controlled" (F, 2018 in Minya).  
The interview data clearly highlights that interviewees from all governorates 
were aware of the national media’s use as a part of the state propaganda machine. 
As a result, this awareness had an impact on both trust and viewership. For 
example, In Menoufia, Interviewee I mentioned that they "preferred watching 
private and international satellite channels because they were not controlled like 
state channels" (I, 2018 in Menoufia). In Qalyoubia, Interviewee G, stated, "after 
I realized that state channels tried to avoid covering Tahrir Square during the 
start of the uprisings I stopped watching it at all and watched private channels 
such as Dream TV and CBC" (G, 2018 in Qalyoubia). In South Sinai, Interviewee 
F, explained, "I watched mainly private channels because they were more 
updated and covered social media updates as well" (F, 2018 in South Sinai). In 
Minya, Interviewee D, said, "Al Jazeera was always showing live coverage unlike 
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state channels which made me always watch it [before 2013] among other private 
channels only" (D, 2018 in Minya).  Evidently, either because of inadequate 
coverage relating to the uprisings (as evident in the comments of Qalyoubia’s 
Interviewee G) or inadequate coverage of social media (as seen in South Sinai’s 
Interviewee F), it was considered across all four governorates that the national 
media was less truthful, honest, and objective than its private counterparts. This 
impacted its audience.  
As such, the role of state media can be understood within the broader context 
of how the evolution of media has influenced the relationship between the 
citizens and the state. In the case of Egypt, media had already clearly been used 
as a tool of mass control and persuasion for many decades, because Egypt was a 
state run by a dictatorial regime. The mass media was under the close control of 
the government which used it to choose what to make public and what to conceal 
from view, what to transmit to the people, and what to make them believe or not. 
This, of course, stifled the creation of a genuinely uncoerced public sphere. In 
fact, it became difficult (if not impossible) to discuss politics in a manner that was 
rational and free of government interference, especially if one relied on state 
media. As a result, the conditions of a public sphere, as outlined by Habermas and 
discussed in Chapter 2, were hindered. It is important to note here, however, that 
the existence, and growing prevalence, of satellite channels and social networks 
ensured that this stifling was more limited than it otherwise could have been. As 
the interview data highlights, the state media was considered to be “controlled by 
the regime according to their agenda” in contrast to satellite channels, which were 
viewed as “more informative” or “not controlled like state channels.”  This shows 
that rural Egyptians were aware of the intended purpose of state media - to 
manipulate public opinion in favour of the regime - and that they avoided this 
media as a result. As such, it can be assumed that state media in this time had 
little impact on invigorating (or harming) the micro-public sphere, and did not 
unduly or negatively impact feelings of empowerment or the build-up of social 
capital in the area. As a result, satellite channels and social media acted more as a 
public sphere than the state channels; satellite and social media served as a 
counter-balance to the government controlled media, leading to a public sphere 
that was more genuine and uncoerced but, of course, still imperfect. 
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Nevertheless, it remains the case that the state-owned media content in Egypt 
was shaped by the regime’s desire to enhance its image and underline its 
leadership among citizens. Since the 2011 uprisings, some drastic changes 
occurred in order to reform the Egyptian media; one of the most important of 
these changes was the abolition of the Egyptian Ministry of Information. This 
measure had as its purpose the ending of government control and manipulation 
over media and marks the beginning of the process of media liberalisation, 
encouraging private media ownership that would give airtime to many different 
voices. This would have completed the formation of an uncoerced public sphere, 
in theory, since all forms of media would be devoid of government coercion. 
Yet, in practice, the media landscape in Egypt did not change as much as 
expected after the 2011 uprisings, as the country is still undergoing a 
democratisation process. The media apparatus is still strongly connected to the 
political regime. As such, despite the fact that policies were enacted officially that 
would have helped in the creation of a genuine public sphere, the reality is that 
these policies had little to no effect. For instance, The Ministry of Information 
was later replaced by SCAF six months after the January 2011 uprisings. Osama 
Heikal, a former military correspondent, replaced the former Minister of 
Information and was named the new head of the same Ministry. Later on, another 
individual close to Mubarak, Major-General Ahmed Anis, replaced Heikal in the 
same position. The 2012 Government – The Muslim Brotherhood – made some 
changes, but brought people who came from the same military-backed 
government of Mubarak into the same position (Issawi, 2012). This is the reason 
why the image of the media was one of a platform transmitting the government’s 
messages, and not of a journalistic tool that disinterestedly and objectively 
updated people about what was happening in different parts of the country. This 
image was highly prevalent, with interviewees from all four governorates stating 
something to the effect that the media was a government tool. For example,  In 
Qalyoubia, Interviewee I asserted that "state media was constantly supporting the 
agenda of the regime so not all information was the true reality" (I, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee A mentioned "the media 
environment was very controlled because of the regime’s constraints on 
information" (A, 2018 in Menoufia). In Minya, Interviewee D stated that "the 
222 
country was in chaos and the government was controlling the information to limit 
the chaos" (D, 2018 in Minya). While in South Sinai, Interviewee B, explained 
that "the interference of the government in media played a major part in what 
was being transmitted on media" (B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
 It is interesting that the relationship between the government and the media in 
Egypt is in fact similar to the example of Europe, as Habermas discusses it. The 
public sphere in Egypt, like in Europe, was deteriorating - and was not being re-
established - because of powerful government interests dictating and influencing 
the nature of political debate (Habermas, 1989). Osama Saraya, the former chief 
editor of Ahram, confirmed that “the main function of state media was to 
embellish the face of the regime, not to monitor it” (Issawi, 2012), while Abdalla 
Kamal chief editor of Roz el Youssef, a newspaper known for campaigning 
against dissidents, affirmed that “I was working in politics. This is common, even 
in Western Media. There was no real political life and media was replacing the 
lacking political parties so it was overwhelmed by politics” (Issawi, 2012). 
As a result of these views, restructuring the media sector was one of the major 
topics of the 2011 uprising’s debate. However, the drastic measures have never 
been taken, and for different reasons. First of all, major cuts would have greatly 
increased unemployment, a move which would probably have generated a 
dissident movement. Many courageous ideas - such as following the BBC’s 
example of demanding media independence from the state - have been discussed, 
but none of these became reality. The idea just mentioned is particularly 
interesting when one considers Habermas’ views on the public sphere. If 
implemented, media independence would have allowed the traditional media to 
behave, in some fashion, like social media in the sense that it would be free from 
government interference. This would have allowed it to become an environment 
for rational and uncoerced discussion. Moreover, this independence may have 
allowed for some kind of avoidance of Habermas’ assertion that public spheres, 
such as those in Europe, decline due to powerful interests by the government. By 
operating wholly separately from the state, the interests of the government would 
no longer be relevant in the sense that those interests could no longer dictate the 
nature of political debate. Finally, without government interference, traditional 
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media could return to the view held in agenda setting theory of a direct 
correlation between the media and the public, since government needs and desires 
would not interfere externally. However, this idea, along with many others, never 
occurred. 
The second reason the restructuring never occurred was that the sudden 
transformation of an extremely politicised media into a decentralised one would 
have been a major challenge. Every time a satellite private television program had 
tried to find its way in the media scene, gaining a large audience and building a 
new culture in terms of media practices – such as the case of 25 TV that was shut 
down approximately one year after the uprisings – they were shut down by the 
regime. This is another example of how government interference hindered the 
direct correlation that should exist, according to agenda setting theory, between 
media and public agendas. The permanent manipulation of media by the state that 
took place for decades in Egypt, together with the decline of professional 
journalistic standards, led to great reductions in audience numbers particularly for 
state media and to a continuous erosion of trust among the citizens, which was 
depicted in the responses presented above in this chapter. Secondary data 
supports this, with studies showing that “private satellite stations aren’t operating 
away from government or economic pressures, yet they are considered the most 
attractive platforms to the audiences” and that “national television has not seen 
actual change in terms of conversion from being the mouthpiece of the 
government to an actual public service broadcaster.” One of the best examples of 
why the media was losing its audience was an edited photo published by the 
newspaper Ahram where Mubarak was shown walking ahead of all participant 
leaders to a Middle East peace convention, while, in fact, he was in second place. 
Asked about this incident, the chief editor responded that the photo was not edited 
under his directions and that he was not aware of this event (Issawi, 2012). If the 
state-run media had audience numbers that were quite low before the 2011 
uprisings, its broadcast describing the protesters as “agent of foreign hands” or 
even as “prostitutes” led to a major reduction in its audience (Issawi, 2012). 
Interview data, seen below, supports this viewpoint.  
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In Qalyoubia, Interviewee I, explained: "The media still seemed controlled 
after the [2011] uprisings because the SCAF replaced the Mubarak regime" (I, 
2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee H, mentioned that, before 2011, "The 
media said what the [Mubarak] government wanted and that is why people kept 
going back to Al Jazeera channel because they felt Egypt had no control on it like 
other channels" (H, 2018 in Menoufia).  
While in Minya, Interviewee D, stated: "Media [during the Mubarak regime] 
did not always give all the updates about what was happening" (D, 2018 in 
Minya). 
In South Sinai, Interviewee B, said: "[After 2011] the government sometimes 
interfered to avoid chaos and insecurity however, the past regime [of Mubarak] 
always gave an impression that corruption was happening so people always felt 
that something big is being baked or hidden" (B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
This interview data highlights the fact that the trust by Egypt’s citizens of the 
state media (and by extension, the state) in general, and the trust of rural citizens 
in the state media and the state in particular, was hindered greatly by the media’s 
actions. For example, Interviewee H’s statements seem to strongly imply that 
rural citizens viewed the media as an extension of the state. This view runs 
counter to the Habermasian ideal of a public sphere that is uncoerced and devoted 
to the establishment of a genuine space for political discourse and debate. As 
such, they stopped watching state media, or minimized its role by watching 
private channels. As previously shown, this was due to the viewpoint across all 
governorates that private media was less controlled. In this sense, it becomes 
clear why social media was important. Because the media “said what the 
government wanted,” social media - and, to an extent, satellite channels like Al 
Jazeera - were viewed more favourably by comparison since the state could not 
do the same thing. This can be seen in usage rates of social media for political 
discussion: in 2011 alone, 64% of mobile users accessed political and news sites 
or applications for the purpose of political engagement. Satellite and social media 
were viewed as being less likely to fall under the influence of SCAF, the Ministry 
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of Information, and the government in general (Information and Communications 
Technology Indicators Bulletin, 2015).  
On the other hand, when channels such as 25 TV or Al-Jazeera did gain large 
audiences by discussing topics that were in line with the public agenda, and 
trusted by the audience, the government’s involvement led to them being shut 
down, or their influence being otherwise limited in some fashion. This, similarly, 
limited the ability of the media to invigorate micro-public spheres or enhance 
feelings of empowerment or the build-up of social capital. For example, In 
Qalyoubia, Interviewee E explained: 
"During the 18 days of the 2011 uprisings I was constantly following 
Al Jazeera and mainly private channels because the state channels 
were hiding many updates. However, Al Jazeera was constantly 
attacked by the government and their office was closed down so it 
showed to the people that they were showing updates that the 
government wanted to hide" (E, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee D mentioned: 
"Al Jazeera and similar channels are what updated viewers on what 
was going on more than state channels which showed that during 
2011 Egyptians trusted what was being viewed on Al Jazeera. Maybe 
when the government started stopping the Al Jazeera transmission it 
was a catalyst for people to believe in it more as a counter-reaction to 
any action the government was taking, similarly to when they cut the 
Internet for a week and it increased the amount of people in Tahrir 
Square and other gathering points in Egypt" (D, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Both these examples show that there was a distinction between private 
channels and state channels in the sense that the former were trusted and the latter 
were viewed as an extension of the state. The statement by Menoufia’s 
Interviewee D is interesting since it highlights the view that government’s attempt 
to limit Al Jazeera’s influence actually backfired, causing viewers to trust it more. 
This is compared to the shutting down of the Internet, an act which served as a 
catalyst for physical and offline informal political acts. In this sense, the private 
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channels and social media may have invigorated the public sphere in the sense 
that the government’s negative reaction to them motivated political involvement. 
Interviewee D’s comments are particularly significant given the below 
statements, which both highlights the importance of private channels in general 
and Al Jazeera in particular. In Minya, Interviewee A stated, "Most viewers of 
television channel followed private channels during 2011, yet Al Jazeera was on 
the top of the list of private channels for updates" (A, 2018 in Minya). In South 
Sinai, Interviewee B mentioned something similar, noting that "Al Jazeera was 
one of the main channels followed by Egyptians during the 2011 uprisings due to 
the amount of live coverage they showed Egyptians that other channels did not. 
However, during the 2013 uprisings the trust Egyptians had in Al Jazeera 
decreased hugely" (B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
Interviewee B’s comment is particularly interesting, since it highlights a 
decrease in the Egyptian population’s trust of Al Jazeera by 2013. This was a 
common claim that can be seen in both interview data and secondary research by 
other scholars. By 2013, the population had begun to view Al Jazeera as an agent 
of foreign manipulation, and there were assertions made that foreign nations such 
as Qatar (where Al Jazeera is headquartered) was taking advantage of the 
popularity of the program by using it for the purpose of propaganda. This was 
based on Al Jazeera’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood in direct contrast to the 
negative opinion Egyptians had regarding the Muslim Brotherhood at the time. Al 
Jazeera’s support was considered a part of Qatar’s tendency to support Islamist 
groups, with scholars such as David B. Roberts noting that Qatar “ has developed 
a reputation for engaging with and supporting Islamist groups around the Middle 
East” as well as specifically “groups related to the Muslim Brotherhood” 
(Roberts, 2019). In this sense, Al Jazeera began to be viewed in a similar light as 
the state channels previously discussed in this chapter. Al Jazeera’s continued 
criticism of Egypt’s political landscape was no longer aligned with the viewpoint 
of its citizens and, as such, the trust placed in the program by those citizens 
dissipated. Al Jazeera’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood at a time where, as 
shown, Egypt’s citizens were no longer supportive of that regime can be seen as a 
trigger for this shift in opinion. 
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These interviewee comments have highlighted the effect that these 
governmental actions have had on the rural citizens views of the state-run media 
in detail, these views being primarily rooted in distrust and a motivation to act in 
response. Nevertheless, some media continued biased reporting, even after the 
2011 uprising ended and the Mubarak regime had been abolished. One of the best 
examples was the Coptic demonstration that was brutally repressed by the police 
while the television presenter Rasha Magdy was desperately calling for citizens to 
defend the police from the “violent protesters”. The official media comments 
after this coverage were astonishing: “This was not incitement to violence. The 
presenter was politically emotional. We admit this is a mistake. The presenter was 
investigated and she is back to work now”, while the state TV “did not show 
footage of killed demonstrators to avoid fueling tension” (Issawi, 2012).  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some changes did occur after the 
uprisings, two of which are notable. First of all, the dissident voices had the 
chance to be heard over voice-only interviews on talk shows while they were at 
Tahrir Square, or  on talk shows after they returned from Tahrir. Also, the news 
sources had been diversified and the official sources were not the only sources 
considered to be truthful. Both measures led to the recovery of a part of the lost 
audience. These measures also affected the national state media, which faced a 
lack of resources and great social capital losses, with it struggling to survive in 
the open market of media competitors.  
However, as previously mentioned, obedience and bureaucracy within the 
system did not totally disappear, especially because the sudden resignation of 
Mubarak left the journalists without directives: 
The idea of prohibited information no longer exists but journalists are used to 
it. They continue to define new red lines even if no one asked them to do so. 
They had to be reassured by the publication of the information by private media 
to consider the news as non-prohibited  
(Interview with Gamal Fahmy, the first secretary of the journalists Syndicate, 
in Issawi, 2012).  
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Many journalists who were trying to do their job (and to broadcast facts as 
they were truly happening) faced bureaucratic and censorship measures, or at 
least attempts to censor them: 
Our correspondent was not relying on the news provided by the official news 
agency as we used to do. He was in the street, when the police issued a 
communiqué saying that they did not use gunfire, our correspondent was 
reporting live showing us the empty cartridge in streets. We were telling what we 
were seeing and not what we were told to say. (…) Our major problem is our 
editors who still follow the old practices, such as waiting for the government to 
issue a communiqué before reporting on the events. The quality of reporting is 
very much linked to the personality of the editor of the day. There is no clear 
editorial policy. 
(Interview with a Nile TV reporter, in Issawi, 2012) 
As such, as already discussed, the relative changes that took place in the 
media’s practices have not been sustained, especially among the media state 
houses. Ideas that may have supported a new uncoerced media were never 
implemented or were abandoned, while strict control under Mubarak became self-
censorship and a culture of fear under SCAF and Morsi. However, the population 
started to distinguish between two obvious structures: the state-controlled media 
and the public private media representing people’s voice. This can be seen in 
statements made from all four of the governorates in which this thesis conducted 
interviews. 
Interviewee E in Qalyoubia mentioned: "Generally, control in private media 
was definitely less than state media to an extent because it was more of indirect 
control on private media" (E, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Interviewee D in Menoufia, 
explained: "Everyone mainly used private media or Al Jazeera not state media 
anymore" (D, 2018 in Menoufia). Interviewee C in Minya, said: 
"The coverage on private channels was less controlled than state 
channels and even if it is the same no one will forget that in 2011 
when the uprisings started the state channels were showing the Nile 
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very calm and not saying much about protests while other private 
channels were showing Tahrir Square" (C, 2018 in Minya). 
Similarly, in South Sinai Interviewee A, explained: "All media was monitored 
by the government however private media had less interference so watching it 
was better than state media that did not give much information" (A, 2018 in 
South Sinai).  
The lack of professional journalistic standards did not clearly highlight these 
differences and many journalists ended up transforming their free journalism into 
expressions of personal and biased points of view or frustrations. Moreover, the 
accuracy of the reporting itself was skewed. SCAF and military institutions 
remained relatively untouched because of fear and Law 313 that prohibited 
coverage without consent of the Director of Military Intelligence. Any deviation 
of this could lead to arrest, torture, and other serious reprecussions (Walker and 
Orttung, 2012). Under the Muslim Brotherhood’s regime, this continued with 
over thirty legal trials against journalists, intimidation by the state, claims of 
defamation, and other forms of abuse against media staff (Issawi, 2012). A small 
group of media staff vehemently protested against this state control and pleaded 
for media independence. However, their protests have never been broadcast and 
most of the time they were dismissed as people making chaotic expressions of 
their personal frustrations (Walker and Orttung, 2012). Although the government 
denied it, the trend was to marginalise any voices of radical or critical opinions 
concerning the government. There were even rumours about a black-list with of 
persona non-grata journalists who had criticised the regime, rumours which were 
not denied by the head of the news department: “if a guest is employing obscene 
expressions and using our platform to settle personal accounts, he cannot be a 
regular guest with us. I asked the staff to invite the wise people and the moderate 
voices; those who have constructive opinions that unite and not divide” (Issawi, 
2012). Thus, clearly, a comparison of the media prior to 2011, when compared to 
the media in the build-up to the 2013 revolts, shows that the media had not 
changed as a result of these uprisings and that any changes that occurred were 
only superficial or repressed by the state.  
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7.3. Social Media after the 2011 Uprisings 
During the 2013 uprisings in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood regime, 
the state media and the private media immediately supported the people and 
adopted a nationalist tone, representing the government as being evil and anti-
nationalist.  
After Morsi resigned, there was an unprecedented wave of anti-media 
repression, while the media focused on glorifying the army and representing it as 
the saviour of the country from the Muslim Brotherhood government, which was 
labelled as a secret terrorist movement. Nevertheless, the propagandist voice of 
private media dissolved the difference between the state media and the 
independent media. It became more difficult to identify the sources, and harder to 
distinguish them.  This was borne out in the interview data. In Qalyoubia, 
Interviewee F explained, 
"there was a point during the 2011 uprisings where it was very 
chaotic in terms of the source of information. People were getting 
different updates not necessarily knowing originally where the news 
started because of the intensity and volatility of the event" (F, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, Interviewee A mentioned, "sometimes I heard updates or news 
about what was going on but did not know exactly the source of the update" (A, 
2018 in Menoufia).  
Similarly, In Minya, Interviewee C stated, 
"there were some situations where one found an update but did not 
know the accuracy of it or source because information was moving 
rapidly and through different forms of media besides word of mouth, 
which resembled the chaos Egypt was in" (C, 2018 in Minya). 
While in South Sinai, Interviewee D asserted that 
"all types of media were updating Egyptians and adding to that were 
the discussions between families about updates and the origin of 
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where or how the information was found got lost during all this 
intensity" (D, 2018 in South Sinai). 
This is interesting since it highlights a more unified viewpoint, dissolving the 
difference between state and private channels. Unlike in 2011, where the state and 
private media held different perspectives and aired different news, the 2013 
uprisings did not seem to have this issue. The result of this is that, unlike during 
2011, interviewees could not distinguish the different sources. One fascinating 
aspect of this is the fact that it clarifies the extent to which the 2011 uprising was 
characterized by a difference in content between private and state channels. A 
further consequence was that interviewees were no longer certain of the veracity 
of the statements made in the media. Interviewees from Minya and South Sinai 
referred to discussions being necessary given the confusion, and even those in 
Qalyoubia mentioned that it was “chaotic” during this time.  
Another difference between 2011 and 2013 is that, during this second uprising 
in 2013, social media use in rural areas through direct usage was much higher 
since the concept was no longer new to them. It is not necessarily that they did 
not still rely on certain social capital norms in relation to politics, but more users 
in rural areas were familiar with being updated about politics via social media 
than in 2011 (G, 2018 in Qalyoubia; J, 2018 in Qalyoubia; E, 2018 in Minya; A, 
2018 in Menoufia). However, the social capital norms in Qalyoubia and 
Menoufia were less rigid than South Sinai and Minya in Upper Egypt. The 
amount of responses in relation to social media usage becoming more regular 
towards 2013 in Qalyoubia and Menoufia was more frequent than in South Sinai 
and Minya, though the phenomenon existed in all four governorates.  
Interview J in Qalyoubia, explained, "when the usage of social media became 
more of a routine for people sometimes it was harder to realize where 
information originally started social or traditional media" (J, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
Interview H in Menoufia, stated, "as time passed and people were more aware 
of social media as part of the media the boundary between social media and 
traditional media lessened (H, 2018 in Menoufia)".  
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Interviewee E in Minya, mentioned, "as time passed people did not focus much 
on which type of media was presenting which information"(E, 2018 in Minya). 
Interviewee D in South Sinai, said, "although social media took time to 
become more normal when it became more used it diluted much of the 
information on both forms of media"(D, 2018 in South Sinai). 
The acceptance of social media, and its increased regularity, in Qalyoubia and 
Menoufia is related to the normality they have in discussing politics in 
comparison to South Sinai and Minya based on their political participation and 
closer distance to Cairo making them less rigid about their norms because of 
visiting Cairo more often and merging their norms with those of Cairo citizens. 
The interviewee responses above highlight this normalization of social media 
across the four studied regions, as well as the differences between them in terms 
of how they viewed social media use. In Qalyoubia and Menoufia, it is clear that 
the boundary between traditional and social media lessened, and it became more 
common to use and trust either of them. There was no inference in either of these 
governorates that one form was lesser than the other. In Minya, it seems similar in 
the sense that the distinction between the forms lessened, though it seems to be 
the case that there was some kind of distinction. The South Sinai interviewee, 
however, clearly highlights a distinction by noting that the normality of social 
media led to the information presented in the news being “diluted” in some 
fashion.  
In any case, another important factor for the increase of social media use is 
related to the fact that interviewees realized the speed of social media in 
providing updates during the 2011 uprisings through the convergence concept. 
Therefore, they started using social media more regularly, even on mobile 
phones, despite the fact that the infrastructure in the area has not improved much 
since 2011. This was obvious by the high mobile penetration on the Internet in all 
rural areas after 2011 uprisings. The following interviewee comments clarify this: 
Interviewee J in Qalyoubia, mentioned: "it became more regular to use social 
media over time because citizens understood it more" (J, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
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Interviewee H in Menoufia, explained: "over time, non-social media users 
knew about social media and either became users or followed the social media 
updates through people they knew" (H, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Interviewee E in Minya, stated: "understanding more about social media led 
people to start accepting it as a form of media more than before" (E, 2018 in 
Minya). 
Similarly, Interviewee D in South Sinai, explained: "the fact that we live in a 
tribal community slowed down the use of social media because it was not a 
priority in how people decide what to do in our community, yet as time increased 
so did its usage" (D, 2018 in South Sinai).  
These interviewees bring to light two facets of social media use. First, the 
normality of social media in the aftermath of 2011 is further emphasized, with 
interviewees from all four governorates conceding that usage noticeably 
increased. The second facet shown is their perspective on this usage. Once again, 
Qalyoubia and Menoufia’s interviewees use terms that denote understanding and 
an implicit judgement being made about its positive benefit. In terms of the latter, 
Menoufia’s interview highlights that even non-social media users came to rely on 
it in some fashion. Minya’s interviewee takes this a step further, using language 
that highlights acceptance of social media, as well as understanding. South 
Sinai’s interviewee, on the other hand, notes that social media use increased but 
almost reluctantly, taking time to highlight that it was not a priority on 
community decision-making and even explicitly stating that the tribal societal 
framework limited the significance of social media. Thus, we can see here that as 
social media usage increased, its benefits became accepted, but that its use was 
subject to the societal considerations of the specific governorate. It is no 
coincidence that South Sinai’s interviewee was less enthusiastic about social 
media use, given the previous discussions throughout this thesis on social capital 
norms and rigidity within Lower Egypt’s governorates. However, in any case, it 
is somewhat clear that the acceptance of social media for communication - 
presumably with those outside one’s immediate region - does highlight an 
enhancement of the public sphere, and an enhancement of social capital through 
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increased communication with other Egyptians, a fact that has been discussed 
here and in the previous chapter.  
As already discussed, several times in this chapter and previously within this 
thesis, the media sphere suffered many fluctuations in the years after the 2011 
Egyptian uprising. Even though the political system prevented any profound 
transformation on a large scale, there have been many notable transformations at 
a lower scale, at the level of private publications, satellite televisions or even at 
the level of individuals – meaning that there have been many journalists who had 
the courage to cover the news in ways very different from state-controlled media. 
Online social media contributed a lot to these transformations, first of all because 
it gave people the opportunity to make their voice heard, to express themselves 
freely and even to become citizen-journalists, when it was needed.  In this sense, 
social media has operated in a manner that is consistent with Habermas’ views on 
an ideal public sphere, or the more nuanced view of micro-public and meso-
public spheres. Again, this serves as  an example of the enhancement of the 
public sphere and the empowerment of rural Egyptians. This is in contrast to the 
state-controlled and private (or satellite) channels, which were wholly controlled 
or strongly influenced by state intervention, and thus subject to censorship or 
public distrust.  
For example, in Qalyoubia Interviewee B, explained:  
"I was not a social media user but as parliament member it was 
necessary to assign someone in my office to start following its updates 
to find more about people’s feelings because it gave some citizens in 
the area a way of expressing their views and as their representative I 
had to know about it"(B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, Interviewee F, mentioned: 
"the idea of connecting with people in other areas we don’t know and 
feeling the community and its nationalism towards Egypt triggered 
emotions that made people express their opinions on social media just 
to even feel they can express themselves" (F, 2018 in Menoufia).  
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In Minya, Interviewee C, explained:"it gave a form of expression for citizens if 
they wanted and made them feel they had the choice" (C, 2018 in Minya). Finally, 
in South Sinai, Interviewee D, stated: "it made me feel I can share my opinions 
with someone besides the tribes we live in" (D, 2018 in South Sinai). 
This data shows us that social media has become embedded to some extent in 
Egypt’s political scene. In Qalyoubia, it became necessary for a member of 
Parliament to develop a social media presence in order to adequately support and 
represent his citizens. This highlights the importance placed on parliamentary 
members being aware of citizen views, as well as the need for a social media 
account in order to hear those views. This seems to be, once more, an expansion 
of the public sphere due to social media. Similarly, in Menoufia and Minya, 
social media use was a method of political involvement and the expression of 
political opinions. In South Sinai, it caused a loosening of the tribal framework to 
some degree, allowing greater communication with the rest of the country. The 
interview comments from Menoufia, Minya, and South Sinai are of particular 
interest given the previously-discussed idea of a local social capital in Egypt. As 
Chapter 4 highlighted, this local social capital was based on the idea that local 
concerns could only be addressed by locals given their unique nature and the 
manner in which they understood the nuances of that society. The interviewees 
from Menoufia and Minya, and South Sinai in particular, provide the idea that 
there may be a movement toward the global conception of social capital. These 
statements highlight the idea that empowerment and social capital within Egypt’s 
governorates was moving away from the definition provided in Chapter 4, and 
towards the more familiar conception, because of the communication capacities 
of social media.  
There are studies showing that in 2013, Egypt was among the top five 
countries in terms of Internet users, which means that people started to 
extensively use Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and any other forms of information 
exchange platforms (El-Bendary, 2013). They managed, as the interviewees data 
just mentioned highlights, to develop a public sphere through the use of social 
media that allowed for trust between the ‘reporter’ and the ‘viewer’ in a manner 
that did not exist with traditional or (to a lesser extent) in private media. This 
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happened because, after the 2011 uprising, the traditional media was still 
controlled by the state power and the citizens did not feel it was free enough. 
Therefore, social media became the new environment where people continued 
their common cause against the abuses of the political system and, at the same 
time, a place where they were able to pursue their own agenda setting, i.e. to 
decide by themselves the important stories on which to focus. The public sphere 
of Egypt organised in such a way to create their own channels of breaking news, 
outside the manipulated agenda setting of the media and outside of the obedient 
journalists’ coverage to the Muslim Brotherhood regime. They created an 
environment where they could discuss political issues and debate on any theme 
they considered important on the daily agenda setting (Heydemann, 2015) 
because Egyptians felt what they aimed for in 2011 uprisings was not being 
achieved. Therefore, by 2013, rural citizen norms have been trending towards an 
increase in social media access; as a result, social media was used more in 2013 
than 2011. This is particularly the case since, in 2013, rural citizens were angrier 
regarding the failure of the 2011 protests to reform society fully and the fact that 
the government changes were moving in the wrong direction. 
7.4. Power Shifts and Changing Norms in the Social Capital and Public 
Spheres 
What was truly unique in the case of Egypt was the fact that changes in the 
political scene have not been triggered by the media, but by the popular mass 
informal political involvement that has been present both online and offline. Both 
uprisings in 2011 and 2013, rather than being organised by political parties or 
institutions, largely represented the voice of the people. The uprisings, thus, act as 
evidence of the strength of the public sphere, and evidence of the strength in 
Egypt’s social ties. Social capital was enhanced by the use of social media - both 
in terms of the increase in usage and the manner in which this usage occurred - 
but was not caused by it. The same can be said for the public sphere; the 
discussions, debates, and communication with strangers that occurred in the 
aftermath of 2011 (as discussed in the previous chapter) positively impacted a 
pre-existing public sphere that had its foundation in the social ties of rural Egypt. 
This enhancement of the public sphere and social capital - and their importance to 
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the political changes that occurred - can be seen in the fact that political change 
occurred in 2011 (and again in 2013) despite the fact that the political, economic, 
and media systems had not witnessed profound changes in that time. It was rather 
the public will, the social capital, the relationships created long ago between 
people who are motivated by the media and have forced it to make a range of 
changes in its structure, rather than go backwards.  For example, Interviewee G in 
Qalyoubia, explained, 
"In 2011, people were angry from circumstances of living and the 
inability of having a voice that could make a difference in the country 
that made them feel like they just have to live in silence. In 2013, they 
gained a voice to express their opinions so - because many Egyptians 
including me felt like they were losing Egypt again to another identity 
which is the Muslim Brotherhood represented by Morsi - they felt that 
they must save the country again from living in silence again" (G, 
2018 in Qalyoubia). 
In Menoufia, Interviewee C, stated, 
"In 2011 Egyptians were waking up from a long nap in politics, yet in 
2013 they became more alert so it did not take them as long to resist 
the Muslim Brotherhood and move into the 2013 uprisings with the 
support of the army" (C, 2018 in Menoufia). 
 Moreover, In Minya Interviewee F, said, "If people did not feel like they have 
to move nothing would have happened in the 2011 and 2013 uprisings" (F, 2018 
in Minya). Finally, Interviewee E in South Sinai mentioned, "Definitely, in 2013 
as a citizen of South Sinai, and given the circumstances we lived in, we had to 
move regardless of the impact of the media on us to save our area from being 
sold to outsiders again" (E, 2018 in South Sinai).  It is clear here that individuals 
were motivated by the success of 2011 (as evident in comments from Qalyoubia 
and Menoufia), and that the common viewpoint was that the Muslim Brotherhood 
needed to be removed. Despite the fact that social media aided in this viewpoint 
becoming widespread, it was not the root of this viewpoint. Groups like Tamarud, 
for example,  operated on Facebook, but also handed flyers out in the street that 
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urged citizens to move against the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s presidency 
less than one year after it began.  This was not based on social media; it simply 
serves as an example of social media aiding a movement that was operating both 
online and offline. Rather, this seems to highlight that the public wished to resist 
the Muslim Brotherhood in order to improve their country. Admittedly, 
references to “waking up from a long nap in politics” and becoming “more alert” 
may partially be related to the quicker communication that social media provided, 
yet it is clear that this was not itself the motivation.  
Even the political reform, although very superficial, was triggered by the force 
of social capital, by the resistance of the people and not by the media structures, 
as is the case in developed countries, where the media represents a strong 
balancing counter voice for state power. Therefore, in the case of Egypt, even 
though not all citizens of Egypt had access to the Internet, social media enhanced 
social capital in rural areas mainly after 2011 uprising, which was tested clearly 
in 2013 where there were many more protesters present during the uprisings. 
While this will be discussed in more detail in this chapter, it is sufficient to say 
here that the 2011 uprisings brought to light a public sphere - consolidated by the 
strength of the rural citizens’ social capital - that could operate more freely 
because of social media access and the uncoerced environment it engendered.  
In this regard, Interviewee B in Qalyoubia, mentioned that: 
"Although I am not a direct social media user, people around me 
updated me about social media, and it was clear that the importance 
of it was sharing information with Egyptians not in our rural area" B, 
2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Additionally, Interviewee G in Menoufia, mentioned: "Locally the use of 
social media did not make any people get to know each other more it was 
knowing the people we did not know in other parts of Egypt" (G, 2018 in 
Menoufia). Interviewee C, in Minya, stated: "Social media helped in connecting 
us with people far away in Cairo by being updated about Tahrir Square not about 
Minya" (C, 2018 in Minya). Finally, Interviewee E in South Sinai, said: "It was 
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interesting to find information about people in other parts of Egypt directly not 
through television"(E, 2018 in South Sinai).  
Even though some studies in the field showed that social media made the 
relationship between people weaker and more superficial (Heydemann, 2015), in 
the case of authoritarian and corrupt political regimes, such as Egypt, social 
media created stronger bonds between people, together with a real bridge above 
the controlled media, a bridge that linked people together with credible 
information about events that were taking place in Egypt, such as abuses, police 
violence, arrests, manipulated trials, etc. (Stefanone et al., 2010). All interviewees 
agreed in this regard, noting that the significance of social media was rooted in 
the manner in which it expanded the public sphere, increasing social ties between 
governorates. The interviewees in Qalyoubia, Menoufia, and Minya state this 
directly by mentioning that locally “the use of social media did not make any 
people get to know each other more” but that, rather, “the importance of it was 
sharing information with Egyptians not in [their] rural area.” This was an 
expansion of the public sphere through the new-found ease of communication, 
and represented increased social capital only in the sense that those once 
considered strangers were now interacting. Interviewee E from South Sinai, 
explains, "the benefit of social media lies in the fact that it was direct, rather than 
through some form of structured media like television"(E, 2018 in South Sinai). 
Similarly, Interviewee I in Qalyoubia, mentioned, "using social media gave me a 
chance to state my opinion directly and viewing others without someone filtering 
what could be said on channels by editors" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). As such, while 
social media may not have aided in connecting individuals with others in their 
area, it allowed for political discourse and debate to occur with those who existed 
outside of their regions, and for that discourse to be trusted since the government 
could play little to no role in influencing it.  
This leads to the conclusion that the real shifts took place beyond the officially 
structured political parties or institutions. The real power in Egypt lies in what we 
call social capital or public spheres “in which the contest over public opinion has 
begun, with governments spinning public relations and political challengers 
trying to widen the definition of authoritarian censorship” (Hafez, 2008). The 
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2011 uprising and what happened after it clearly showed that traditional media 
had less power to challenge the government than expected, while the real 
challenge came from the social capital of rural areas, which included various 
groups of leftist, Arab nationalists, secularist, feminist, Islamist etc, who were 
able to strongly influence public opinion and to generate huge movements outside 
the media who were united against Mubarak and later on, against the other 
oppressive governments installed after his resignation. The 2013 uprising was 
clearly a massive popular movement, a large mobilization based on the social 
capital of the region that gathered together people from various groups and beliefs 
and united them through the strong bond of their unique voice calling for real 
changes (Ledwell, 2012). It was social capital and the solidification of the public 
sphere, aided but not created by the use of social media, that helped create this 
gathering.  
As Castells affirmed, “the move towards mass self-communication is 
fundamentally changing the relationship between everyday individuals and the 
institutions that once dominated the communication infrastructure and means of 
cultural production” (Castells, 2009). He describes the social capital as a 
“network society” in which the power centres are in “communication nodes”, 
where institutional media no longer occupies a position of primacy: “power is no 
longer located in one particular social sphere or institution, but it is distributed 
throughout the entire realm of human action” (Castells, 2009).  Illustrating this 
very phenomenon, Qalyoubia’s Interviewee A explained, 
"In the end, even if you were not a social media user, because of the 
gatherings between people and different types of people and media, 
consumer information from different media forms was shared. So the 
knowledge coming from different media forms, even if you were not a 
user of it, was shared and, based on it, citizens decide whether to 
follow more news or join in discussions on social media platforms" 
(A, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
This serves as an example of power being distributed through different 
mediums, and across a wide range of actions. Similarly, in Menoufia, Interviewee 
G mentioned that "due to the intensity and value of the uprisings, participating in 
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politics while feeling it could make a difference, motivated me and people around 
me to participate in expressing political opinions" (G, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Finally, in South Sinai, Interviewee D noted that "after the 2013 uprisings one felt 
that he was part of Egypt as a whole not as a separate area and needed to 
constantly follow and engage into politics more than before" (D, 2018 in South 
Sinai). All these examples highlight the manner in which power became 
dispersed, and involvement was no longer dependent on “one particular social 
sphere or institution” (Castells, 2009). Instead, different media forms, actions, 
opinions, groups, and individuals hold the power. Rural citizens were not 
dependent on one particular media form or another, and became aware that their 
involvement was what mattered in the sense that the strength of their social 
capital and collective action could affect outcomes. Social media was simply one 
method from which this could occur.  
Therefore, the benefit of convergence between both medias was that it 
supported making information reach the public, and empowered citizens to start 
using social media more after 2011 in order to consolidate their opinions and 
begin to feel comfortable using this new form of communication to influence  
public perception. Maybe the most important aspect that has to be taken into 
consideration in this situation is the fact that the goal of citizen journalists is very 
much different from the goal of institutional journalists. The use of online 
networks did not cause the 2011 uprisings, but it certainly gathered disparate 
individuals together under the common voice of protests against a humiliating 
and dictatorial regime in different areas of Egypt and not making rural citizens 
feel as isolated citizens in Egypt. The many years of such a regime had shifted the 
collective consciousness of the rural Egyptians and caused them to extend their 
trust no further than their immediate acquaintances, such as their tribe, their 
family, their neighbours or their co-workers. The lack of social trust was also the 
product of a lack of social interactions that have been caused by isolation, poor 
infrastructure and high distances in the rural areas. This is why the people – who 
were fragmented in various public spheres, such as the rural areas studied, felt 
they protested for so long about politics – used the online space to grow their 
power after 2011 when they had a better understanding of social media and to 
spread their word to the urban areas that have not focused on them.  In Qalyoubia, 
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Interviewee I, explained, "using social media gave me a chance to interact with 
people I did not know that were not particularly from Qalyoubia" (I, 2018 in 
South Sinai). In Menoufia, Interviewee H mentioned, "social media helped me in 
exposing myself to understanding the opinions of people living in urban centers 
about politics" (H, 2018 in Menoufia). Interviewee C in Minya mentioned 
something similar, stating that "when social media helped in grouping people 
from different parts of Egypt, it made the collective feeling stronger then when 
each area was living in its own bubble" (C, 2018 in Minya). Finally, In South 
Sinai, Interviewee E discussed the fact that "after the uprisings social media gave 
us the first chance to collaborate with people in different areas of Egypt and 
made us think about other areas more than just South Sinai only after we got used 
to social media so around the 2013 uprisings" (E, 2018 in South Sinai). These all 
serve as examples of the manner in which social media aided in the expansion of 
social circles, and an enhancement of rural Egypt’s social capital through greater 
ease in communication between previously isolated regions.  
Again, this highlights the role of social media in creating a wider public sphere 
by decreasing the lack of social interactions caused by isolation and distance. In 
this way, fragmentation decreased and an uncoerced space for political discourse 
grew through social media. Especially in the rural areas, this happened at a very 
low level before the uprising, but after these events more people wanted at least 
to spread their news and opinions to people out of their social circle. Even non-
direct social media users in rural areas, who were mainly above 50 years old, 
unless they held leading positions in political parties opposing the ruling party, 
relied on having access to social media from through other family or group 
members who used the Internet (Ledwell, 2012). This was highlighted previously 
in relation to Qalyoubia’s parliament member. Therefore, it is clear that the public 
sphere was enhanced through the use of online social networks and that, as a 
result, a stronger and more widespread social capital came to exist. Interviewee B 
from Qalyoubia’s comment that the importance of social media was based on the 
fact that it allowed “sharing information with Egyptians not in [their] rural 
area” is only one example of this (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
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The interviews that were done and analysed for this study showed that, at least 
in the rural areas, people still preferred their social circles to the social media 
networks as explained and quoted in Chapter 4. However, even though these 
actions appear more like an activist endeavour, rather than a journalistic one, 
people had a common goal: to support the public interest. Even though the 
Egyptian government had been accused for decades of injustice, it was the image 
of a young man killed and disfigured by the security forces which led people to 
engage in massive protests, which were also inspired and mobilised by the online 
dissemination of this cruel image. This is borne out in interview data. In 
Qalyoubia, Interviewee E, said, "Khaled Said was resembling the symbol of 
injustice over the years of the Mubarak regime" (E, 2018 in Qalyoubia). In 
Menoufia, Interviewee A, explained, "the way Khaled Said was treated irritated 
many Egyptians and moved them regardless of if he was a drug addict or not" (A, 
2018 in Menoufia). In Minya, Interviewee D mentioned, "many mothers were 
moved by Khaled Said’s mom and her statement about him which helped in 
moving people after feeling he was a victim of the corrupt police managed in 
Egypt" (D, 2018 in Minya). In South Sinai, Interviewee E, stated, "Khaled Said 
was the most important catalyst in instigating people’s feelings" (E, 2018 in 
South Sinai). All of this highlights that national sentiments did exist in 2011, and 
immediately prior to the 2011 uprisings, despite the fact that these rural areas 
mostly focused on their own areas. The abuse of Said, and the subsequent 
creation of the Facebook group “We are All Khaled Said” brought a light to this 
example of injustice, and mobilized the public. In this way, social networks did in 
face operate in a journalistic fashion.  
Even though citizen journalism has many times been characterised as 
amateurish, the 2011 uprising demonstrated that the media practices needed to 
undergo a very profound change not only in terms of gaining independence from 
the state, but also in terms of storytelling. The citizen-journalist delivered 
authentic experiences accompanied by videos, images and testimonials that - 
despite the fact they were not professional - had the power of generating real 
emotions and empathy. This kind of journalism was closer to the specificity of the 
Egyptian citizens who were reacting to what their neighbours told them rather 
than to what they were reading in a newspaper or watching on TV (Ledwell, 
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2012). Social media, in this way, acted as an online version of the community-
mindedness that already characterized rural Egypt when it came to discussing, 
verifying, and trusting information about politics.  
Interviewee B in Qalyoubia, explained, "when social media became more 
common it became as an extension of the social circles in rural areas"(B, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). 
Interviewee G in Menoufia, stated, 
"social media usage helped connecting the social circles in the rural 
communities with people in other parts of Egypt, so exposing the 
social circles in rural areas to other social circles that might not 
necessarily be rural social circles" (G, 2018 in Menoufia).  
Interviewee D in Minya, said, 
"social media extended the form of media people in our rural 
communities could be exposed to even if it won’t change their minds 
but it adds to the methods of news in the rural community they are 
living in if they can use it" (D, 2018 in Minya).  
Interviewee E in South Sinai, mentioned, "using social media connected 
information to the information we got through traditional media and in social 
circles in our tribes" (E, 2018 in South Sinai).  
Before, during and after the uprising in 2011, the Egyptian audience reacted to 
real experiences that the new media managed, at some point, to offer. The 
ordinary voices of ordinary people had more and more authority in a state ruled 
by a deaf dictatorial regime and by a state-owned media, leading to a dramatic 
change in the journalistic coverage after the 2011 uprising. Even though the 
political regimes that came after Mubarak tried to control them at no cost, some 
independent media managed to represent the voice of the people (Ledwell, 2012). 
On social media, the debate is centered around what it is called “discussion 
groups”, which refers to the “cascade effect in which “non-experts rely on non-
experts” which can lead to the “fortification of errors” (Sunstein and Thaler, 
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2008). Nevertheless, the diversity of opinions offered by social media 
environments also offers the opportunity to get many recommendations and many 
counter-opinions so that the system is self regulatory and the members of a really 
strong community will not accept within their social groups information they 
consider fake. The reason why social media enhances, in fact, social capital, is the 
fact that with limited social capital, such as with members of a neighbourhood or 
even of a family, one never has the chance to exchange information at a higher 
level. In social media networks, one can extend their social circle and build 
bridges to those outside their immediate circle, meaning one can participate in a 
more heterogeneous discussion and engage in different polemics and 
controversies, as well as share ideas and information, which increases access to a 
large amount of information (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Social capital is used to 
make connections and to exchange information and, in the case of rural Egypt, 
social media contributed heavily to the construction of an interactive culture 
enabling people of very different environments to participate in the creation of a 
virtual community where the elite members of the press were no longer dictating 
the agenda setting (Srinivasan, 2014). This is because rural citizens used these 
social media platforms to reach people in urban areas and express their opinions 
in the rural areas. Unlike urban citizens, rural citizens generally felt secluded 
from the rest of Egypt and, as such, benefitted from social media in the sense that 
they could connect to the rest of the country, speak to other Egyptians, and feel 
closer to their fellow citizens as opposed to isolated to their own governorate 
alone. For example, Interviewee I in Qalyoubia, explained, "the idea that I could 
interact with other Egyptians in other urban areas added a form of 
communication for a rural citizen like me" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Interviewee G 
in Menoufia, stated, "communicating with Egyptians in different parts of Egypt 
was very interesting during the uprisings because it gave a collective feeling to 
citizens being grouped as all Egyptians" (G, 2018 in Menoufia). Interviewee A in 
Minya, 
"the use of social media and communicating with Egyptians in 
different parts of Egypt gave an option that did not happen before in 
terms of communicating between citizens that gave me a sense of 
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feeling that I was an Egyptian not just a citizen from Minya" (A, 2018 
in Minya). 
Interviewee E in South Sinai, stated, "using social media made me feel slightly 
better that I am not a citizen from South Sinai secluded from all events if they are 
not happening in South Sinai as before" (E, 2018 in South Sinai). According to 
the previous quotes it is clear that social media connected different people on its 
platforms. Even though the rural citizens did not have Internet access to the same 
scale as their urban comrades, the boundary between the online and the offline 
environment became weaker and weaker, because in one way or another, the 
information was spread across all houses and families. Interviews showed that 
many citizens living in the rural areas over the age of 50 years had never accessed 
social media or had social media accounts, but they did ask members of their 
community about the online information and had further discussions with the 
members of their social groups (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia; B, 2018 in South Sinai). 
The interviews that have been done for this study confirmed these findings and 
also the fact that younger citizens – up to the age of 40 – started to use social 
media after the 2011 uprisings and continued to increase. Many people from rural 
areas preferred to remain traditional and haven’t accessed social media, but their 
social interactions with family members and close social group members have 
been impacted by what happened in the social and converging media 
environment. In fact, the creators of social media movements, such as the 
administrators of different successful Facebook and Twitter pages counted on this 
behaviour and knew that their messages would also be spread around via word of 
mouth (Erle et al., 2012). Therefore, rural citizens that became social media users 
used the media to spread their opinions to urban areas not the other way around. 
They impacted the media by explaining their opinions and it increased their social 
capital by feeling that their opinion can be heard in other areas such as through 
the space of flows concept. 
7.5. The Effect of the 2011 Egyptian Uprisings on the Electoral 
Framework  
As already discussed, the 2011 uprisings represented a traditional mode of 
political participation in Egypt and marked the beginning of a series of 
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transformations in the political system of this country. After the resignation of 
President Mubarak, studies showed that almost all citizens had strong feelings of 
nationalism (Ellison, 2015; Sakr, 2013a), as they were all proud of being 
Egyptians, but their political values and trust were affected by the divisions in the 
country, in terms of religious and national identity.  The oppressive governance 
from the previous 40 years caused them to be highly unsupportive of the majority 
of political actors and institutions. Their feeling that Egypt would remain corrupt 
and lacking in civil liberties in the future was still present; this is revealed in the 
following statistics gathered between August and October 2011, all of which 
highlight that trust in the majority of political actors was low. For Islamic 
Charities and the press, those who chose “no confidence at all” or “little 
confidence” number 39% and 59% respectively. For religious groups and parties, 
this was 60%. Finally, in terms of the police, civil society organizations, unions, 
and political parties, the statistic highlights that 61%, 63%, 70%, and 76% chose 
“no confidence at all” or “little confidence” respectively (Erle et al., 2012). 
The effect of this can be seen when looking at formal participation in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. After SCAF took power of the state, a 
constitutional review committee was founded and a referendum for a 
constitutional declaration organised. During this time, the restrictive measures 
against forming political parties was removed and over 80 parties were formed. 
Parliamentary elections were organised between November 2011 and January 
2012. These elections were proclaimed as being “the first honest national 
elections of any sort held in Egypt since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952” 
(Ifes.org, 2013). The Islamists, run by Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom Justice 
Party, had an overwhelming victory, taking 47% of seats. As already 
demonstrated, citizens from rural areas proved to have a very strong political 
consciousness, as they participated massively in both parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Turnouts showed that around 72% of the rural population 
took part in parliamentary elections. In May and June of 2012 Egypt faced the 
first free presidential elections; the first round held thirteen candidates and the 
second round held only two - the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, and 
Ahmed Shafik, a former Mubarak regime Prime Minister (El-Mallakh, 2017). 
These elections gave many rural citizens mixed feelings. For example, 
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Interviewee F in Minya explained that "everyone thought the candidate from 
Mubarak’s regime would win because they had their old connections" (F, 2018 in 
Minya).  
In any case, Morsi won the election. A total of 51.8% of the population of 
Egypt participated in the presidential elections and the turnouts fell below 50% 
for all votes that followed it (El-Mallakh, 2017). The main grievances of the 
citizens were related to political freedoms, civil rights and economic issues. In 
Qalyoubia, Interviewee I stated, "the fact that I knew that normally votes were 
forged did not make me feel my vote will make a difference right away after 2011 
uprisings. I could not believe that the Mubarak regime style of elections was 
over" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
In Menoufia, Interviewee G, explained, "my vote never made a difference 
before so I felt like the change would not happen immediately and that maybe 
corruption would still be there in voting" (G, 2018 in Menoufia).  
In Minya, Interviewee B, said,  "I did not feel like my vote would make a 
difference and I was busy so was not keen to put in the effort for a wasted vote" 
(B, 2018 in Minya). 
In South Sinai, Interviewee A, mentioned, "I knew that many people would 
vote anyway and did not feel like my vote would make a difference" (A, 2018 in 
South Sinai).   
As the interviewee comments seem to imply, the voter turnout was not as high 
as expected: in the first round only 46% of the citizens participated in the 
presidential elections, while in the second round the percentage increased to 
51.8% (El-Mallakh, 2017). These figures show that, first of all, people were not 
used to taking part in free elections and, second, they still had no trust that any 
real change would happen. For example, in Menoufia, Interviewee G stated: "why 
would elections make a difference this time? The government always did what 
they wanted so this time it would have been the SCAF instead" (G, 2018 in 
Menoufia). The 40 years of dictatorial rule made them uninterested in engaging in 
formal political activities. Also, the percentages show that when people had only 
two choices, in the second round, their participation in the elections was not much 
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higher than in the first round, which means that they did not trust either of the 
candidates (El-Mallakh, 2017). This is evident in one Qalyoubia interviewee’s 
statement, Interviewee C, who asserted that "the rule of Muslim Brotherhood was 
using religion to mix it with politics and that was [negatively] impacting the 
identity of Egypt" (C, 2018 in Qalyoubia). Of course, this is only one example; 
the statement made by Interviewee G in Menoufia - that everyone believes "the 
candidate from Mubarak’s regime would win because they had their old 
connections" - and Interviewee F in Minya’s opinion that the elections were 
essentially meaningless since the "government [has] always [done] what they 
want" equally apply to this point (G, 2018 in Menoufia; F, 2018 in Minya). These 
examples all highlight that the presidential elections may not have been viewed as 
truly honest, and that citizens were unconvinced by either the candidates or the 
process. This may be due to the actors involved, as the trust in political actors 
further highlights, or it may simply be due to unease at elections. In terms of the 
latter, the 2005 elections show that this situation can be viewed with suspicion 
and that this suspicion can impact involvement (Lynch, 2006). In any case, in all 
elections, rural participation was much higher than Cairo, which is the biggest 
urban city and where Tahrir Square is.   
The participation in parliamentary elections was much higher than that in 
presidential elections, because, once again, the rural areas made their presence 
felt. For villagers, the elected parliamentarians represent the mediators between 
their community and the state, which provided their direct representatives. 
Therefore, the rural citizens had a greater interest in participating in parliamentary 
elections, which was why the participants’ percentages were higher. Nevertheless, 
Morsi’s victory was very much due to the high presence of rural citizens in the 
presidential elections, because rural Egypt had a long history of support for 
Islamists. In Qalyoubia, Interviewee F, mentioned, "I was never a Muslim 
Brotherhood supporter, yet when it came to the first elections after 2012 I thought 
if the other option was from the past regime why not try another option maybe it 
would be better" (F, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
The rural local leaders were especially nostalgic for the public order they had 
experienced before the 2011 uprisings, so the support of the countryside again 
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was a major contribution to the elections’ results (Abadeer et al., 2017). In South 
Sinai, Interviewee C, said, "stability was needed with having a president and 
regime in place, which motivated people to be more keen on voting in the first 
presidential elections after the 2011 uprisings" (C, 2018 in South Sinai).  
However, the Morsi regime did not prove to be very different from the 
previous one and, on the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood did everything 
possible to embody the Mubarak regime’s old state mechanism – the army, the 
police and the bureaucracy – even naming the former Mubarak staff to the head 
of the most important state positions. Despite continuous protests and proposals 
suggested by informal political movements and human rights organisations, 
Morsi never cleaned the political apparatus and used the same old state-practices, 
such as torture, detentions and even killings. Consequently, the people mobilised 
again. In fact, the number of protests in 2013 were higher than at any time in the 
history of Egypt – 3817 different protests were staged during one single year 
(Ifes.org., 2013). Once again, like 2011, there was a disconnect between the 
public sphere and the state in terms of their desires, political opinions, and views 
on political discourse. This seems to have played a role in the re-mobilisation.  
The corrupt traditional media broadcasting state-controlled news, together with 
the oppressive Morsi regime, was responsible for replacing the excitement 
generated by the parliament elections with a sense of despair and scepticism 
towards politics, among all citizens. In Menoufia, Interviewee D, explained, "I 
voted because I felt that I have a personal civic and political sense of duty, a to  
contribute in change" (D, 2018 in Menoufia). He voted because he felt that his 
vote was not a simple transaction with the state, but a responsibility that has to be 
taken personally. Thus, it is clear that there was also a disconnect between the 
public sphere - as seen through social media and local discussion - and the 
traditional media. The views of the citizens were in conflict with the views set out 
by the media and the state. As a result, the public sphere - and, consequently, the 
strong social capital that existed and was enhanced by social media - strengthened 
the desire to re-mobilise. This situation may explain why the number of protests 
were much higher in 2013. 
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Interviewee F in Menoufia, explained: "I just voted because I felt the country 
needed me to move not that I really believed the change would happen" (F, 2018 
in Menoufia). 
Interviewee G, also from Menoufia, stated: 
"Morsi’s rule made Egyptians feel as if we are going backwards and 
not that 2011 led to change, which encouraged people to move more 
than 2011. Even when people voted for Morsi in 2012 they did not 
expect him to interfere [with] religion to that extent. He was focusing 
on [the] Muslim Brotherhood, not Egypt" (G, 2018 in Menoufia). 
Interviewee K in Qalyoubia, mentioned: "I was motivated to participate this 
time because people around me were all motivated, and seemed like they were 
supporting each other via discussions to participate, and encouraging everyone 
else to be involved for the benefit of our country" (K, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Similarly, in Minya, Interviewee F explained: "The way Egypt was heading under 
the Muslim Brotherhood did not look like Egypt. It seemed like another 
country"(F, 2018 in Minya). Even in South Sinai, Interviewee B who used to 
support the Muslim Brotherhood, explained: "They shocked Egyptians and made 
people hate them in a very short time, which depressed everyone who 
participated in 2011 uprisings"(B, 2018 in South Sinai). 
After the 2011 uprisings and the parliamentary elections, Egyptian citizens 
truly believed that their vote would not be just ink on a piece of paper, which was 
how they felt during the Mubarak regime that had used them only as a façade of 
democracy. They hoped that their sacrifices would really count and that a new 
political order would be installed. However, they soon realised that the electoral 
promises and the liberal democratic ideologies did not represent a guarantee for a 
better future but were rather a metaphorical form of political expression. 
Therefore, they also understood that they had to fight for their rights by all 
available means. After the new wave of 2013 uprisings, the intention to vote 
again was generally rated at under 50%, although in the rural areas people still 
proved to be motivated, as is revealed the table below, representing the four 
governorates chosen to be taken into account for this thesis. 
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Governorate Population Urban 
Population 
Rural 
Population 
Political 
Participation in 
Presidential 
Elections 2014 
Qalyoubia 5,105,972 2,280,927 2,825,045 55.2% 
South Sinai 167,426 85,502 81,924 45.4% 
Minya 5,156,702 973,418 4,183,284 35.4% 
Menoufia 3,941,293 812,833 3,128,460 62.6% 
Political Participation in Presidential Election, 2014 (CAPMAS, 2015) 
The voter turnouts were indeed 47.5%, which is under 50%, and once again 
people proved to be more excited about participating in the voting process in the 
rural areas than in urban ones. After the 2013 uprising, citizens from the rural 
areas had two different opinions about the abolishment of the Morsi regime. 
Some of them were excited and truly believed in their social force, and its 
implications for democratic power, considering that any president coming after 
Mubarak and Morsi should understand that the people represent a force and that 
they would bring him down if he failed to deliver on what he promised. Interview 
data suggests that this opinion was brought about by the understanding of rural 
citizens that their social capital could be used to enact change, and that the use of 
this social capital would align Egypt’s politics with the desires of the public 
sphere. 
For example, Interviewee B in Qalyoubia, explained: "It was necessary for the 
Muslim Brotherhood to understand the strength of Egyptians and the support of 
the army for the people when needed regardless of the regime" (B, 2018 in 
Qalyoubia). 
In Minya, Interviewee C, explained: "So many things were going on and no 
one knew what to do but it was clear that the country was messed up and 
something had to be done hoping that Mubarak regime would not come back" (C, 
2018 in Minya).  
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In South Sinai, Interviewee B explained: "Although I supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood they clearly were not the right decision and they had to be removed" 
(B, 2018 in South Sinai).  
In Menoufia Interviewee J, said: "Egypt was not Egypt with the Muslim 
Brotherhood; we had to act and show them our strength" (J, 2018 in Menoufia).  
The other group in rural Egypt were concerned that if Morsi went away, it will 
be much easier for the Mubarak state to return to power. As such, this group was 
more hesitant to act, despite knowing that they could. They held the opinion that 
it may be more beneficial to wait since there was a risk that any action may aid in 
the Mubarak regime returning. The interview data below highlights this. 
Interviewee I in Qalyoubia, stated: "The main fear I felt during the 2013 
uprisings was the return of the Mubarak regime" (I, 2018 in Qalyoubia).  
While Interviewee C in Menoufia, explained: 
"It was a very critical time; no one knew what was the right move, 
whether to wait or support the 2013 uprisings because the Muslim 
Brotherhood was heading in the wrong direction. Would the Mubarak 
regime take over again or what would happen?" (C, 2018 in 
Menoufia).  
While Interviewee F in South Sinai, said: "If there was a guarantee at the time 
that the Mubarak regime would not return I would have not hesitated about 
supporting the 2013 uprisings" (F, 2018 in South Sinai). 
Clearly, both groups were motivated to vote by their different beliefs. 
Regardless of which group they were in, however, rural citizens had a higher 
engagement level, which had ramifications for voter turnout. For example, Suez 
(an urban governorate) had a turnout of 18.1%, while South Sinai’s turnout was 
41.6% (Pres2014.elections.eg, 2014). As such, it is clear that these different 
beliefs may have played a role in political participation, but that the urban versus 
rural nature of the actors was still more significant.  
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The newly elected president after the 2013 uprisings was the former defence 
minister, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who was elected with around 97% of the votes 
because he conducted the operation to overthrow Morsi. A very important aspect 
that can be underlined from the 2014 voter turnouts is the fact that, since the 
villagers were less exposed to the media agenda setting than their urban 
counterparts, their collective mindset acts in a freer way. Even though they 
listened closely to their local leaders, their way of acting was more independent 
than in the urban areas, being less demoralised and discouraged. Unlike the hard 
life and lack of resources they face on a daily basis, their political sense is much 
stronger than in the urban areas (El-Mallakh, 2017). 
However, dissatisfaction in the elections’ results and the triumph of the Ikhwan 
(Muslim Brotherhood) after the first democratic presidential elections generated 
some political powers that have created a counter balance to their own uprisings. 
This situation generated the 2013 uprising that eventually led to a military 
intervention. It “countered the counter-revolution and led to demands for the 
return of legitimacy to the people and for a respect of the outcomes of the ‘Jan 
25’ revolution” (Castells, 2012).   
7.6. Conclusion 
After the 2011 uprising, the media continued its activity and its coverage, still 
impacting micro and macro public spheres. Those citizens who had not even 
accessed media and especially social media sources, became more open to its use 
after the 2011 uprising. While their specific opinions of the value of social media 
varied based on governorate, all agreed that reliance on social media for 
information became more commonplace and accepted.  
In terms of state media, there was little impact on feelings of empowerment or 
the enhancement of the public sphere. This can be seen in interview data 
highlighting knowledge of the regime’s control of state channels. However, this 
was not the case with private, satellite, and social media. In these cases, it seems 
to be the case that there was an invigoration of the public sphere and an increase 
in feelings of empowerment. For private and satellite channels, their closure 
motivated citizens to go out and physically protest, as mentioned in the interview 
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data throughout this chapter. For social media, this invigoration of the public 
sphere and enhanced empowerment is evident in many areas. First, this can be 
seen in the increase of citizen-journalists and Facebook groups that arose to 
discuss issues of political, economic, and social significance. Second, the 
invigoration of the public sphere and enhanced feelings of empowerment is 
evident in the increased communication between once-strangers, and the transfer 
of “thick” trust, as mentioned in this chapter. Finally, social media trust in the 
aftermath of 2011 led to its greater use and growth in rural areas for direct 
communication relevant to politics. The parliament member from Qalyoubia 
(Interviewee B) highlights this clearly (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia). 
Generally, the analysis of the results of the interviews, supported by statistics, 
demonstrated some other very interesting and important factors that are 
considered useful to the goal of this thesis. First of all, it proved to be the case 
that the 2011 uprising was created and enhanced by the social capital of Egypt’s 
citizens - a majority of which were, as discussed, rural. These citizens, due to a 
unity of aim, acted in a unified manner in order to protest against civil, political, 
and social injustice. Despite the fact that -  as seen by the 2013 Muslim 
Brotherhood regime - little change had occurred to the state apparatus in the 
aftermath of Mubarak’s resignation, this was not due to disinterest on the side of 
Egypt’s citizens. In fact, the uprisings of 2013 highlight a renewed interest in 
politics, a decrease in political apathy, and a motivation to continue to use the 
enhanced social capital achieved in 2011 in order to enact change. This, 
essentially, caused a shift in power; a public sphere began to arise that included 
communication between distinct governorates, and an interest in national politics 
followed. Despite little effect on the political system, there were in fact changes 
at the individual and social level.  
With regards to voting, the high voter turnout in the parliamentary elections - 
both before and after the uprisings - demonstrated a very important issue: despite 
claims that social media negatively impacts social capital, the fact that voting in 
parliamentary elections was (and remain) high indicates that this is not the case.. 
In a state ruled by a 40-year dictatorship, social media empowered people, instead 
of destabilising their level of connectivity. Relations between people had not 
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become weaker and more superficial. On the contrary, in times of instability, high 
corruption, and high control over traditional media, social media maintained a 
strong level of social interaction between people who could express themselves 
freely, who were able to get updated and find out real coverage of the facts and 
who could even participate in agenda setting by becoming citizen journalists. 
Even though people from rural areas did not have access to the Internet due to 
various barriers, they were still impacted by the fact that members of their 
community updated them concerning the social media coverage. After 2011, 
norms began to change and social media use became more prevalent than it had 
been before 2011. Rural citizens then used social media to express their opinions 
to urban citizens, empowering and enhancing the pre-existing social capital that 
existed in their areas. This chapter demonstrated that the citizens from the rural 
areas had again been a force for political change through significant political 
engagement. Their political and civic sense was demonstrated during the 
elections. This was especially the case when it came to the parliamentary 
elections. On one hand, their hope and desire for a democratic regime made them 
overcome economic, cultural and geographic barriers and fears, and brought them 
out to vote in high numbers. On the other hand, they proved that they were not 
naïve and easy to deceive. Once they saw that the new Morsi regime was not 
what they were expecting it to be, they did not hesitate to protest again and to be 
present once again in the 2013 uprising, in higher percentages than the urban 
citizens, in the new presidential elections.  
In conclusion, a number of profound transformations did take place in Egypt 
after the 2011 uprisings, but they were mainly visible in people’s collective 
consciousness, because they realised the power they held together. Social media - 
along with some private satellite television channels, newspaper publications and 
some individual courageous professional journalists - empowered the people, 
including those from rural areas, to take action and to fight for their rights.  
The aim of this chapter was to respond to the third research question of this 
thesis - how did media coverage of the uprisings impact micro public spheres and 
so feelings of empowerment and social capital in rural Egypt? It has been shown 
that media coverage, particularly in the form of private television and social 
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media, strengthened the micro-public spheres of Egypt by increasing the links 
between governorates, and emphasizing the strength of Egypt’s citizens to enact 
political change. This positively impacted social capital as well as feelings of 
empowerment. State media remained unchanged and, therefore, did not affect 
feelings of empowerment in either direction; as previously shown, the citizens of 
Egypt viewed state media as part of the state propaganda machine and did not 
trust it. This viewpoint expanded to include Al Jazeera, albeit in a slightly 
different form, in the build-up to 2013. However, the other forms of media did in 
fact play a role in feelings of empowerment and the strengthening of Egypt’s 
social capital, as well as in the formation of more connected governorates. In fact, 
the expansion of social capital to include strangers, and the overall acceptance 
that disparate governorates did in fact share commonalities is highly significant. 
This impacted national elections, connectivity both online and offline, and 
decreased levels of political apathy within the country. As such, media did play a 
role that cannot be neglected. 
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8. Conclusion: Rural Egypt (2011-2015) & What Comes Next 
 
Throughout this thesis, interview data has been collected and analysed from 
interviews in four rural areas in Egypt: Qalyoubia, Menoufia, Minya, and South 
Sinai. This data - in combination with secondary data, statistics, and academic 
research from a variety of fields, including communication studies and politics - 
has been used in order to examine and assess the impact of the new media 
environment, specifically the synergy between social media and satellite 
television, on the public sphere and political interactions of rural Egypt in order to 
ultimately analyse the role social media played in neglected areas of Egypt during 
the 2011 uprisings. In order to achieve the aims of this study, an assessment has 
been conducted of various areas that touch on this overarching subject. The first 
of these areas was an analysis of the role of social media in relation to its effect 
on political interaction and interaction norms in rural Egypt. This was followed 
by an assessment of social capital, as well as the manner in which the social 
capital of rural Egypt affected political interaction among rural Egyptians in the 
public sphere, taking into consideration the state of rural interaction with social 
media. Finally, the effect of media coverage on the uprisings was considered in 
rural Egypt with a focus on the media’s role in invigorating the micro-public 
sphere and an assessment of its contribution regarding the strengthening of the 
social capital within rural Egypt. Through each of these areas being considered, 
the relationship between social capital, media coverage, political interaction and 
interaction norms has been clarified. 
 
As such, a conclusion has been reached on the impact of the new media 
environment on the public sphere and political interaction within rural Egypt, 
specifically in terms of the effect of social media: it was found that social capital - 
more than any other aspects, including social media and the new media 
environment - played the largest role in the uprisings of 2011 and their aftermath. 
The new media environment and social media did affect political interaction and 
the public sphere in the sense that they expanded the conversations that were 
already occurring in each governorate, which had a positive effect on social 
capital. Moreover, given the lack of trust in the media, and the prevalent idea that 
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state news was controlled by the state, social media acted to provide updates 
‘from the ground’ and brought to light the perspectives of the common citizens. 
Thus, while social media and the new media environment did undoubtedly play a 
role, neither of them acted as the decisive factor in relation to the 2011 uprisings 
and their 2013 counterparts.  In order to reach this conclusion, this thesis was 
divided into six distinct chapters, each dealing with one specific element of the 
overarching aim. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis delved into the contextual background of the 
subject in order to provide a suitable foundation for all subsequent analysis. A 
brief overview of rural Egypt was provided, as was a brief outline of the 
historical, social, and geographic differences between the four chosen regions. By 
highlighting these differences, it was shown that these four regions provided 
enough diversity from which one could derive commonalities and differences 
relevant to this study. Following this overview, an outline was provided of formal 
and informal political participation in Egypt, highlighting the definitions of each 
as well as the prevalence of each form of political participation within Egypt. 
Given that one focus of this thesis is the manner in which the new media 
environment affects political interaction and interaction norms, this section was 
necessary in order to provide a baseline from which any analysis would start. It 
was shown that formal and informal participation existed in Egypt, that the 
importance placed on parliamentary elections in rural Egypt highlights a greater 
connection with formal participation, and that informal political participation did 
exist through both online and offline acts. These acts existed partially as an 
inadvertent effect of the Mubarak regime’s attempts to appear pro-democratic 
internally, and partially through the response of citizens to injustices that arose 
through the regime’s authoritarian methods and infringement of civil rights. 
Given the existence of these informal political acts, the following section 
elaborated on social media access in rural Egypt in order to clarify the limitations 
that exist in these areas. It was shown that economic, linguistic, educational, 
infrastructural, and socio-political barriers limited social media use in rural Egypt 
prior to 2011 and that, as a result, social media usage was minimal. This meant 
that the idea of the uprisings as a “revolution [that] began on Facebook”  was, at 
the very least, an incomplete analysis of the situation (Vargas, 2012). The final 
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section of this chapter dealt with the relationship between the media and the state, 
both prior to 2011 and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. It was highlighted 
here that the media faced many challenges prior to 2011 that arose due to its 
relationship with the state. Centralized printing, censorship by the state, 
bureaucracy to limit the creation of new channels, threats of imprisonment, and a 
culture of fear and self-censorship existed in pre-2011 Egypt. This limited the 
media’s ability to act in an uncoerced manner and operate as an objective public 
sphere. This continued in the aftermath of the uprisings, despite the attempts of 
several journalists to enact change. The aftermath of 2011 was characterized by a 
continuation of the self-censorship culture, the continued threat of imprisonment 
by the Muslim Brotherhood, fear of SCAF, and a culture of obedience ingrained 
into the sector from years under Mubarak. 
 
Having provided this contextual background, the second chapter then provided 
a background to the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. Among others, this 
chapter considered the political context of the Egyptian media system, public 
sphere theory, agenda setting theory, relevant studies and practical examples 
relating to social media, convergence theory and the manner in which private, 
state, and international broadcasting proved significant in 2011, as well as the 
concept of social capital. In essence, this chapter provided an overview of 
relevant scholarly research of significance for the purpose of this study and its 
objectives regarding the investigation of social media, political interaction, and 
rural Egypt. Much of this data was used throughout the thesis in order to highlight 
or evaluate the practical considerations found through the interview data. As 
such, this chapter was fundamental for the findings of the study. 
 
Having considered the theoretical and contextual aspects of this study, the 
thesis began to address the question at hand: what was the new media 
environment’s effect on the public sphere and political interactions of rural Egypt, 
taking into consideration the synergy between social media and satellite 
television, and - given this - what was the role played by social media in rural 
Egypt during the uprisings of 2011? As determined in Chapter 4, the idea that the 
2011 uprising was a Facebook or Twitter uprising was shown to be incomplete. It 
was found through primary interview data, as well as through a number of 
261 
secondary statistics and academic research, that the number of people with 
Internet access was small compared to the population of Egypt. Due to this, it is 
unlikely that social media - or Internet usage - could have an instant effect on the 
norms of the Egyptian population. In fact, when taking into consideration rural 
Egypt, the idea that Internet usage strongly impacted political interaction norms 
to the extent that an uprising occurred becomes even less likely. First, this is 
because rural Egypt already had a long history of protesting political and socio-
economic injustice, a history which predates the prevalence of social media in 
Egypt. An example of this can be seen in the crisis that arose in the aftermath of 
the 1992 legislative measures, discussed in Chapter 4, which highlight the 
existence of rural resistance prior to 2011. These examples of resistance, it has 
been shown, could have created a path or tradition of protesting against the 
regime, and this period could in fact mark a period of continuous rural resistance 
in Egypt.  Researchers such as Saad (2016) have discussed this topic, and agree. 
In addition, the idea that social media impacted political interaction and 
interaction norms - and that this impact was responsible for the execution of the 
2011 uprisings - does not take into account the vast infrastructural, financial, 
educational, and socio-economic barriers that limited social media usage within 
rural Egypt. Given that over 50% of the Egyptian population is rural, these 
limitations are highly significant. Interview data supports the impact of these 
limitations. 
 
Finally, it must be taken into consideration when evaluating the significance of 
social media that the Mubarak regime shut down the Internet and mobile phone 
services relatively early in the process of the 2011 uprisings. During this time, 
social media usage was non-existent and its communicative and collaborative 
opportunities were functionally useless. Because of this, the protests had to be 
sustained through offline activities and real actions on the streets. This led to a 
situation wherein those engaged in the informal political acts that sustained the 
uprisings became aware of the scale of the protests and physical danger of those 
involved through action outside of computers, phones, and mobiles, but rather 
through the street. In some cases, this was because the individuals commuted to 
the protest centers, as they were already accustomed to for work. For others, who 
were more isolated like South Sinai, it was a matter of word-of-mouth combined 
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with television. In essence, communication and information-gathering was 
sustained only through satellite television, or direct involvement. Furthermore, 
organisation and effective planning could only be sustained through face-to-face 
interaction at protest centres such as Tahrir Square. This is not to imply that 
social media had no impact on political interaction whatsoever. The findings 
show that online and offline groups that were engaged in informal political acts 
maintained communication while the Internet was shut down. Moreover, 
Facebook groups such as “We are All Khaled Said” and the “April 6 Movement” 
did connect users under common concerns such as police brutality, economic 
inequality, and civil injustice. However, in terms of execution, much of the 
uprisings entailed offline action and face-to-face interaction. 
 
This brings us to the concerns raised during Chapter 5, during which this thesis 
evaluated the significance of social capital, as well as the manner in which the 
social capital of rural Egypt affected political interaction among rural Egyptians 
in the public sphere, taking into consideration the state of rural interaction with 
social media. In this chapter, it was found that social capital within rural Egypt 
operated in a manner that was unique and somewhat distinct from the classical 
conception of social capital. This local social capital has come to exist as a result 
of the unique historical, geographic, and societal realities of rural Egypt. Each 
governorate in Egypt was focused on addressing different issues and, as such, had 
a quasi-unified perspective on which issues were of the utmost importance. For 
example, in South Sinai this issue was security. Given the governorate’s border 
and security issues, the interview data found that this concern was consistently 
addressed. For Minya, security was less of a concern than financial stability. 
Moreover, because of the unique historical, geographical and societal realities of 
the regions, different norms existed. The more conservative approach in Lower 
Egypt regarding female public involvement is an example of this. In any case, 
these considerations and unique concerns led to regional focus on social ties and 
the viewpoint that the issues faced by each region were unique to that region and 
could only be appropriately addressed by an individual with a local connection. 
As social capital was experienced primarily due to the importance of social 
connections, societal ties, and a candidate’s tailored knowledge of the region as 
found by family history in leadership and responsibility in the area, this 
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phenomenon diminishes the idea of voting solely on the basis of political 
considerations, campaigns or ideas at the local and regional levels. Moreover, this 
leads to a situation wherein national elections are considered far less important 
than their parliamentary counterparts. 
 
One effect of this local social capital can be seen in the fact that rural political 
involvement has always been high. In fact, as shown throughout this thesis, the 
four governorates studied consistently highlighted the importance of 
parliamentary elections. This led to the Mubarak regime’s efforts to co-opt 
parliamentary members from rural regions into the ruling party in order to 
maintain a majority, highlighting the strong impact of this local social capital. 
However, this also shows that rural political activity prior to 2011 was high and 
consistent despite the barriers to social media use in the areas. After 2011, rural 
involvement in parliamentary elections remained high. However, an interesting 
development was the increased interest in presidential and national concerns. 
Many interviews spread across all four governorates noted that the 2011 uprisings 
invigorated interest in national concerns, and that this was because of the view 
that change may finally be possible. This is, of course, in contrast to the previous 
viewpoint that the presidential elections were predetermined and voting would 
not make a difference. As Interviewee B in Qalyoubia and Interviewee A in South 
Sinai stated respectively, the 2011 uprisings encouraged the opposing viewpoint 
that each area was a “part of Egypt as a whole not a separate area” and that, as 
such, these individuals needed to “follow and engage [in] politics more than 
before” (B, 2018 in Qalyoubia; A, 2018 in South Sinai). 
 
This change - from disinterest in national politics to a motivation to engage - 
was at least partially aided by social media. Unlike the pre-2011 conditions, 
where each governorate was more siloed in terms of interest and engagement, the 
use of social media during the 2011 uprisings and its aftermath led to a situation 
wherein rural citizens began to communicate more with those outside their areas 
whom they had previously considered “strangers.” Commonalities in 
circumstances and interests arose during these discussions, as did the viewpoint 
that each governorate could be viewed as a “part of Egypt as a whole not a 
separate area.” This “bridging” brought local ideas of political involvement, and 
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the local social capital, to the national level. Social media played a role in this, 
since it allowed for that communication to occur organically, and supported 
uncoerced and personal engagement. This is in contrast to the pre-2011 period, 
where the focus of rural Egyptians was almost explicitly on parliamentary 
elections due to the view that these elections actually had an effect on the lives of 
citizens in the area. The evidence of this can be seen in both the interview data of 
this thesis where it is explicitly stated, as well as in the percentages for voter 
turnout in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The voter turnout figures were 
considered unprecedented; for example, the November 2011 election turnout was 
76% compared to 23% during the 2005 presidential elections. Moreover, as 
previously stated, the rural areas exhibited a higher percentage of involvement in 
the form of voting in presidential and constitutional elections than their urban 
counterparts. This highlights that rural political involvement was high, and that 
social media acted in such a fashion as to create a bridge between areas in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, lessening the isolation and disinterest in the 
national level.  
 
However, it is important to note that these changes do not justify the theory 
that the uprisings could be seen as a ‘Social Media Revolution’ or a “revolution 
[that] began on Facebook” (Vargas, 2012). Between 2011 and 2015, social capital 
was the key motivator. As mentioned, the history of uprisings in rural areas, the 
initial period of the 2011 uprisings where the Internet was disabled by the state, 
the relatively significant percentage of the population that relied on word-of-
mouth rather than media for information, and the general infrastructural barriers 
that limited social media use, when combined, all highlight that the 2011 
uprisings (and their 2013 counterpart) were not based on Facebook, Twitter, or 
any other social media. Instead, social media enhanced the actions that were 
already taking place, increased the engagement that was already occurring, and 
highlighted the commonalities between the rural areas in terms of their concern. 
However, as mentioned, these actions were already occurring. Offline 
engagement was taking place, and formal political participation (in terms of the 
parliamentary elections) was already considered important. In this sense, social 
media existed as another option for informal political engagement, one that 
allowed citizens to engage in a local and uncoerced space with relative ease and 
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over extended distances. However, it was one of many forms of informal political 
engagement, all of which were reliant on social capital (Lilleker and Koc-
Michalska, 2016).  
 
Of course, one interesting implication of this is that the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings lessened the extent to which rural areas operated with a local definition 
of social capital. At present, engagement with presidential elections in Egypt 
follow neither the local nor the global social capital definitions fully; instead, 
depending on whether citizens are from urban or rural areas, voting for 
presidential elections can be based on either political considerations - since the 
conventional definition provides “the necessary basis of a common language for 
analyzing capitalization…of social- and individual-based resources for certain 
utilitarian outcomes” - or societal considerations in a similar way to the decision-
making that occurs in parliamentary elections. This issue is further exacerbated 
by the fact that political understanding, and voting based on political 
considerations, is a novel idea in Egypt given the country’s history as a single-
party state. It may be possible that eventually local social capital will disappear 
and be replaced by conventional social capital over time. However, this is 
dependent on many factors, including an increased reliance on, and understanding 
of political considerations by rural and urban Egyptians; this question does serve 
as a potential subject for further study.  
 
Having shown the importance of social capital in rural Egypt during the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, as well as the manner in which this social capital 
affected political interaction and was affected by social media, it was significant 
to highlight the effect of media coverage on the uprisings in rural Egypt. This 
final consideration, with a focus on the media’s role in invigorating the micro-
public sphere and contributing to the strength of social capital, allowed for further 
clarity regarding social media and its impact. It was found that the state media 
continued its role as a part of the state propaganda machine after the 2011 
uprisings, and remained uncritical of state authority in its coverage, which 
continued to impact micro and macro public spheres by causing doubt in the mind 
of Egypt’s citizens regarding the veracity of the claims made. Moreover, those 
citizens who had not even accessed social media sources became more open to its 
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use after the 2011 uprising. While their opinions of social media varied based on 
their governorate, all agreed that reliance on social media for information, and 
trust of that information, became more commonplace and accepted.  
 
Moreover, it is clear that regional differences relating to citizen viewpoints on 
social media did exist, but that these were minor and ultimately had little impact 
for the purpose of this thesis. As mentioned previously, the histories of Egypt’s 
rural areas are deep and unique; the result of this is that the citizens of the 
governorates associate themselves more strongly with the region than they do 
with the country overall. While this is significant, and a topic that could itself be 
subject to research, its effect on social media use was minimal. There were, 
however, minor differences that deserve attention here. For example, Qalyoubia 
and Menoufia were governorates that were geographically closer to Cairo and, as 
shown in Chapter 6, normalized some of the norms in Cairo of discussion in 
general, and political discussion with strangers in particular. As such, the 
distinction between social and traditional media lessened more notably, and more 
quickly, in these governorates. In Minya, attitudes toward social media were 
characterized more by disinterest or a lack of time rather than distrust; however, 
even in the case of this governorate, it is clear that the distinction between the 
different forms of media (new and old) lessened, though it seems to be the case 
that there was still some kind of distinction. In relation to South Sinai, the 
governorate’s tribal system and security concerns led to a more conservative 
approach to social media and a slower thawing of distrust. An example of this 
exists in the comments made by Interviewee D of South Sinai, where a distinction 
is clearly highlighted when he notes that the normality of social media led to the 
information presented in the news being “diluted” in some fashion. However, 
despite this, all governorates did display a decrease in distrust of social media and 
some form of normalization. Having noted these distinctions however, it is 
important to note that this is of course an area that could be studied further, 
especially given these findings.  
 
In any case, it has already been stated that media coverage - both before and 
after the 2011 uprisings - was plagued by a variety of issues, including censorship 
by the state, bureaucracy to limit the creation of new channels, threats of 
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imprisonment, and a culture of fear and self-censorship. This limited the trust that 
rural Egyptians had in relation to the media. Several interviewees noted this, 
discussing that they used social media, private channels, and Al Jazeera because 
of the fact that the state media was controlled, propagandist, and censored. This 
finding proves that the 2011 uprising was created and desired by the common 
people, and was executed primarily by individuals gathering together in order to 
achieve a common goal. These individuals realised that their social capital was 
their most important asset and that they truly had the power to generate waves of 
protests and changes, to a certain extent at least. The fact that the corrupt system 
continued to exist and to act as an oppressive regime even after Mubarak’s 
resignation - through the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF - was not the fault of 
ordinary people, but rather highlights the view of the elite and political 
institutions was not in line with that of the remainder of Egypt. 
 
This engagement in rural Egypt can be seen, once again, with the high voter 
turnout in November 2011. The parliamentary elections, prior to and after the 
2011 uprisings, highlight the strength of rural Egypt’s formal political interaction. 
The increase in formal political participation on the national level shows that this 
strength grew to include Egypt as a whole. Interaction with social media had not 
affected social capital in a negative way. In a state ruled by a 40-year dictatorship, 
social media empowered people, instead of destabilising their level of 
connectivity. Relations between people had not become weaker and more 
superficial. On the contrary, in times of instability, high corruption, and high 
control over traditional media, social media maintained a strong level of social 
interaction between people who could express themselves freely, who were able 
to get updated and find out real coverage of the facts and who could even 
participate in the creation of the agenda setting by creating relevant first-hand 
media reports, and feeding that content into the media. Rural-urban 
communication increased, commitment to enacting political change was sparked, 
and the idea that each governorate was separate and independent decreased since 
it became clear what a unified aim could accomplish. This emphasises, once 
again, that it was in fact the social capital of Egypt that most affected the 2011 
uprisings.  
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Given the importance placed on regime change within academic fields such as 
political science, history and law - as well as the importance placed on the new 
media environment, social media, and interaction norms in fields such as 
sociology, communication studies, and journalism - this thesis has contributed to 
knowledge within the field of communication studies in two ways. First, it has 
placed social capital within the context of political interaction and regime change, 
discussing one way in which these areas can interact and the effect of this 
interaction. The relationship outlined between rural Egypt and political 
interaction, and the manner in which rural Egypt’s political interaction played a 
role in the outcome of the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath, is significant. 
Previous research had, for the most part, neglected the role of rural Egypt, 
preferring to focus instead on the protest ‘hotspots’ of Tahrir Square in Cairo, or 
on Alexandria. By distinguishing between physical presence at protest sites and 
other forms of political engagement, the role of rural Egypt has been highlighted 
as being more significant than previously thought. The second manner in which 
this research has contributed to knowledge is through an analysis of social 
media’s effect, both in regards to regime change as well as political interaction 
and social capital. As mentioned throughout, the idea that social media can 
impact interaction norms is not new. It has been studied by many theorists such as 
Elseewi, Castells, and Jenkins. This thesis, however, has shown that social media 
can act to expand social capital, bringing disparate groups of a population 
together, and igniting an interest in national discussions. While the claim that the 
2011 uprisings were a “Social Media Revolution” is erroneous, it is undoubtedly 
clear that social media did in fact play a role in the size of the 2011 uprisings, the 
reaction to the 2011 uprisings, and the aftermath of those uprisings. This opens up 
an avenue from which other areas of the world in the midst of regime change or 
uprisings can be analysed in the light of the ubiquity of social media, whether 
these are closer to home - as in the case of Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon and 
Sudan - or further out geographically and culturally as in Armenia, Hong Kong, 
and the “Latin American Spring”.  
 
 
Regarding the wider applicability of the research conducted in this thesis, there 
are many factors to be considered. First, the concern highlighted by Kabbanji 
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(2011) - that researchers within the social sciences have a tendency to focus on 
the elites and middle class, on the political authorities, and on the centres of 
demonstration - may be alleviated to an extent. This thesis builds on a body of 
work that focuses not on those elites, but on the segments of society that have 
been ignored in previous studies. This method - while it is only one method from 
myriad others - may be duplicated in studies of similar geographic areas with 
similar cultural heritages to achieve the same results. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the idea that social media can lead to changes in interaction norms 
and expansion of social capital is one that should be given particular emphasis. 
Disconnection, especially in this era when a variety of methods exist to alleviate 
(or entirely abolish) the idea of disconnection, is a topic that has potential. The 
ubiquity of social media, and the changes it may have caused in rural areas that 
were previously disconnected, is a relatively new consideration; social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter have not yet reached their 
twentieth year. As such, the study of the effect of these platforms on society, 
interaction norms, public spheres, and social capital will only continue to grow. 
This thesis points to one avenue in which they can be studied, but there are many 
more.  
On that note, throughout this thesis, agenda setting has been discussed as a 
significant theory for any analysis of the media landscape. This media technique, 
it has been shown, is being used in Egypt. However, due to changes in 
technology, as discussed in the literature review, the methods of agenda setting 
are also changing. It has become easier to identify the common thoughts, 
concerns, and desires of citizens due to their ability to create content and share it 
online. Moreover, any attempt to counteract this content creation and sharing is 
fraught with difficulty. Within this study, it has been shown that agenda setting 
was embedded within the regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi, both 
directly through control of printing presses and indirectly as regards to a culture 
of fear, bureaucracy, and legal limitations within the media sphere. However, due 
to the changes that have occurred in the media environment, this is an area that 
deserves its own research since further study will clearly allow for a greater 
understanding of the interaction between agenda setting, authoritarian states, and 
a media landscape shaped by changing technology. In particular, regarding Egypt, 
the period of this thesis proves insufficient for answering this question. Between 
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2011 and 2015, Egypt’s media landscape (as has been shown) was in a state of 
change, and continues to be in one. A longer study, taking into consideration the 
period beyond 2015, could prove beneficial for a greater understanding of the 
importance of agenda setting and the impact of changing technology.  
 
However, despite the above discussion of the findings and wider applicability 
of this research, it is important to note that this research (like all research) has its 
limitations. The most obvious of these limitations relates to the findings of the 
research: they are specific to the cultural, historical, and socio-political realities of 
rural Egypt. As such, while they may point to patterns or trends that may exist in 
other areas, no finding can be considered without taking into account the context 
of rural Egypt. In a wider sense, this research is also limited by its focus on a 
particular level of urbanisation. Egypt’s population, as has been noted throughout, 
is largely rural. Many of the findings in this thesis assess the importance of 
Egypt’s rural population in light of the fact that it makes up a majority of the 
population, and that an event as nationally significant as the 2011 uprisings were 
to Egypt would likely impact them. As such, a focus on a state that is largely 
urban may not reach the same conclusions and, in fact, may not deal with the 
same concerns whatsoever. 
 
More generally, it is important to note that, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
findings of this research were based on qualitative data gathered in the form of 
semi-structured interviews, wherein some themes were considered (and 
confirmed or refuted) beforehand and other themes emerged naturally from the 
discourse that occurred. As Chapter 3 highlights, this came with several benefits; 
however, one limitation is that there is no formulaic approach to implement if one 
wishes to conduct the same research in another geographic region. The research 
developed organically and, as such, is based on the contributions of those 
individuals who were selected for interviews and accepted. There is no guarantee 
that this effort could be duplicated. A second limitation lies in the fact that, being 
based on semi-structured interviews in rural areas, any researcher must deal with 
the linguistic and cultural barriers that arise in that context and the consequences 
of that. As Abu-Lughod (1986) states, the “degree of contact individuals [from 
these regions] had with those outside the community varied tremendously.” This 
271 
may be due to personal avoidance, circumstances, disinterest, infrastructural 
barriers, cultural traditions as in the case of Upper Egypt, or anything else. This 
leads to a situation wherein contact, communication, and the development of a 
thesis is made difficult. 
 
Finally, the very nature of semi-structured interviews brings with it a focus on 
the opinions, thoughts, and recollections of those involved in the events 
themselves. While this is beneficial in the sense that the topic being discussed 
was social media as relating to interaction norms and the public sphere, it also 
comes with the potential cost to accuracy that arises from asking individuals to 
remember events that occurred over five or eight years earlier, and to distinguish 
between occurrences that were sometimes separated by hours or days. In this 
case, secondary data and previous academic research proves useful. However, for 
events that did not achieve as much media attention as the Arab Spring, this may 
be an issue.  
 
In any case, given these findings, there are some implications for further study 
of this subject that should be considered. The first of these is the change in social 
capital, and whether the pattern that this thesis has elaborated on - of the local 
social capital moving towards the classical conventional definition - continued 
after 2015. Given the unique socio-political and geographical features of rural 
Egypt, and the difference between each region, a study of whether social media 
use helped develop a conventional social capital from its unique counterpart 
would be a study that is fascinating for the field. Another subject that may 
warrant consideration, related to this one, is whether this normalisation of digital 
media for political interaction has continued (or even been enhanced) in the 
aftermath of the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, and how this 
newfound connection between rural and urban citizens has impacted political 
interaction following 2015. Similarly, further research may consider the manner 
in which the newfound acceptance of social media has impacted the state media 
of Egypt. As mentioned, even in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, state media 
remained characterized by state censorship, self-censorship, bureaucracy to limit 
the creation of new channels, threats of imprisonment, and a culture of fear. 
However, given two separate and successful uprisings to oust two separate 
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regimes, it may be worthwhile to consider whether the state’s institutions - 
namely, the media in this case - adjusted given the population’s view of their 
untrustworthiness. 
 
Finally, one element that deserves its own study is the role of transnational 
media. While Aljazeera has been mentioned throughout this thesis as an example 
of a transnational “leading news channel in the Middle East,” (Yehia, 2011), it is 
not the only transnational news channel that played a role during the uprisings. It 
has been focused on primarily due to the fact it was strongly entrenched in Egypt 
as a news source during the time, and as a strong source to contrast against state 
media. Other studies have been conducted to highlight the unique way in which  
Al Jazeera portrayed the uprisings, and the effect this had on news practices 
within the Middle East. However, other transnational news channels such as BBC 
Arabic and Al Arabiya also played a role. This is area deserves further study for 
three reasons: (i) the reliance on Al Jazeera within Egypt as a trustworthy source 
of news decreased significantly in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, as 
mentioned briefly in this thesis, potentially opening up space for other 
transnational news channels to impact the sphere, (ii) even during the period 
between 2011 and 2015, channels such as BBC Arabic and Al Arabiya played a 
role in highlighting the difference between state and transnational media which 
has not been discussed and, as such, the differences between their practices and 
those of Al Jazeera may provide significant insight into role of media in that 
period, and (iii) a significant period of time has elapsed since 2011, allowing 
room for more in-depth study on the impact of transnational media channels such 
as BBC Arabic and Al Arabiya in the aftermath of the 2013 uprisings. Given this, 
the role of transnational media should be considered as an avenue for further 
research.  
 
In any case, it has become clear that a number of profound transformations did 
take place in Egypt after the 2011 uprisings, but they were mainly visible in 
people’s collective consciousness, because they realised the power they held 
together. Social media - along with some private satellite television channels, 
newspaper publications and some individual courageous professional journalists - 
empowered the people, including those from rural areas, to take action and to 
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fight for their rights. However, it was the social capital of the region that 
determined, executed, and followed through on this.  
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11. Appendix 
11.1. Themes Framework 
Within this Appendix, examples of the theme Framework used in this thesis 
will be shown. These examples provide an overview of the themes that were 
considered for the analysis of this paper, and act as the primary evidence from 
which the three central research questions were considered. The intention of this 
appendix is to allow for a greater understanding for how the interviewee data 
used in this thesis was collected, organized, and then synthesized in order to 
formulate the analysis that forms the basis of this thesis. 
The four overarching themes that were considered prior to the outset of the 
thesis were: (i) political engagement before and after the uprisings, (ii) trust in 
media before and after the uprisings, (iii) strength of social ties prior to, and in the 
aftermath of, the uprisings, and (iv) convergence within the media in the 
aftermath of the uprisings. In terms of all four of these themes, changes that 
occurred in the aftermath of the 2011 and 2013 uprisings were considered, with 
each being considered separately after the interview data was collected.. 
The two themes that arose naturally as a result of the semi-structured 
interviews were: (i) the normalization of social media, and (ii) the expansion of 
social capital. These themes, as mentioned, were not conceived of prior to the 
interviews. However, the interview data highlighted clearly that these were 
considerations that needed to be taken into account. 
Thus, this appendix serves as an example of the manner in which all these 
themes were considered, and should be taken as a sample of a larger undertaking. 
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11.1.1. Themes Considered Beforehand 
11.1.1.1. Political Engagement Before & After the Uprisings 
 
 Parliamentary vs. 
Presidential Elections 
Social Capital & 
Political Engagement 
  Interviewee (Gov) Quote Quote 
South Sinai B 
“parliamentary elections 
have always been a major 
event even before the 
uprisings, yet presidential 
elections have become 
more important after the 
uprisings” 
“during parliamentary 
elections prior 2011 and 
after as well I always 
spent time with people 
that live in my 
neighborhood to explain 
to them the benefits of 
voting and who is the 
suitable candidate in the 
area because they trusted 
me and did not 
necessarily understand 
all the aspects related to 
the elections so 
sometimes needed 
guidance and 
explanation” 
Qalyoubia H “residents of Qalyoubia are 
always very keen on 
choosing their 
parliemantary candidate 
because it is part of the 
history for them since years 
unlike presidential 
elections” 
“social connections are 
related to political events 
and voting for many 
people in Qalyoubia 
including me” 
Minya A “parliemantary elections is 
an event that I grew finding 
my family and people 
around us very involved in” 
“due to our isolated area 
and distance from Cairo 
social conections are 
major in relation to 
politics because reaching 
the government is hard 
without the 
parliamentary 
represenatative” 
 
332 
11.1.1.2. Trust in Media Before & After the Uprisings 
 
Interviewee State Media vs. 
Private Media 
Social Media vs. 
State Media 
The Use of Social 
Media by 
Traditional 
Media 
 Qalyoubia A “satellite channels 
are less controlled 
in comparison to 
state channels” 
“social media 
allowed more 
information 
compared to state 
channels that 
were converged 
via satellite 
channels” 
“heard about 
social media 
pages on satellite 
channels” 
South Sinai F “satellite channels 
showed more 
detailed and true 
information than 
state channels” 
“social media 
updates were on 
television as well” 
“heard about 
social media 
updates from 
satellite channels” 
Menoufia A “I avoided 
watching state 
channels because 
all the 
information was 
on satellite 
channels” 
“social media 
connected 
Egyptians so was 
different in 
comparison to 
state channels” 
“first social media 
page I joined was 
Khalid Said  
Minya B “preferred 
satellite channels 
because they were 
more updated 
than state 
channels” 
“state channels 
did not show any 
social media 
updates” 
“first social media 
page I accessed 
was Khalid Said” 
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11.1.1.3. Strength in Social Ties Before & After the Uprisings 
 
 Community Politics & 
Parliamentary 
Elections 
 Qalyoubia H  “heads of families 
always discuss political 
decisions” 
“parliamentary elections 
are a major event for 
families because they 
want someone with a 
history in the area that 
knows all about it” 
South Sinai B  “heads of tribes rotate 
for parliementary 
elections due to the tribal 
nature we live in” 
“the relation between 
tribes allows the rotation 
for elections” 
Menoufia I “voting for familiar 
candidate in 
parliemantary elections 
is very important” 
“the parliemantary 
candidate voted for 
normally is someone 
familiar with our area 
and needs” 
Minya F “Minya is a secluded 
part and our social 
connections is what 
makes us powerful as a 
community when we 
need to” 
“parliamentary elections 
resemble importance to 
get our needs done 
through our candidate” 
 
11.1.1.4. Convergence In the Media After the 2011 Uprisings 
 2011 & Convergence 2013 & Convergence 
 Qalyoubia B “heard about social 
media updates from my 
campaign manager but 
was my first time to 
know about it” 
“I became more familiar 
about finding about 
social media updates but 
through younger people 
around me” 
South Sinai A “social media updates on 
television were 
happening but were not 
relying on it completely” 
“social media became 
more normal and used 
by 2013 uprisings” 
334 
Menoufia C “my family members 
started using social 
media” 
“by 2013 social media 
became more natural for 
them” 
Minya E “television was the main 
news source” 
“social media became as 
normal as television by 
2013” 
 
11.1.2. Themes That Arose Naturally 
11.1.2.1. The Normalization of Social Media 
Governorates 2011 2013 
 Qalyoubia I “started using social 
media constantly for 
politics not 
entertainment only” 
“became more used to 
use it for politics in 2013 
uprisings” 
South Sinai E “social media was still 
new for politics” 
“became more normal to 
use it for politics in 
2013” 
Minya B  “social media was a new 
media form” 
“social media was much 
more common in 2013” 
Menoufia E “was too busy for social 
media in 2011” 
“started using it after 
2012” 
 
11.1.2.2. The Expansion of Social Capital 
 Bridging Engagement in 
Presidential 
Elections 
Discussion with 
Strangers 
 South Sinai F “feeling that all 
Egyptians were 
connected 
whether via social 
media or 
convergence of 
medias 
encouraging flow 
of 
communicating” 
“people were 
more encouraged 
to participate in 
presidential 
elections after 
2011 uprisings” 
“discussing 
politics became 
more common 
after 2011 
uprisings” 
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Minya A “meeting and 
discussing politics 
with people you 
don’t know 
allowed people to 
make new 
relationship” 
“presidential 
elections became 
an important after 
2011 uprisings” 
“talking to 
strangers about 
politics became 
more normal” 
Qalyoubia I “making new 
relationships out 
of Qalyoubia 
whether from 
Tahrir Square or 
social media was 
a new addition” 
“definitely I was 
more encouraged 
to join and vote in 
presidential 
elections because 
I felt my voice 
will make a 
difference” 
“after the 2011 
uprisings it 
became normal to 
discuss politics 
even with people 
you don’t know 
not just family” 
Menoufia L “feeling that all 
Egyptians are 
speaking about 
same issues and 
discussing it was 
the achievement 
of the uprisings” 
“presidential 
elections became 
more important 
after 2011 unlike 
before the 
uprisings” 
“the fact that 
presidential 
elections became 
more important 
encouraged 
people to 
communicate 
about politics 
more even with 
strangers” 
 
 
 
 
